Event Notification Report for June 13, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/12/2013 - 06/13/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
491174911049112491134911449115
Research Reactor
Event Number: 49117
Rep Org: KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Licensee: KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: MANHATTAN State: KS
County: RILEY
License #: R-88
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000188
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY GEUTHER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: MANHATTAN State: KS
County: RILEY
License #: R-88
Agreement: Y
Docket: 05000188
NRC Notified By: JEFFREY GEUTHER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 06/14/2013
Notification Time: 11:20 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2013
Event Time: 15:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2013
Notification Time: 11:20 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2013
Event Time: 15:39 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
ALEXANDER ADAMS (NRR)
SPIROS TRAIFOROS (NRR)
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
ALEXANDER ADAMS (NRR)
SPIROS TRAIFOROS (NRR)
FAILURE OF IN-CORE THERMOCOUPLE
"Description of Event:
"During operations at full power (500 kWth), the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) on duty noticed that the fuel temperature thermocouple reader indicated a temperature of 202 [degrees] C, approximately 60 - 70 [degrees] C below the expected value. The SRO recognized that the problem was likely caused by a fuel thermocouple wire grounding to its conduit. A trainee was instructed to move the wires to avoid grounding. Following this action, the thermocouple reader indicated the proper value.
"Upon review of the log book, the SRO noticed that the faulty fuel temperature reading had been logged for several days without corrective action. The facility Technical Specifications (TS) require at least one fuel temperature indication to be operable during operation, and define a system as 'operable' when it is capable of performing its intended function in a normal manner.
"Therefore the fuel temperature indication was not operable as defined in the TS. Since the reactor was not immediately secured nor was the indication immediately fixed, the event constitutes a Reportable Occurrence per facility TS 6.9.2.
"Background:
"For the four days of reactor operations during which the problem with the thermocouple existed, the reactor was operated for short amounts of time (approximately 10 -15 minutes) at various power levels in order to characterize a new beam port configuration and test an experimental apparatus. The total time above 100 kWth was 2 hours and 51 minutes. The reactor was typically staffed by a trainee at the panel, supervised by a licensed reactor operator (RO).
"The indicated temperature is the average reading of three thermocouples. One thermocouple is at the fuel midplane, one is 2 [inches] above the midplane, and one is 2 [inches] below the midplane. The fuel temperature indication, when partially grounded, is approximately correct below the point of adding heat (approximately 10 kWth). It differs from the expected value by approximately 15 [degrees] C at 100 kWth, and by approximately 65 [degrees] C at 500 kWth. The fuel temperature readout at the control panel is used to provide an automatic scram at 400 [degrees] C. This setpoint is set well below the Safety Limit of 750 [degrees] C fuel temperature during steady state reactor operations. The fuel temperature scram is NOT required by TS. Normal operations at the reactor do not approach this scram setpoint or the Safety Limit.
"The logbooks are reviewed daily as part of the pre-operation reactor checkout procedure. The staff is trained to review logs back to the most recent time they were on duty, to check for changes to the reactor, problems with instruments, etc. The staff is not trained to audit the previous days' logs for anomalous readings.
"Timeline:
"The following timeline of operations is taken from the reactor logbook. Only operations at or above 100 kWth are listed, because the difference between measured and expected temperature is small at lower power levels. All times are local (Central Daylight Time).
Date Time Power T (Measured, [degrees] C) T (Expected, [degrees] C)
6/7/2013 0946-1001 500kW 200 265
6/7/2013 1037 - 1050 500kW 202 265
6/7/2013 1441 - 1446 500kW 202 265
6/10/2013 0937 - 0950 100kW 83 100
6/10/2013 1005 - 1015 100kW 87 100
6/10/2013 1029-1041 100kW 84 100
6/12/2013 0906 - 0919 100kW 84 100
6/12/2013 0934 - 0959 530kW 217 270
6/12/2013 1611 - 1633 100kW 74* 100
6/13/2013 1103 - 1143 500kW 201 265
6/13/2013 1352 - 1406 530kW 209 270
*Temperature was logged while it was still rising toward an equilibrium value.
"6/13/2013 - 1559 - Problem observed and corrected by repositioning thermocouple wires.
"6/14/2013 - 1020 - Reportable occurrence reported to NRC Headquarters Operations Center.
"Causes:
"The facility has identified the following as contributing causes to the event.
"1. Licensed operators were not sufficiently attentive when supervising trainees at the control panel. The licensed operators were focused on reactor power indications and did not pay sufficient attention to other TS related indications.
