Event Notification Report for September 09, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/08/2013 - 09/09/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
49371493324933449335
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49371
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE KLEVORN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE KLEVORN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 09/20/2013
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2013
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Notification Time: 14:40 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2013
Event Time: 17:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNANALYZED LEAKAGE OF CONTAINMENT SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVE CONTROLLED LEAKAGE DEVICES
"On September 9, 2013, during the A1R17 Braidwood Station Unit 1 refueling outage, the as-found leakage of the controlled leakage devices (1RH01SA and 1RH01SB) for the safety injection (SI) system ECCS sump containment isolation valves (1SI8811A and 1SI8811B) were determined to not be 'leak tight' as described in the UFSAR. Since there was only minor leakage from the isolation valves or the associated residual heat (RH) system piping (1-2 drops/month from 1SI8811A and no leakage from 1SI8811B), there was no actual impact on offsite dose or long-term ECCS operation. However, further evaluation has concluded that there was a potential to exceed the assumed leakage limits of the Alternate Source Term (AST) calculation.
"The RH system is classified as a closed system outside containment meaning the system is designed to accommodate a single active failure (i.e., the failure of the 1SI8811B valve to close) and still maintain an adequate isolation barrier to release recirculation water outside containment. The encapsulation device is intended to capture and limit leakage from a potential leak in the 1SI8811A/B or piping. The controlled leakage device is built to the same standards as the remainder of the RH system recirculation water outside containment. The design function is to limit potential offsite dose due to leakage of recirculation water outside containment. This is not a specified safety function and there are no Technical Specification requirements for these devices. The encapsulation devices do not perform a containment function and are not a principle safety barrier. As there was only minor ECCS system leakage at the time of discovery, there was no impact on past offsite dose or long-term ECCS operation.
"This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) since the as-found leakage of the controlled leakage devices could have allowed RH leakage to exceed the calculated limits for ECCS systems outside containment.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
* * * RETRACTION FROM RANDY RAHRIG TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1556 EDT ON 10/31/13 * * *
"Retraction of ENS 49371 dated 9/09/2013:
"The purpose of this report is to retract ENS report #49371 (September 9, 2013). This report was made during Braidwood's refueling outage (A1R17) for the as-found leakage on the controlled leakage devices (1RH01SA and 1RH01SB) for the safety injection (SI) system ECCS sump containment isolation valves (1SI8811A and 1SI8811B) that were determined not to be 'leak tight' as described in the UFSAR. When the ENS notification was made on 9/9/2013, the station determined that there was a potential to exceed the assumed leakage limits of the alternate source term (AST) calculation. The ENS notification was made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"At 1500 CDT on Thursday, October 17, 2013, the Braidwood Generating Station concluded that the prior ENS notification could be retracted based on the completion of Revision 2 of calculation BRW-13-0135-M, '1/2RH01SA/B Leak Rate Conversion and Test Pressure Determination'.
"The as-found pressure test results for the 1RH01SA and 1RH01SB valve containment assemblies would not have resulted in a total ECCS leakage outside containment in excess of that assumed in the AST dose calculation BRW-04-0038-M, 'Re-Analysis of Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Using Alternate Source Terms (AST)'.
"The as-found valve containment assembly (VCA) pressure test results did not result in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Daley).
"On September 9, 2013, during the A1R17 Braidwood Station Unit 1 refueling outage, the as-found leakage of the controlled leakage devices (1RH01SA and 1RH01SB) for the safety injection (SI) system ECCS sump containment isolation valves (1SI8811A and 1SI8811B) were determined to not be 'leak tight' as described in the UFSAR. Since there was only minor leakage from the isolation valves or the associated residual heat (RH) system piping (1-2 drops/month from 1SI8811A and no leakage from 1SI8811B), there was no actual impact on offsite dose or long-term ECCS operation. However, further evaluation has concluded that there was a potential to exceed the assumed leakage limits of the Alternate Source Term (AST) calculation.
"The RH system is classified as a closed system outside containment meaning the system is designed to accommodate a single active failure (i.e., the failure of the 1SI8811B valve to close) and still maintain an adequate isolation barrier to release recirculation water outside containment. The encapsulation device is intended to capture and limit leakage from a potential leak in the 1SI8811A/B or piping. The controlled leakage device is built to the same standards as the remainder of the RH system recirculation water outside containment. The design function is to limit potential offsite dose due to leakage of recirculation water outside containment. This is not a specified safety function and there are no Technical Specification requirements for these devices. The encapsulation devices do not perform a containment function and are not a principle safety barrier. As there was only minor ECCS system leakage at the time of discovery, there was no impact on past offsite dose or long-term ECCS operation.
