Event Notification Report for August 13, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/12/2013 - 08/13/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
492784927949340492724927549276
Agreement State
Event Number: 49278
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: STANFORD State: CA
County:
License #: NOT PROVIDED
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: STANFORD State: CA
County:
License #: NOT PROVIDED
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 08/13/2013
Notification Time: 21:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2013
Notification Time: 21:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CONTAMINATION LIMITS ON PACKAGE EXCEEDED
The following Agreement State report was received via email.
"[The California Department of Public Health / Radiation Health Branch was notified that Stanford University received a package containing Radium 223 from Cardinal Health in Denver, Colorado and the package indicated removable contamination of 400 DPM of technetium 99 on the package. The following information was provided:
"The caller stated, that a package was received at the Nuclear Medicine Department and the package had a reading of 400 DPM which exceeds the Dept. of Transportation limits. Caller stated the package has been isolated and secured in the appropriate area and the carrier notified. Caller stated that the package will be at normal readings tomorrow.
"Cardinal Health, in Denver, was notified and will investigate this issue. RHB California will report additional information."
The following Agreement State report was received via email.
"[The California Department of Public Health / Radiation Health Branch was notified that Stanford University received a package containing Radium 223 from Cardinal Health in Denver, Colorado and the package indicated removable contamination of 400 DPM of technetium 99 on the package. The following information was provided:
"The caller stated, that a package was received at the Nuclear Medicine Department and the package had a reading of 400 DPM which exceeds the Dept. of Transportation limits. Caller stated the package has been isolated and secured in the appropriate area and the carrier notified. Caller stated that the package will be at normal readings tomorrow.
"Cardinal Health, in Denver, was notified and will investigate this issue. RHB California will report additional information."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 49279
Facility: AREVA NP INC RICHLAND
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: CALVIN MANNING
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: CALVIN MANNING
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 08/14/2013
Notification Time: 12:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: 22:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2013
Notification Time: 12:32 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: 22:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(5) - ONLY ONE SAFETY ITEM AVAILABLE
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (a)(5) - ONLY ONE SAFETY ITEM AVAILABLE
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
PETER HABIGHORST (NMSS)
VALVE FAILED TO CLOSE AS REQUIRED ON LOW TEMPERATURE INTERLOCK
"At 2230 [PDT] on 8/13/2013, AREVA Richland Dry Conversion Operations notified AREVA Safety personnel that a low temperature interlock on one of the uranium hexafluoride (UF6) headers activated and that the valve, HV1-1054, did not close as required, and therefore the process has been shut down pending investigation. The system remains down and will remain down pending thorough investigation and appropriate corrective actions.
"The low temperature interlock is not an IROFS [Item Relied on for Safety]. However, further investigation this morning determined the valve, HV1-1054, impacted the function of four IROFS, which would not have performed as required. Of these four, two were found to be used in accident sequences that only credited one additional IROFS for nuclear criticality accident sequences. In each of the cases accidental nuclear criticality remained highly unlikely due to the robustness of the remaining IROFS and the low occurrence frequency of the initiating event.
"Operating with only one IROFS to protect against accidental nuclear criticality is reported within one hour of discovery under 10CFR70 Appendix A criterion (a)(5). AREVA determined that this criterion had been met at approximately 0900 [PDT, on 8/14/2013]. It is estimated that this particular process line had operated for less than 100 hours in this condition."
The licensee has notified NRC Region II.
* * * UPDATE AT 1526 EDT ON 9/6/13 FROM CALVIN MANNING TO PETE SNYDER * * *
"Based on the following discussion, AREVA formally withdraws the notification made in NRC event report 49279 with this update.