"2. The log book review required prior to daily operations was not conducted with sufficient rigor to detect the improper thermocouple readings logged the previous day. The review was instead focused on noting changes to the reactor facility and problems with instrumentation since the operators' previous duty at the panel.
"3. Only one functioning instrumented fuel element was used to provide the required fuel temperature indication channel. Therefore no redundant readout was available to check against the indicated fuel temperature.
"4. The sharp edge on the instrumented fuel element conduit can cut through the insulation on the thermocouple wires, causing grounding.
"Corrective Actions:
"The facility will perform the following corrective actions. All changes to the reactor systems, such as thermocouple wire insulation, are subject to review per the requirements of 10CFR50.59.
"Time: Prior to operation;
"Action: Attempt to improve insulation on thermocouple wires, using electrical tape, shrink tubing, or spray-on insulation.
"Time: Prior to operation;
"Action: Attempt to repair thermocouple wires for a currently installed but non-functional instrumented fuel element to provide an independent fuel temperature indication channel.
"Time: Prior to operation;
"Action: Install a new instrumented fuel element. This will bring the total number of independent channels of fuel temperature indication to 2 - 3.
"Time: Prior to operation and as part of requalification training program;
"Action: Train reactor staff on the importance of vigilance when supervising trainees and the importance of attentiveness to all channels of information at the control console, as opposed to focusing on a few specific indicators, such as reactor power channels.
"Time: Prior to operation and as part of requalification training program;
"Action: Train reactor staff to check for anomalous values in the prior days' log entries during the daily reactor checkout.
"Time: Upon approval by Reactor Safeguards Committee, but not necessarily prior to operation;
"Action: Append Procedure 15 - Reactor Startup with a list of observed instrument values for different reactor power levels to be used as a reference by trainees and licensed staff.
"A copy of this report will be provided to the Kansas State University Reactor Safeguards Committee for review."
"Description of Event:
"During operations at full power (500 kWth), the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) on duty noticed that the fuel temperature thermocouple reader indicated a temperature of 202 [degrees] C, approximately 60 - 70 [degrees] C below the expected value. The SRO recognized that the problem was likely caused by a fuel thermocouple wire grounding to its conduit. A trainee was instructed to move the wires to avoid grounding. Following this action, the thermocouple reader indicated the proper value.
"Upon review of the log book, the SRO noticed that the faulty fuel temperature reading had been logged for several days without corrective action. The facility Technical Specifications (TS) require at least one fuel temperature indication to be operable during operation, and define a system as 'operable' when it is capable of performing its intended function in a normal manner.
"Therefore the fuel temperature indication was not operable as defined in the TS. Since the reactor was not immediately secured nor was the indication immediately fixed, the event constitutes a Reportable Occurrence per facility TS 6.9.2.
"Background:
"For the four days of reactor operations during which the problem with the thermocouple existed, the reactor was operated for short amounts of time (approximately 10 -15 minutes) at various power levels in order to characterize a new beam port configuration and test an experimental apparatus. The total time above 100 kWth was 2 hours and 51 minutes. The reactor was typically staffed by a trainee at the panel, supervised by a licensed reactor operator (RO).
"The indicated temperature is the average reading of three thermocouples. One thermocouple is at the fuel midplane, one is 2 [inches] above the midplane, and one is 2 [inches] below the midplane. The fuel temperature indication, when partially grounded, is approximately correct below the point of adding heat (approximately 10 kWth). It differs from the expected value by approximately 15 [degrees] C at 100 kWth, and by approximately 65 [degrees] C at 500 kWth. The fuel temperature readout at the control panel is used to provide an automatic scram at 400 [degrees] C. This setpoint is set well below the Safety Limit of 750 [degrees] C fuel temperature during steady state reactor operations. The fuel temperature scram is NOT required by TS. Normal operations at the reactor do not approach this scram setpoint or the Safety Limit.
"The logbooks are reviewed daily as part of the pre-operation reactor checkout procedure. The staff is trained to review logs back to the most recent time they were on duty, to check for changes to the reactor, problems with instruments, etc. The staff is not trained to audit the previous days' logs for anomalous readings.
"Timeline:
"The following timeline of operations is taken from the reactor logbook. Only operations at or above 100 kWth are listed, because the difference between measured and expected temperature is small at lower power levels. All times are local (Central Daylight Time).
