Event Notification Report for September 05, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/04/2013 - 09/05/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
49326493274932349324
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49326
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MASON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MASON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/06/2013
Notification Time: 00:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2013
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2013
Notification Time: 00:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2013
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEMS
"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. Conditions were discovered which appear to require immediate NRC notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) due to both trains of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water [CCW] being inoperable several times since 7/27/2012. A deficiency was identified with Auxiliary Component Cooling Water valve ACCW-126A, which is a part of the ultimate heat sink system, associated with the inability to adequately close this valve manually, locally, in order to preserve Wet Cooling Tower A inventory during an accident. System operability requirements came into question and resulted in Operations declaring the system inoperable on 9/4/2013 at 1509 CDT, and entering Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.7.3 and associated cascading TS. As part of the review for NRC reporting requirements associated with the inoperable CCW Train A, historical information was discovered that indicated the redundant train of CCW, Train B, was declared inoperable several times, while ACCW-126A was presumably in the degraded or inoperable condition, since ACCW-126A had last been rebuilt on 7/27/2012. This condition requires immediate reporting to NRC under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. The condition was corrected and the system declared operable on 9/5/2013 at 1231 CDT, exiting the CCW TS LCO and associated cascading TS.
"Prior to the condition with ACCW-126A being corrected, a snubber pin (FWSR-60) was found missing on 9/5/2013 at 1228 CDT that could have adversely affected the ability to feed Steam Generator #2 with Emergency Feedwater. Less than 4 hours later, the pin was replaced, which restored the path to operable at 1609 CDT on 9/5/2013.
"The plant remained stable at 100% during this time. Plant risk index was 10.0 green."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3. Conditions were discovered which appear to require immediate NRC notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) due to both trains of Auxiliary Component Cooling Water [CCW] being inoperable several times since 7/27/2012. A deficiency was identified with Auxiliary Component Cooling Water valve ACCW-126A, which is a part of the ultimate heat sink system, associated with the inability to adequately close this valve manually, locally, in order to preserve Wet Cooling Tower A inventory during an accident. System operability requirements came into question and resulted in Operations declaring the system inoperable on 9/4/2013 at 1509 CDT, and entering Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.7.3 and associated cascading TS. As part of the review for NRC reporting requirements associated with the inoperable CCW Train A, historical information was discovered that indicated the redundant train of CCW, Train B, was declared inoperable several times, while ACCW-126A was presumably in the degraded or inoperable condition, since ACCW-126A had last been rebuilt on 7/27/2012. This condition requires immediate reporting to NRC under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. The condition was corrected and the system declared operable on 9/5/2013 at 1231 CDT, exiting the CCW TS LCO and associated cascading TS.
"Prior to the condition with ACCW-126A being corrected, a snubber pin (FWSR-60) was found missing on 9/5/2013 at 1228 CDT that could have adversely affected the ability to feed Steam Generator #2 with Emergency Feedwater. Less than 4 hours later, the pin was replaced, which restored the path to operable at 1609 CDT on 9/5/2013.
"The plant remained stable at 100% during this time. Plant risk index was 10.0 green."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49327
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MATT HUMMER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MATT HUMMER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/06/2013
Notification Time: 05:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2013
Event Time: 22:44 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2013
Notification Time: 05:10 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2013
Event Time: 22:44 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TURBINE BUILDING STACK RADIATION MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE
"At 2244 PDT on September 5, 2013, the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Low Range detector, and the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector were declared non-functional due to a failure of the sample rack supply fan.
"At 0156 hours PDT on September 6, 2013, a temporary sample cart was installed to return the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Low Range detector, and the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector to service.
"To compensate for the loss of assessment capability while the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitoring equipment was nonfunctional, a field team survey would have been used if required.
"This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"At 2244 PDT on September 5, 2013, the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Low Range detector, and the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector were declared non-functional due to a failure of the sample rack supply fan.
"At 0156 hours PDT on September 6, 2013, a temporary sample cart was installed to return the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Low Range detector, and the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitor - Intermediate Range detector to service.
"To compensate for the loss of assessment capability while the Turbine Building Stack Radiation Monitoring equipment was nonfunctional, a field team survey would have been used if required.
"This event is being reported as a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49323
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ERVIN LYSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ERVIN LYSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/05/2013
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2013
Event Time: 13:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2013
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2013
Event Time: 13:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/05/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 45 | Power Operation |
FAILURE TO ALIGN CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY DURING TESTING
"CCNPP [Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant] U2 CEA [Control Element Assembly] #27 fully inserted (CEA dropped) into the core during testing per STP 0-029-2. Technical Specification 3.1.4, Action B was entered and required the CEA to be realigned within 2 hours. With this action not met Technical Specification 3.1.4, Action C required the Unit be reduced to < 70% rated thermal power (achieved at 1308 [EDT]) and the CEA to be realigned within 2 hours.
"With the CEA being unable to be realigned, Technical Specification 3.1.4.F was entered at 1314 [EDT] which requires the Unit to be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours.
"A plant shutdown has been initiated in accordance with this Technical Specification. Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications.'"
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"CCNPP [Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant] U2 CEA [Control Element Assembly] #27 fully inserted (CEA dropped) into the core during testing per STP 0-029-2. Technical Specification 3.1.4, Action B was entered and required the CEA to be realigned within 2 hours. With this action not met Technical Specification 3.1.4, Action C required the Unit be reduced to < 70% rated thermal power (achieved at 1308 [EDT]) and the CEA to be realigned within 2 hours.
"With the CEA being unable to be realigned, Technical Specification 3.1.4.F was entered at 1314 [EDT] which requires the Unit to be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours.
"A plant shutdown has been initiated in accordance with this Technical Specification. Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications.'"
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49324
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID SPARGO
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: DAVID SPARGO
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/05/2013
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2013
Event Time: 08:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Notification Time: 17:31 [ET]
Event Date: 09/05/2013
Event Time: 08:31 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
VINCENT GADDY (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
POTENTIAL LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PUMP RUN OUT CONDITION
"Current design basis calculations indicate the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pumps could potentially operate in a run-out condition under certain worst case design basis conditions. The LPSI pumps could operate in a run-out condition beyond the analyzed time by 20 minutes. Current design basis calculation assumes LPSI Pump would be shutdown by [the] RAS [Recirculation Actuation Signal] in less than one hour, however due to past changes to Containment Spray Pump Start Logic, the time was lengthened to 80 minutes which is beyond the one hour analyzed. This represents a reportable unanalyzed condition."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM LUKE JENSEN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1722 EDT ON 10/31/13 * * *
"Fort Calhoun completed additional analysis which verified that the LPSI pumps will not go into run-out as previously reported. Therefore Fort Calhoun is withdrawing the event notification."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Drake).
"Current design basis calculations indicate the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pumps could potentially operate in a run-out condition under certain worst case design basis conditions. The LPSI pumps could operate in a run-out condition beyond the analyzed time by 20 minutes. Current design basis calculation assumes LPSI Pump would be shutdown by [the] RAS [Recirculation Actuation Signal] in less than one hour, however due to past changes to Containment Spray Pump Start Logic, the time was lengthened to 80 minutes which is beyond the one hour analyzed. This represents a reportable unanalyzed condition."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM LUKE JENSEN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1722 EDT ON 10/31/13 * * *
"Fort Calhoun completed additional analysis which verified that the LPSI pumps will not go into run-out as previously reported. Therefore Fort Calhoun is withdrawing the event notification."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Drake).