"After careful review of this plant condition, the apparent causes and the extent of condition, AREVA NP has concluded that the plant condition that precipitated the initial notification did not meet the criteria for reporting to the NRC under 10CFR70 Appendix A. This conclusion is based primarily on the fact that closure of valve HV1-1054 (for UF6 isolation) was not required to meet the safety function specified by the IROFS credited to prevent the accident sequences related to this plant condition. Specifically, the temperature triggers for IROFS 1005, 1006, and 1018 each activate both the UF6 Isolation and the Reaction Gas Shutoff interlocks. The UF6 isolation interlock causes valve HVx-1054 to close. However, UF6 isolation was not required to meet the safety function specified for IROFS 1005, 1006, and 1018.
"AREVA was compliant with the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61 at all times during the condition reported to the NRC on 8/14/2013.
"A more detailed write-up of this conclusion was previously provided to NRC Region II and additional information will be provided to them later today [9/6/13]."
Notified R2DO (Ernstes) and NMSS (Guttmann).
"At 2230 [PDT] on 8/13/2013, AREVA Richland Dry Conversion Operations notified AREVA Safety personnel that a low temperature interlock on one of the uranium hexafluoride (UF6) headers activated and that the valve, HV1-1054, did not close as required, and therefore the process has been shut down pending investigation. The system remains down and will remain down pending thorough investigation and appropriate corrective actions.
"The low temperature interlock is not an IROFS [Item Relied on for Safety]. However, further investigation this morning determined the valve, HV1-1054, impacted the function of four IROFS, which would not have performed as required. Of these four, two were found to be used in accident sequences that only credited one additional IROFS for nuclear criticality accident sequences. In each of the cases accidental nuclear criticality remained highly unlikely due to the robustness of the remaining IROFS and the low occurrence frequency of the initiating event.
"Operating with only one IROFS to protect against accidental nuclear criticality is reported within one hour of discovery under 10CFR70 Appendix A criterion (a)(5). AREVA determined that this criterion had been met at approximately 0900 [PDT, on 8/14/2013]. It is estimated that this particular process line had operated for less than 100 hours in this condition."
The licensee has notified NRC Region II.
* * * UPDATE AT 1526 EDT ON 9/6/13 FROM CALVIN MANNING TO PETE SNYDER * * *
"Based on the following discussion, AREVA formally withdraws the notification made in NRC event report 49279 with this update.
"After careful review of this plant condition, the apparent causes and the extent of condition, AREVA NP has concluded that the plant condition that precipitated the initial notification did not meet the criteria for reporting to the NRC under 10CFR70 Appendix A. This conclusion is based primarily on the fact that closure of valve HV1-1054 (for UF6 isolation) was not required to meet the safety function specified by the IROFS credited to prevent the accident sequences related to this plant condition. Specifically, the temperature triggers for IROFS 1005, 1006, and 1018 each activate both the UF6 Isolation and the Reaction Gas Shutoff interlocks. The UF6 isolation interlock causes valve HVx-1054 to close. However, UF6 isolation was not required to meet the safety function specified for IROFS 1005, 1006, and 1018.
"AREVA was compliant with the performance requirements of 10CFR70.61 at all times during the condition reported to the NRC on 8/14/2013.
"A more detailed write-up of this conclusion was previously provided to NRC Region II and additional information will be provided to them later today [9/6/13]."
Notified R2DO (Ernstes) and NMSS (Guttmann).
Agreement State
Event Number: 49340
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BAKER HUGHES
Region: 4
City: BRIGHTON State: CO
County:
License #: CO RML#678-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHERI HALL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: BAKER HUGHES
Region: 4
City: BRIGHTON State: CO
County:
License #: CO RML#678-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CHERI HALL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 09/12/2013
Notification Time: 20:17 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2013
Notification Time: 20:17 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
MICHAEL HAY (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE - SCRAP METAL SHIPMENT CONTAINING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The following information was received via facsimile:
"On August 13, 2013, the Colorado State Department Public Health and Environment received a phone call from Western Metals Recycling indicating a need for a special permit to return a shipment of scrap metal flagged as containing radioactive materials by portal monitor alarms. The shipment originated at Baker Hughes of Brighton, Colorado (CO RML#678-01). The DOT Special Permit (#CO-CO-13-01) was issued on August 13, 2013, with a reading of 0.04 mrem/hr on the outside of the shipment.