Date Time Power T (Measured, [degrees] C) T (Expected, [degrees] C)
6/7/2013 0946-1001 500kW 200 265
6/7/2013 1037 - 1050 500kW 202 265
6/7/2013 1441 - 1446 500kW 202 265
6/10/2013 0937 - 0950 100kW 83 100
6/10/2013 1005 - 1015 100kW 87 100
6/10/2013 1029-1041 100kW 84 100
6/12/2013 0906 - 0919 100kW 84 100
6/12/2013 0934 - 0959 530kW 217 270
6/12/2013 1611 - 1633 100kW 74* 100
6/13/2013 1103 - 1143 500kW 201 265
6/13/2013 1352 - 1406 530kW 209 270
*Temperature was logged while it was still rising toward an equilibrium value.
"6/13/2013 - 1559 - Problem observed and corrected by repositioning thermocouple wires.
"6/14/2013 - 1020 - Reportable occurrence reported to NRC Headquarters Operations Center.
"Causes:
"The facility has identified the following as contributing causes to the event.
"1. Licensed operators were not sufficiently attentive when supervising trainees at the control panel. The licensed operators were focused on reactor power indications and did not pay sufficient attention to other TS related indications.
"2. The log book review required prior to daily operations was not conducted with sufficient rigor to detect the improper thermocouple readings logged the previous day. The review was instead focused on noting changes to the reactor facility and problems with instrumentation since the operators' previous duty at the panel.
"3. Only one functioning instrumented fuel element was used to provide the required fuel temperature indication channel. Therefore no redundant readout was available to check against the indicated fuel temperature.
"4. The sharp edge on the instrumented fuel element conduit can cut through the insulation on the thermocouple wires, causing grounding.
"Corrective Actions:
"The facility will perform the following corrective actions. All changes to the reactor systems, such as thermocouple wire insulation, are subject to review per the requirements of 10CFR50.59.
"Time: Prior to operation;
"Action: Attempt to improve insulation on thermocouple wires, using electrical tape, shrink tubing, or spray-on insulation.
"Time: Prior to operation;
"Action: Attempt to repair thermocouple wires for a currently installed but non-functional instrumented fuel element to provide an independent fuel temperature indication channel.
"Time: Prior to operation;
"Action: Install a new instrumented fuel element. This will bring the total number of independent channels of fuel temperature indication to 2 - 3.
"Time: Prior to operation and as part of requalification training program;
"Action: Train reactor staff on the importance of vigilance when supervising trainees and the importance of attentiveness to all channels of information at the control console, as opposed to focusing on a few specific indicators, such as reactor power channels.
"Time: Prior to operation and as part of requalification training program;
"Action: Train reactor staff to check for anomalous values in the prior days' log entries during the daily reactor checkout.
"Time: Upon approval by Reactor Safeguards Committee, but not necessarily prior to operation;
"Action: Append Procedure 15 - Reactor Startup with a list of observed instrument values for different reactor power levels to be used as a reference by trainees and licensed staff.
"A copy of this report will be provided to the Kansas State University Reactor Safeguards Committee for review."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49110
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JAMES PRIEST
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JAMES PRIEST
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/13/2013
Notification Time: 09:41 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2013
Event Time: 02:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2013
Notification Time: 09:41 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2013
Event Time: 02:52 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
GLENN DENTEL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
DISCOVERY OF PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE
"On 6/13/13 at approximately 0252 EDT, during the initial walk down of the drywell of the Hope Creek Unit 1 forced outage, water was observed leaking from a 40% circumferential crack in a weld in the RHR vent line adjacent to the outboard isolation valve (BCV-597). The estimated leakage rate through the crack is less than one gallon per minute. The RHR vent line is one-inch ASME Class 1 piping. Hope Creek Unit 1 is stable in Operational Condition 3, Hot Shutdown.
"This report is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for a weld or material defect in the primary coolant system which cannot be found acceptable under applicable ASME standards.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The only safety-related equipment out of service at the time event was the 'C' Service Water Pump, which was tagged for scheduled maintenance.
"No personnel injuries occurred. No radiation releases occurred."
The licensee entered a 24 hr. action statement under T.S. 3.4.3.2, Condition A to be in mode 4 by 0252 EDT on 6/14/13.
The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Creek township.
"On 6/13/13 at approximately 0252 EDT, during the initial walk down of the drywell of the Hope Creek Unit 1 forced outage, water was observed leaking from a 40% circumferential crack in a weld in the RHR vent line adjacent to the outboard isolation valve (BCV-597). The estimated leakage rate through the crack is less than one gallon per minute. The RHR vent line is one-inch ASME Class 1 piping. Hope Creek Unit 1 is stable in Operational Condition 3, Hot Shutdown.
"This report is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for a weld or material defect in the primary coolant system which cannot be found acceptable under applicable ASME standards.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The only safety-related equipment out of service at the time event was the 'C' Service Water Pump, which was tagged for scheduled maintenance.
"No personnel injuries occurred. No radiation releases occurred."
