Event Notification Report for July 26, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/25/2013 - 07/26/2013
Part 21
Event Number: 49217
Rep Org: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 1
City: CRANBERRY TWP. State: PA
County: BUTLER
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 1
City: CRANBERRY TWP. State: PA
County: BUTLER
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES GRESHAM
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 07/26/2013
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2013
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
PART 21 REACTORS (EMAI)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
PART 21 REACTORS (EMAI)
POTENTIAL EXISTENCE OF DEFECTS IN SHIELD PASSIVE THERMAL SHUTDOWN SEAL SYSTEM
"The defect being reported concerns an identified inconsistency between the intended design functionality of the SHIELD passive thermal shutdown seal (SDS) and that observed during post-service testing.
"The purpose of the SDS is to reduce current reactor coolant system inventory losses to very small leakage rates for a plant that results in the loss of all reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal cooling. The SDS is a thermally actuated, passive device integral to the RCP Number 1 seal insert and is positioned between the Number 1 seal and the Number 1 seal leak-off line to provide a near leak-tight seal once activated.
"There are two delivered components associated with this report: 1. the SDS hardware, and 2. the Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) SDS model and the assigned SDS reliability. The hardware component is the SHIELD passive thermal shutdown seal. The associated PRA SDS model and assigned reliability basic component is WCAP-17100-P-A, Supplement 1, Rev. 0, 'PRA Model for the Westinghouse Shut Down Seal Supplemental Information for All Domestic Reactor Coolant Pump Models' (dated December 2012).
"The SDS has only been delivered and installed in the following plants: Beaver Valley Unit 2, Callaway, D.C. Cook Unit 1, Farley Units 1 and 2, and Wolf Creek.
"Westinghouse has concluded that the hardware itself will not adversely impact safe plant operation.
"Westinghouse has completed a root cause analysis (RCA) and an independent third party review of this RCA is expected to be completed by August 2013. In parallel, SDS design improvements are being considered and may be completed during the third quarter of 2013. Additionally, and if necessary, Westinghouse will revise WCAP-17100 and its Supplements, as needed, to reflect any new information that is developed.
"Affected customers have been informed via their respective Customer Project Managers of the post-service test failure."
"The defect being reported concerns an identified inconsistency between the intended design functionality of the SHIELD passive thermal shutdown seal (SDS) and that observed during post-service testing.
"The purpose of the SDS is to reduce current reactor coolant system inventory losses to very small leakage rates for a plant that results in the loss of all reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal cooling. The SDS is a thermally actuated, passive device integral to the RCP Number 1 seal insert and is positioned between the Number 1 seal and the Number 1 seal leak-off line to provide a near leak-tight seal once activated.
"There are two delivered components associated with this report: 1. the SDS hardware, and 2. the Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) SDS model and the assigned SDS reliability. The hardware component is the SHIELD passive thermal shutdown seal. The associated PRA SDS model and assigned reliability basic component is WCAP-17100-P-A, Supplement 1, Rev. 0, 'PRA Model for the Westinghouse Shut Down Seal Supplemental Information for All Domestic Reactor Coolant Pump Models' (dated December 2012).
"The SDS has only been delivered and installed in the following plants: Beaver Valley Unit 2, Callaway, D.C. Cook Unit 1, Farley Units 1 and 2, and Wolf Creek.
"Westinghouse has concluded that the hardware itself will not adversely impact safe plant operation.
"Westinghouse has completed a root cause analysis (RCA) and an independent third party review of this RCA is expected to be completed by August 2013. In parallel, SDS design improvements are being considered and may be completed during the third quarter of 2013. Additionally, and if necessary, Westinghouse will revise WCAP-17100 and its Supplements, as needed, to reflect any new information that is developed.