"On August 15, 2013, the rolloff was returned to Baker Hughes, where they determined a number of valves and seats from a fluid end of a well fracking site contained the contamination. The Baker Hughes staff tracked the parts back to a site worked in conjunction with ProTechnics (CO RML#545-01) with radioactive tracer material. ProTechnics was contacted and offered to take possession of the material. Baker Hughes reported valves with readings ranging from 0.02 mrem/hr to 1 mrem/hr on contact.
"On August 19, 2013, the Colorado State Department Public Health and Environment's Health Physicists visited the Brighton location of Baker Hughes, where the material was being held, to meet with staff from both Baker Hughes and ProTechnics. The material was identified as Ir-192, using an Identifinder 2 detector, with a dose rate of 0.2 mrem/hr on contact with one of the valves. It was decided ProTechnics would take possession of all parts contaminated with radioactive material in order to decontaminate and store the waste for decay. An amendment or provisional license was necessary for either Western Metals Recycling or Baker Hughes.
"On August 26, 2013, the Colorado State Department Public Health and Environment received the survey reports from the Thompsen well site for the dates of concern. The survey reports showed no contamination was detected
"On August 30, 2013, the Colorado State Department Public Health and Environment received a full report from Protechnics indicating approximately 0.026 mCi of Ir-192 was recovered from the contaminated equipment and will be held for decay at their Fruita facilities.
"A Notice of Violation will be issued in response to this event."
Colorado State Incident Report I13-09.
The following information was received via facsimile:
"On August 13, 2013, the Colorado State Department Public Health and Environment received a phone call from Western Metals Recycling indicating a need for a special permit to return a shipment of scrap metal flagged as containing radioactive materials by portal monitor alarms. The shipment originated at Baker Hughes of Brighton, Colorado (CO RML#678-01). The DOT Special Permit (#CO-CO-13-01) was issued on August 13, 2013, with a reading of 0.04 mrem/hr on the outside of the shipment.
"On August 15, 2013, the rolloff was returned to Baker Hughes, where they determined a number of valves and seats from a fluid end of a well fracking site contained the contamination. The Baker Hughes staff tracked the parts back to a site worked in conjunction with ProTechnics (CO RML#545-01) with radioactive tracer material. ProTechnics was contacted and offered to take possession of the material. Baker Hughes reported valves with readings ranging from 0.02 mrem/hr to 1 mrem/hr on contact.
"On August 19, 2013, the Colorado State Department Public Health and Environment's Health Physicists visited the Brighton location of Baker Hughes, where the material was being held, to meet with staff from both Baker Hughes and ProTechnics. The material was identified as Ir-192, using an Identifinder 2 detector, with a dose rate of 0.2 mrem/hr on contact with one of the valves. It was decided ProTechnics would take possession of all parts contaminated with radioactive material in order to decontaminate and store the waste for decay. An amendment or provisional license was necessary for either Western Metals Recycling or Baker Hughes.
"On August 26, 2013, the Colorado State Department Public Health and Environment received the survey reports from the Thompsen well site for the dates of concern. The survey reports showed no contamination was detected
"On August 30, 2013, the Colorado State Department Public Health and Environment received a full report from Protechnics indicating approximately 0.026 mCi of Ir-192 was recovered from the contaminated equipment and will be held for decay at their Fruita facilities.
"A Notice of Violation will be issued in response to this event."
Colorado State Incident Report I13-09.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49272
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: NAVEEN KOTEEL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: NAVEEN KOTEEL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/13/2013
Notification Time: 07:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: 02:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2013
Notification Time: 07:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: 02:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION FAILURE
"A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 emergency response facilities action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to a failure to start of the TSC HVAC unit. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM NAVEEN KOTEEL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0744 EDT ON 8/15/13 * * *
The Technical Support Center HVAC system was returned to service at 1100 EDT on August 14, 2013. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Musser).