"This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) since the as-found leakage of the controlled leakage devices could have allowed RH leakage to exceed the calculated limits for ECCS systems outside containment.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
* * * RETRACTION FROM RANDY RAHRIG TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1556 EDT ON 10/31/13 * * *
"Retraction of ENS 49371 dated 9/09/2013:
"The purpose of this report is to retract ENS report #49371 (September 9, 2013). This report was made during Braidwood's refueling outage (A1R17) for the as-found leakage on the controlled leakage devices (1RH01SA and 1RH01SB) for the safety injection (SI) system ECCS sump containment isolation valves (1SI8811A and 1SI8811B) that were determined not to be 'leak tight' as described in the UFSAR. When the ENS notification was made on 9/9/2013, the station determined that there was a potential to exceed the assumed leakage limits of the alternate source term (AST) calculation. The ENS notification was made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"At 1500 CDT on Thursday, October 17, 2013, the Braidwood Generating Station concluded that the prior ENS notification could be retracted based on the completion of Revision 2 of calculation BRW-13-0135-M, '1/2RH01SA/B Leak Rate Conversion and Test Pressure Determination'.
"The as-found pressure test results for the 1RH01SA and 1RH01SB valve containment assemblies would not have resulted in a total ECCS leakage outside containment in excess of that assumed in the AST dose calculation BRW-04-0038-M, 'Re-Analysis of Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) Using Alternate Source Terms (AST)'.
"The as-found valve containment assembly (VCA) pressure test results did not result in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R3DO (Daley).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49332
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: QUOC VO
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: QUOC VO
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 09/09/2013
Notification Time: 07:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2013
Event Time: 04:07 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2013
Notification Time: 07:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2013
Event Time: 04:07 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
MAINTENANCE ON TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER / OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION
"Scheduled maintenance of the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) HVAC system for maintenance on the Air Handler (AMA-AH-S1) recirculation fan, outside air duct heater, and thermostat will start at approximately 0400 hours PDT on 09/09/13 and will last approximately 40 hours (estimated time from equipment tag out back to OPERABLE). During this time the TSC and OSC will not be available for use to support emergency response activities. Established compensatory measures direct Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members normally responding to either of these facilities to respond to alternate locations. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by the scheduled TSC / OSC Facilities HVAC maintenance work.
"This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The resident inspector has been notified. A follow up notification will be made when HVAC maintenance to the TSC / OSC Facilities has been completed and operability of these EP Facilities has been restored."
* * * UPDATE FROM VERLE KESZLER TO PETE SNYDER AT 0823 EDT ON 9/15/13 * * *
"Scheduled maintenance of the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) HVAC system is completed. The HVAC system has been returned to service and declared functional at 05:05 PDT on 9/15/13.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R4DO (Hay).
"Scheduled maintenance of the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) HVAC system for maintenance on the Air Handler (AMA-AH-S1) recirculation fan, outside air duct heater, and thermostat will start at approximately 0400 hours PDT on 09/09/13 and will last approximately 40 hours (estimated time from equipment tag out back to OPERABLE). During this time the TSC and OSC will not be available for use to support emergency response activities. Established compensatory measures direct Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members normally responding to either of these facilities to respond to alternate locations. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by the scheduled TSC / OSC Facilities HVAC maintenance work.
"This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The resident inspector has been notified. A follow up notification will be made when HVAC maintenance to the TSC / OSC Facilities has been completed and operability of these EP Facilities has been restored."
* * * UPDATE FROM VERLE KESZLER TO PETE SNYDER AT 0823 EDT ON 9/15/13 * * *
"Scheduled maintenance of the Technical Support Center (TSC) / Operations Support Center (OSC) HVAC system is completed. The HVAC system has been returned to service and declared functional at 05:05 PDT on 9/15/13.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified R4DO (Hay).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49334
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEREMEY COBBS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEREMEY COBBS
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 09/09/2013
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2013
Event Time: 13:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2013
Notification Time: 16:05 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2013
Event Time: 13:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANNED PARTIAL LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY IN TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER
"This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a planned loss of communications capability at the DCPP Technical Support Center (TSC). This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because planned maintenance affects the functionality of some TSC communications systems.
"Planned maintenance activities on the TSC communications systems begins 09/09/13. The work includes removing phones and normal business use computers from service to support a minor remodel which includes the installation of new furniture and painting in the TSC command room. The communications equipment scope of work is confined to the TSC command room only and there is no expected loss of capability in the engineering, administrative or radiological rooms within the TSC. There is no expected loss of plant display systems (SPDS, ERDS, or ERFDS) in the TSC during this planned maintenance. The work is scheduled to complete by 09/26/2013.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. A select group of TSC ERO personnel have been pre-designated to respond to their backup TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures. If a complete relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Site Emergency Coordinator will relocate the remaining TSC staff to a backup location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization teams have been notified of the planned maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This planned maintenance poses no threat to the public or station employees."