The licensee entered a 24 hr. action statement under T.S. 3.4.3.2, Condition A to be in mode 4 by 0252 EDT on 6/14/13.
The licensee will be notifying the Lower Alloways Creek township.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49112
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL PEAK
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL PEAK
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 06/13/2013
Notification Time: 16:55 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2013
Event Time: 08:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2013
Notification Time: 16:55 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2013
Event Time: 08:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNANALYZED CONDITION
"The station is reporting an unanalyzed condition involving the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump. A postulated high energy line break in the room containing the pump could result in steam communicating with equipment in the safety related switchgear and battery rooms which are immediately above the room. The plant is currently in cold shutdown with the fuel removed from the core."
The licensee stated that in the event of a postulated high energy line break, steam could possibly enter the switchgear and battery rooms via a stairwell and ventilation ductwork.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The station is reporting an unanalyzed condition involving the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump. A postulated high energy line break in the room containing the pump could result in steam communicating with equipment in the safety related switchgear and battery rooms which are immediately above the room. The plant is currently in cold shutdown with the fuel removed from the core."
The licensee stated that in the event of a postulated high energy line break, steam could possibly enter the switchgear and battery rooms via a stairwell and ventilation ductwork.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49113
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KIRK DUEA
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KIRK DUEA
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 06/13/2013
Notification Time: 22:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2013
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2013
Notification Time: 22:02 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2013
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
ERIC DUNCAN (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS START
"While preparing for an equipment test Thursday afternoon, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant lost off-site power on its normal off-site power feed. Power for safety related loads was automatically transferred to the alternate off-site power source. The Emergency Diesel Generators started as designed but did not load onto the safety related busses due to the availability of off-site power. Operators stabilized the plant, which is shutdown for a refueling and maintenance outage, in less than an hour and are investigating the cause of the event. The current plant focus is on restoring the normal off-site power feed. The event posed no danger to the public or plant workers, and no one was injured. There was no release of radiation. Plant safety systems continue to be powered by the backup off-site power feed, with the emergency diesel generators available if needed.
"Event Specifics:
"At approximately 1430 CDT, during a refueling outage with the plant in Mode 4, reactor level at approximately 200 inches, and a full Scram already inserted, a loss of normal off-site power occurred due to a fault in a non-safety related bus supply breaker. The fault was in the 13.8 KV supply breaker to the #11 bus. This caused the Station 2R transformer to lockout, resulting in a loss of the normal off-site power to Essential Busses 15 and 16. Shutdown Cooling (SDC) was lost for approximately 1 hour due to loss of supply power and isolation of the common suction valves.
"Both 11 and 12 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) automatically started but did not load onto their respective busses (as designed) due to the 1AR emergency off-site transformer re-energizing both 15 and 16 bus. This essential bus transfer is being reported as a 'Valid actuation of emergency AC electrical power systems' under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv).
"During the event the decision was made to shut down the EDGs which rendered them inoperable for a short period of time until the Fast Start capability was reset. The period of time that the EDGs were inoperable is being reported as a 'Condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety functions to remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, and mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), (C), and (D). Both EDGs have been restored to Automatic Standby Status and are operable.
"The loss of power resulted in a Group II Containment Isolation signal causing secondary containment to isolate and Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Filtration to initiate as well as associated Group II Containment Isolation Valves to close. This is being reported as a 'General containment isolation signal ESF actuation' under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv). The containment isolation has been reset, and SDC and SFPC have been restored. Reactor temperature rose approximately 4 degrees F during the event from 161 degrees to 165 degrees which remained in the prescribed operating band. Reactor level did not change.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
"While preparing for an equipment test Thursday afternoon, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant lost off-site power on its normal off-site power feed. Power for safety related loads was automatically transferred to the alternate off-site power source. The Emergency Diesel Generators started as designed but did not load onto the safety related busses due to the availability of off-site power. Operators stabilized the plant, which is shutdown for a refueling and maintenance outage, in less than an hour and are investigating the cause of the event. The current plant focus is on restoring the normal off-site power feed. The event posed no danger to the public or plant workers, and no one was injured. There was no release of radiation. Plant safety systems continue to be powered by the backup off-site power feed, with the emergency diesel generators available if needed.
"Event Specifics:
"At approximately 1430 CDT, during a refueling outage with the plant in Mode 4, reactor level at approximately 200 inches, and a full Scram already inserted, a loss of normal off-site power occurred due to a fault in a non-safety related bus supply breaker. The fault was in the 13.8 KV supply breaker to the #11 bus. This caused the Station 2R transformer to lockout, resulting in a loss of the normal off-site power to Essential Busses 15 and 16. Shutdown Cooling (SDC) was lost for approximately 1 hour due to loss of supply power and isolation of the common suction valves.