"A condition is being reported per Technical Requirements Manual 13.13.1 emergency response facilities action B.2. The functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) has been lost due to a failure to start of the TSC HVAC unit. Alternate facilities are available to provide emergency response functions and actions are proceeding to return the TSC to functional status with high priority. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM NAVEEN KOTEEL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0744 EDT ON 8/15/13 * * *
The Technical Support Center HVAC system was returned to service at 1100 EDT on August 14, 2013. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Musser).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49275
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL MARVEL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL MARVEL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 08/13/2013
Notification Time: 14:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2013
Notification Time: 14:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PLANNED MAINTENANCE ON TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY
"This ENS [event notification] is being issued in advance of planned corrective maintenance on a TSC [Technical Support Center] HVAC [Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning] power supply.
"On 8/13/2013 at 1600 [EDT], the Technical Support Center ventilation system will be removed from service to perform corrective maintenance on an electrical panel that supplies power to the system. The emergency ventilation system will not be available and cannot be restored within the time period required to staff and activate the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). The work is scheduled to complete on 8/13/2013 at 1800 [EDT].
"If an emergency is declared and the TSC activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological or other conditions. The Station Emergency Director would assess habitability in accordance with station procedures. TSC relocation of personnel would be directed as required until such time that the TSC ventilation system is returned to service.
"An update will be sent upon TSC HVAC restoration."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MARK ARNOSKY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2255 EDT ON 8/13/13 * * *
At 2030 EDT on 8/13/13, the TSC emergency ventilation system has been restored to normal.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Powell).
"This ENS [event notification] is being issued in advance of planned corrective maintenance on a TSC [Technical Support Center] HVAC [Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning] power supply.
"On 8/13/2013 at 1600 [EDT], the Technical Support Center ventilation system will be removed from service to perform corrective maintenance on an electrical panel that supplies power to the system. The emergency ventilation system will not be available and cannot be restored within the time period required to staff and activate the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). The work is scheduled to complete on 8/13/2013 at 1800 [EDT].
"If an emergency is declared and the TSC activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological or other conditions. The Station Emergency Director would assess habitability in accordance with station procedures. TSC relocation of personnel would be directed as required until such time that the TSC ventilation system is returned to service.
"An update will be sent upon TSC HVAC restoration."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MARK ARNOSKY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2255 EDT ON 8/13/13 * * *
At 2030 EDT on 8/13/13, the TSC emergency ventilation system has been restored to normal.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Powell).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49276
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: TERRY DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: TERRY DAVIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 08/13/2013
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: 11:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2013
Notification Time: 16:11 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2013
Event Time: 11:02 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/13/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION FILTRATION TRAINS DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At approximately 1102 [EDT], August 13, 2013, both control room ventilation filtration trains were declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10, Condition B, due to a control room boundary door not being fully closed. The door was unable to be closed for approximately nine minutes due to an apparent mis-operation of the door operating mechanism. The door's locking bolts fully extended causing interference between the door and door frame. The door was restored to operable status at approximately 1111 [EDT], August 13, 2013.
"Technical Specification 3.7.10 allows control room boundary doors to be opened intermittently, under administrative control for preplanned activities, provided the doors can be rapidly restored to the design condition. Previous evaluations of the door not being fully closed for a limited time concluded no loss of safety function had existed.
"This condition had no impact on the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At approximately 1102 [EDT], August 13, 2013, both control room ventilation filtration trains were declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10, Condition B, due to a control room boundary door not being fully closed. The door was unable to be closed for approximately nine minutes due to an apparent mis-operation of the door operating mechanism. The door's locking bolts fully extended causing interference between the door and door frame. The door was restored to operable status at approximately 1111 [EDT], August 13, 2013.
"Technical Specification 3.7.10 allows control room boundary doors to be opened intermittently, under administrative control for preplanned activities, provided the doors can be rapidly restored to the design condition. Previous evaluations of the door not being fully closed for a limited time concluded no loss of safety function had existed.
"This condition had no impact on the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."