Event Notification Report for August 10, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/09/2013 - 08/10/2013
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49262
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CHARLES MORGAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: CHARLES MORGAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/10/2013
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2013
Event Time: 07:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2013
Notification Time: 10:38 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2013
Event Time: 07:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTENT SINGLE EMERGENCY SIREN ACTIVATION
"Calvert Cliffs was notified at 0711 [EDT] by Calvert Control Center that a siren in the Calvert County Area was activated. [It was] determined to be Siren C15 on Lloyd Bowen Road.
"Per CNG-NL-1.01-1004 this is a verbal report to Calvert Control Center.
"This event is reportable as a 4-hour non-emergency notification [under] 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'Any event resulting in notification to other government agencies that has or will be made.'"
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Calvert Cliffs was notified at 0711 [EDT] by Calvert Control Center that a siren in the Calvert County Area was activated. [It was] determined to be Siren C15 on Lloyd Bowen Road.
"Per CNG-NL-1.01-1004 this is a verbal report to Calvert Control Center.
"This event is reportable as a 4-hour non-emergency notification [under] 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'Any event resulting in notification to other government agencies that has or will be made.'"
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
Event Number: 49263
Rep Org: SUSQUEHANNA
Licensee: PPL SUSQUEHANNA LLC
Region: 1
City: ALLENTOWN State: PA
County: LUZERNE
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket: 72-28
NRC Notified By: DOUG LAMARCA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: PPL SUSQUEHANNA LLC
Region: 1
City: ALLENTOWN State: PA
County: LUZERNE
License #: GL
Agreement: Y
Docket: 72-28
NRC Notified By: DOUG LAMARCA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/10/2013
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2013
Event Time: 04:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2013
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2013
Event Time: 04:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
72.75(c )(2) - SPENT FUEL, HLW OR RX-REL GTCC RED. EFECT 72.75(d)(1) - SFTY EQUIP. DISABLED OR FAILS TO FUNCTION
10 CFR Section:
72.75(c )(2) - SPENT FUEL, HLW OR RX-REL GTCC RED. EFECT 72.75(d)(1) - SFTY EQUIP. DISABLED OR FAILS TO FUNCTION
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
HO NIEH (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
HO NIEH (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
DEGRADED NEUTRON SHIELDING FOR A SPENT FUEL CASK
"PPL Susquehanna, LLC became aware of a reduction in the effectiveness of a spent fuel confinement system at 0430 [EDT] on Saturday August 10, 2013. One of the safety barriers in a spent fuel cask is the water filled volume of the cask which provides neutron shielding. This volume is normally filled with approximately 670 gal of demineralized water. It has been determined that the neutron shielding volume was not completely filled. The cask neutron shield volume is currently being filled. The loaded spent fuel canister is currently located in the reactor building on the refuel floor and has been located there for the duration of the event. Investigation is currently in progress concerning personnel radiation exposure. The lack of neutron shielding represents a significant reduction in the effectiveness of a spent fuel storage cask confinement system which is an 8 hour reportable condition under 10CFR72.75(c)(2). This also represents a dry fuel storage safety system that was disabled or failed to function which is a 24 hour reportable condition under 10CFR72.75(d)(1)."
The cask was a TransNuclear NUHOMS-61BTH. Personnel on the refuel floor were equipped with neutron dosimetry.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1609 EDT ON 10/3/2013 FROM DOUG LAMARCA TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"At the time the original ENS notification was made, PPL Susquehanna, LLC had determined that a significant reduction in the effectiveness of a spent fuel storage confinement system had occurred, and that spent fuel equipment important to safety was disabled or failed to function as designed. This conclusion was reached because a loaded dry fuel storage transfer cask's neutron water shield was found partially drained down.
"Subsequent to this event, an investigation concluded that the identified condition is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 72.75(c)(2) or 10 CFR 72.75(d)(1). Transnuclear's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter K.7 defines the 61BT dry fuel storage 'confinement system' as those components which make up the dry shielded cask (DSC) and not the transfer cask. Therefore, the transfer cask neutron shield is not part of the confinement system and the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 72.75(c)(2) do not apply. In addition, Transnuclear FSAR drawing number NUH-03-8002-SAR, Rev. 8, Sheet 1 'General License NUHOMSr ISFSI Onsite Transfer Cask Inner & Outer Shell Assembly' defines the neutron shield components as 'not important to safety.' Therefore, the TC neutron shield is not part of the dry fuel storage safety system and the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 72.75(d)(1) do not apply.'"
No personnel exposures exceeded regulatory limits.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the state.
Notified the R1DO (Joustra).
"PPL Susquehanna, LLC became aware of a reduction in the effectiveness of a spent fuel confinement system at 0430 [EDT] on Saturday August 10, 2013. One of the safety barriers in a spent fuel cask is the water filled volume of the cask which provides neutron shielding. This volume is normally filled with approximately 670 gal of demineralized water. It has been determined that the neutron shielding volume was not completely filled. The cask neutron shield volume is currently being filled. The loaded spent fuel canister is currently located in the reactor building on the refuel floor and has been located there for the duration of the event. Investigation is currently in progress concerning personnel radiation exposure. The lack of neutron shielding represents a significant reduction in the effectiveness of a spent fuel storage cask confinement system which is an 8 hour reportable condition under 10CFR72.75(c)(2). This also represents a dry fuel storage safety system that was disabled or failed to function which is a 24 hour reportable condition under 10CFR72.75(d)(1)."
The cask was a TransNuclear NUHOMS-61BTH. Personnel on the refuel floor were equipped with neutron dosimetry.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1609 EDT ON 10/3/2013 FROM DOUG LAMARCA TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"At the time the original ENS notification was made, PPL Susquehanna, LLC had determined that a significant reduction in the effectiveness of a spent fuel storage confinement system had occurred, and that spent fuel equipment important to safety was disabled or failed to function as designed. This conclusion was reached because a loaded dry fuel storage transfer cask's neutron water shield was found partially drained down.
"Subsequent to this event, an investigation concluded that the identified condition is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 72.75(c)(2) or 10 CFR 72.75(d)(1). Transnuclear's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Chapter K.7 defines the 61BT dry fuel storage 'confinement system' as those components which make up the dry shielded cask (DSC) and not the transfer cask. Therefore, the transfer cask neutron shield is not part of the confinement system and the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 72.75(c)(2) do not apply. In addition, Transnuclear FSAR drawing number NUH-03-8002-SAR, Rev. 8, Sheet 1 'General License NUHOMSr ISFSI Onsite Transfer Cask Inner & Outer Shell Assembly' defines the neutron shield components as 'not important to safety.' Therefore, the TC neutron shield is not part of the dry fuel storage safety system and the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 72.75(d)(1) do not apply.'"
No personnel exposures exceeded regulatory limits.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the state.
Notified the R1DO (Joustra).