"Both 11 and 12 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) automatically started but did not load onto their respective busses (as designed) due to the 1AR emergency off-site transformer re-energizing both 15 and 16 bus. This essential bus transfer is being reported as a 'Valid actuation of emergency AC electrical power systems' under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv).
"During the event the decision was made to shut down the EDGs which rendered them inoperable for a short period of time until the Fast Start capability was reset. The period of time that the EDGs were inoperable is being reported as a 'Condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety functions to remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, and mitigate the consequences of an accident under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), (C), and (D). Both EDGs have been restored to Automatic Standby Status and are operable.
"The loss of power resulted in a Group II Containment Isolation signal causing secondary containment to isolate and Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Filtration to initiate as well as associated Group II Containment Isolation Valves to close. This is being reported as a 'General containment isolation signal ESF actuation' under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv). The containment isolation has been reset, and SDC and SFPC have been restored. Reactor temperature rose approximately 4 degrees F during the event from 161 degrees to 165 degrees which remained in the prescribed operating band. Reactor level did not change.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49114
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN ABELL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN ABELL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 06/13/2013
Notification Time: 22:03 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2013
Event Time: 18:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2013
Notification Time: 22:03 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2013
Event Time: 18:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NOTIFICATION OF NORTH CAROLINA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DUE TO SPILL OF DIESEL OIL
"At 6:30 PM EDT on 6/13/13 an all spill was identified which resulted in approximately one quart of fuel oil spilled to the ground from a diesel powered portable light which overturned during a storm. The oil spill was outside of the dike containment in which the light unit was located and was approximately 10 feet from waters of the Harris Lake (waters of the US). No oil entered the lake. This event was reportable to the state of North Carolina because it occurred within 100 feet of the Harris Lake. At 7:03 PM EDT on 6/13/13 Harris Environmental Services Section personnel made the oil spill notification to North Carolina Emergency Management which was acting on behalf of the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
"The spill was cleaned up by removing the topsoil in the area.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as described in NUREG-1022, based on an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made.
"There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 6:30 PM EDT on 6/13/13 an all spill was identified which resulted in approximately one quart of fuel oil spilled to the ground from a diesel powered portable light which overturned during a storm. The oil spill was outside of the dike containment in which the light unit was located and was approximately 10 feet from waters of the Harris Lake (waters of the US). No oil entered the lake. This event was reportable to the state of North Carolina because it occurred within 100 feet of the Harris Lake. At 7:03 PM EDT on 6/13/13 Harris Environmental Services Section personnel made the oil spill notification to North Carolina Emergency Management which was acting on behalf of the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
"The spill was cleaned up by removing the topsoil in the area.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as described in NUREG-1022, based on an event related to protection of the environment for which a notification to other government agencies has been made.
"There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49115
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN ABELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN ABELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 06/14/2013
Notification Time: 03:25 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2013
Event Time: 21:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2013
Notification Time: 03:25 [ET]
Event Date: 06/13/2013
Event Time: 21:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
FRANK EHRHARDT (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF ONE OF TWO NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE TONE ALERT RADIO TRANSMITTERS
"At 9:27 p.m. EDT June 13, 2013, the National Weather Service reported a loss of the National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitter, WXL-58 located in Chapel Hill, NC serving the northeast Piedmont on 162.550 MHz, due to damage or power failure sustained during the passage of severe thunderstorms. The National Weather Service expects the transmitter to be out of service through at least Friday morning June 14, 2013.
"The purpose of the National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio transmitters is a redundant means to the 83 Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Sirens to warn the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event. The 83 Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Sirens were verified at 12:05 a.m. EDT June 14, 2013 to be in service and fully functional to alert the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event should an event occur.
"There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 9:27 p.m. EDT June 13, 2013, the National Weather Service reported a loss of the National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio Transmitter, WXL-58 located in Chapel Hill, NC serving the northeast Piedmont on 162.550 MHz, due to damage or power failure sustained during the passage of severe thunderstorms. The National Weather Service expects the transmitter to be out of service through at least Friday morning June 14, 2013.
"The purpose of the National Weather Service (NOAA) Tone Alert Radio transmitters is a redundant means to the 83 Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Sirens to warn the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event. The 83 Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Sirens were verified at 12:05 a.m. EDT June 14, 2013 to be in service and fully functional to alert the public within the 5 mile radius of the plant of an actual event should an event occur.
"There is no impact to public health and safety due to this condition.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."