"Affected customers have been informed via their respective Customer Project Managers of the post-service test failure."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49219
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM BAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JIM BAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/27/2013
Notification Time: 01:14 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2013
Event Time: 23:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2013
Notification Time: 01:14 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2013
Event Time: 23:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/27/2013
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
JOHN MONNINGER (NRR)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
THOMAS BERGMAN (R4)
JENNIFER UHLE (NRR)
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
JOHN MONNINGER (NRR)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
THOMAS BERGMAN (R4)
JENNIFER UHLE (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A FIRE IN THE TURBINE BUILDING LASTING GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES
On July 26, 2013, at 2349 CDT, the Callaway nuclear power plant declared an Unusual Event due to a fire not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification, EAL HU 2.1. The fire was located in the turbine building near the main generator. Concurrent with the fire, the reactor tripped due to a turbine trip. All control rods fully inserted and all reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) tripped. The fire has been extinguished and the licensee is in progress of restoring RCPs.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State Emergency Management Agency and Local Authorities.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, and DHS NICC.
* * * UPDATE ON 7/27/13 AT 0201 EDT FROM MARK COVEY TO BILL HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0101 CDT. Decay heat is being removed via aux feed water from the steam generators to the condenser. Visual inspection determined the location of the fire to be in the phase B generator bus duct.
Notified R4DO (Allen), NRR EO (Monninger), IRD (Marshall), DHS SWO, FEMA, and DHS NICC.
* * * UPDATE ON 7/27/13 AT 0430 EDT FROM MARK COVEY TO DONG PARK * * *
The licensee made notifications under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) [RPS Actuation], 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) [Offsite Notification] and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) [ESF Actuation - AFW]. The licensee will be making a press release and notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Allen).
* * * UPDATE ON 7/27/13 AT 0826 EDT FROM MARK COVEY TO BILL HUFFMAN * * *
Upon further review, the licensee believes that the initially reported EAL for the UE notification, HU 2.1, was not applicable. Although indications of a fire were present for greater than 15 minutes, the criteria at Callaway apply to a fire within 50 feet of safety related equipment. There was no safety related equipment within 50 feet of where the fire occurred. The proper EAL classification should have been HU 3.1 due to release of potentially toxic gas or asphyxiant or flammable gas that could impact plant operation. This EAL is applicable due to the heavy smoke release from burning electrical insulation and melted bus and ductwork which prevented access to the turbine building area where the fire took place.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector of this update. Notified R4DO (Allen).
On July 26, 2013, at 2349 CDT, the Callaway nuclear power plant declared an Unusual Event due to a fire not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification, EAL HU 2.1. The fire was located in the turbine building near the main generator. Concurrent with the fire, the reactor tripped due to a turbine trip. All control rods fully inserted and all reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) tripped. The fire has been extinguished and the licensee is in progress of restoring RCPs.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State Emergency Management Agency and Local Authorities.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, and DHS NICC.
* * * UPDATE ON 7/27/13 AT 0201 EDT FROM MARK COVEY TO BILL HUFFMAN * * *
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0101 CDT. Decay heat is being removed via aux feed water from the steam generators to the condenser. Visual inspection determined the location of the fire to be in the phase B generator bus duct.
Notified R4DO (Allen), NRR EO (Monninger), IRD (Marshall), DHS SWO, FEMA, and DHS NICC.
* * * UPDATE ON 7/27/13 AT 0430 EDT FROM MARK COVEY TO DONG PARK * * *
The licensee made notifications under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) [RPS Actuation], 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) [Offsite Notification] and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) [ESF Actuation - AFW]. The licensee will be making a press release and notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Allen).
* * * UPDATE ON 7/27/13 AT 0826 EDT FROM MARK COVEY TO BILL HUFFMAN * * *
Upon further review, the licensee believes that the initially reported EAL for the UE notification, HU 2.1, was not applicable. Although indications of a fire were present for greater than 15 minutes, the criteria at Callaway apply to a fire within 50 feet of safety related equipment. There was no safety related equipment within 50 feet of where the fire occurred. The proper EAL classification should have been HU 3.1 due to release of potentially toxic gas or asphyxiant or flammable gas that could impact plant operation. This EAL is applicable due to the heavy smoke release from burning electrical insulation and melted bus and ductwork which prevented access to the turbine building area where the fire took place.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector of this update. Notified R4DO (Allen).