* * * UPDATE FROM ADAM PECK TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1704 EDT ON 9/19/13 * * *
"The planned maintenance on the TSC communications systems is complete. DCPP restored the emergency response communications capability at 1400 PDT on September 19, 2013."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Deese).
"This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a planned loss of communications capability at the DCPP Technical Support Center (TSC). This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because planned maintenance affects the functionality of some TSC communications systems.
"Planned maintenance activities on the TSC communications systems begins 09/09/13. The work includes removing phones and normal business use computers from service to support a minor remodel which includes the installation of new furniture and painting in the TSC command room. The communications equipment scope of work is confined to the TSC command room only and there is no expected loss of capability in the engineering, administrative or radiological rooms within the TSC. There is no expected loss of plant display systems (SPDS, ERDS, or ERFDS) in the TSC during this planned maintenance. The work is scheduled to complete by 09/26/2013.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. A select group of TSC ERO personnel have been pre-designated to respond to their backup TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures. If a complete relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Site Emergency Coordinator will relocate the remaining TSC staff to a backup location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization teams have been notified of the planned maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This planned maintenance poses no threat to the public or station employees."
* * * UPDATE FROM ADAM PECK TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1704 EDT ON 9/19/13 * * *
"The planned maintenance on the TSC communications systems is complete. DCPP restored the emergency response communications capability at 1400 PDT on September 19, 2013."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Deese).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49335
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RONALD BLENKER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RONALD BLENKER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/09/2013
Notification Time: 22:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2013
Event Time: 14:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2013
Notification Time: 22:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/09/2013
Event Time: 14:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK BARRIER IMPROPERLY OBSTRUCTED
"At 1400 [CDT] on September 9, 2013, plant personnel found HELB barrier HATCH-1/TB blocked. The hatch is diamond plate steel located on the turbine floor. Pallets, a fan and a gantry were positioned on top of the hatch possibly preventing pressure relief during a HELB event. This issue is being reported as an unanalyzed condition per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). All items were removed from the hatch by 1800 on September 9, 2013."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM JEREMY TANNER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1118 EDT ON 10/04/13 * * *
"The licensee reviewed the design basis calculations and analyses for HELB events in the area where Hatch-1/TB is located. The review determined that it is acceptable to block or hold Hatch-1/TB down and that the painted markings on the hatch are overly restrictive.
"In looking at HELB calculation of record, feed water break at the feed water pumps, there is no flow path modeled between the HELB volumes. Therefore, if Hatch-1/TB is blocked, the physical flow path is in accordance with the Gothic model of the HELB volume. Further, the analyses also indicated that no credit is taken for the hatch to relieve as no HELBs are postulated in the room under the hatch. Finally, Hatch 1/TB structural integrity was verified assuming a HELB occurred with the hatch blocked as described in notification 49335 (pallets, fan and gantry) the barrier would function as designed.
"Licensee initiated a Work Request to remove any markings on Hatch-l/TB that indicate do not block or hold down."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The Region 3 Duty Officer (Valos) was notified.
"At 1400 [CDT] on September 9, 2013, plant personnel found HELB barrier HATCH-1/TB blocked. The hatch is diamond plate steel located on the turbine floor. Pallets, a fan and a gantry were positioned on top of the hatch possibly preventing pressure relief during a HELB event. This issue is being reported as an unanalyzed condition per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). All items were removed from the hatch by 1800 on September 9, 2013."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM JEREMY TANNER TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1118 EDT ON 10/04/13 * * *
"The licensee reviewed the design basis calculations and analyses for HELB events in the area where Hatch-1/TB is located. The review determined that it is acceptable to block or hold Hatch-1/TB down and that the painted markings on the hatch are overly restrictive.
"In looking at HELB calculation of record, feed water break at the feed water pumps, there is no flow path modeled between the HELB volumes. Therefore, if Hatch-1/TB is blocked, the physical flow path is in accordance with the Gothic model of the HELB volume. Further, the analyses also indicated that no credit is taken for the hatch to relieve as no HELBs are postulated in the room under the hatch. Finally, Hatch 1/TB structural integrity was verified assuming a HELB occurred with the hatch blocked as described in notification 49335 (pallets, fan and gantry) the barrier would function as designed.
"Licensee initiated a Work Request to remove any markings on Hatch-l/TB that indicate do not block or hold down."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The Region 3 Duty Officer (Valos) was notified.