Event Notification Report for July 23, 2013

PROGRAMMATIC FAILURE TO TEST PERSONNEL RETURNING TO THE SITE

"On July 23, 2013 at 1345 [EDT], the Fitness-for-Duty Snapshot Self-Assessment team identified an anomaly with the Employee Plant Access Control Tracking (EMPACT) program used to randomly select V.C. Summer employees for daily fitness for duty (FFD) screenings. More specifically, when an employee terminates employment at the station, Access Control personnel select 'Exclude from Random' feature in the EMPACT program to remove their name from the program code that randomly selects current employees for daily FFD screenings. When a former employee returns to the station for re-employment, Access Control personnel select 'New Request' within the EMPACT program. The 'New Request' feature is supposed to automatically deselect the 'Exclude from Random' feature, which adds the employee back to the randomly selected population. This feature of the EMPACT program was determined not to be functional.

"In accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4), this program flaw constitutes: 'Any programmatic .... discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit the undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program.'

"This event has been entered into the station's corrective action program under CR-13-03066. The issue is limited to 53 employees (2.9% of the randomly selected population) that have returned to V.C. Summer for employment in the previous six years. Immediate corrective actions consist of contacting the program vendor, conducting an Access Control Program standdown, and contacting the 53 employees to report for fitness-for-duty screening.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

"Other utilities known to use the EMPACT software have been contacted."

This issue does not affect units 2 or 3 since they use a different system.

INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM GROUP 3 ACTUATION

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide information pertaining to an invalid Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 3 actuation signal that affected containment valves in more than one system.

"On 7/23/2013, and again on 7/24/2013, with the reactor at 100% power, an invalid PCIS Group 3 actuation occurred from a momentary spike of the 'B' Reactor Building ventilation radiation monitor which reached the instrument's high radiation trip set point. A radiation protection technician was dispatched and radiation levels in the vicinity of the 'B' radiation monitor were verified to be normal and below the alarm set points. The radiation monitor was verified to be indicating normal expected radiation levels. Subsequent visual inspection and functional checks of the radiation monitors were completed satisfactory and the instrument channel was returned to service.

"At the recommendation from the vendor, the detectors were replaced in both of the Reactor Building ventilation monitors as well as the Refuel Floor radiation monitors.

"On 8/19/2013, 9/12/2013, and 9/13/2013, with the reactor at 100% power, invalid PCIS Group 3 actuations occurred from a momentary spike of the 'A' Refuel Floor radiation monitor which reached the instrument's high radiation trip set point. A radiation protection technician was dispatched to the refuel floor and dose rates in the vicinity of the 'A' radiation monitor detector were verified to be normal and below the alarm set points. The radiation monitor was verified to be indicating normal expected radiation levels. Subsequent visual inspection and functional checks of the radiation monitors were completed satisfactory and the instrument channel was returned to service.

"Both trains of Standby Gas Treatment System started as designed and Reactor Building ventilation isolated as a result of the invalid PCIS actuation.

"The PCIS functioned successfully providing a complete Group 3 isolation. The PCIS Group 3 isolation involves the following systems:

Drywell and Suppression Chamber air and vent: V16-19-6A, 6B, 7, 7A, 7B, 8, 9, 10, 23
Containment Makeup: V-16-20-20, 22A, 22B
Containment Air Sampling: VG-23, 26, V109-76A, 76B
Containment Air compressor suction: V72-38A, 38B
Containment Air Dilution: VG-9A, 9B, 22A, 22B, NG-11A, 11B, 12A, 12B, 13A, 13B

"Since no actual high radiation condition existed which required the PCIS Group 3 isolation, and the actuation was not in response to actual plant conditions satisfying the requirements for isolation, this event has been classified as an invalid actuation.

"This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public."

"In accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1) a telephone notification is being made instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector."

ABB SOLID STATE CIRCUIT SHIELD AND POWER SHIELD RELAYS SHIPPED WITH INCORRECT CERTIFICATES OF CONFORMANCE

The following information was obtained from ABB, Inc. via facsimile:

"This notification is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii). Solid State Circuit Shield Relays (27, 40, 47, 60, 81, 25V, 27/59, 27D, 27H, 27N, 46D, 46Q, 47H, 50H, 59G, 87M) and Power Shield (K-Line) Relays containing CMOS technology Integrated Circuits (IC's) have been shipped with Certificates of Conformance (CoC's) that incorrectly state that they are qualified to 100,000 rads.

"On July 23, 2013, ABB discovered that the above radiation tolerance value had been incorrectly communicated to customers due to a reference to an incorrect document. ABB failed to update the reference document following the Part 21 notification dated July 28, 1994. ABB's investigation showed that this issue dates back to the beginning of production of solid state relays in the Coral Springs facility in 2009 when the CoC format changed to include this information. As such, the CoC's that ABB provided incorrectly identified the radiation tolerance as 100,000 rads rather than 1,000 rads.

"All qualification documents and future CoC's will be reviewed to ensure proper record of radiation tolerance is maintained. This review is to be completed by Dec 31, 2013

"ABB will notify the affected customers for the listed relays that they should review their applications which require total radiation tolerance greater than 1,000 rads to determine the effects of a possible device malfunctioning on the system.

"ABB does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(b), we are making this notification simultaneously to our customers so they may evaluate this issue, pursuant to 10 CFR 21(a).

"Any customers finding that [ABB's] qualification level is insufficient will be advised to contact [ABB's] customer support line at 1-800-222-1946 or 1-954-752-6700 for discussion of remedial action.

"This information was provided by:

Dennis Batovsky
Managing Director
ABB, Inc.
4300 Coral Ridge Drive
Coral Springs, FL 33065"