Event Notification Report for May 24, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/23/2013 - 05/24/2013
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49066
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARTIN RAJKOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARTIN RAJKOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 05/24/2013
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2013
Event Time: 03:34 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2013
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2013
Event Time: 03:34 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
LAURA KOZAK (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
AUTOMATIC START OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DUE TO BUS UNDERVOLTAGE
"At 0334 (CDT) on 5/24/2013 MNGP [Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant] experienced a loss of power to Bus 15 (Division 1 4kV Essential Bus) during performance of preoperational testing on the 2R reserve transformer which initiated an Essential Bus Transfer of Bus 15 and automatic start of 12 Emergency Diesel Generator.
"MNGP was in Mode 5 operations with water level >21 feet 11 inches above the top of the RPV flange and all credited safety systems were lined up to Bus 16 (Division 2 4kV Essential Bus) which was unaffected by this event.
"Bus 15 was automatically repowered from the 1AR reserve transformer as designed. During this evolution all critical safety functions remained green and all systems responded as expected to the Essential Bus transfer. The cause of the sequence of events that led to the Bus 15 loss of power is being investigated.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv) as an event that results in a valid actuation of 12 Emergency Diesel Generator. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 0334 (CDT) on 5/24/2013 MNGP [Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant] experienced a loss of power to Bus 15 (Division 1 4kV Essential Bus) during performance of preoperational testing on the 2R reserve transformer which initiated an Essential Bus Transfer of Bus 15 and automatic start of 12 Emergency Diesel Generator.
"MNGP was in Mode 5 operations with water level >21 feet 11 inches above the top of the RPV flange and all credited safety systems were lined up to Bus 16 (Division 2 4kV Essential Bus) which was unaffected by this event.
"Bus 15 was automatically repowered from the 1AR reserve transformer as designed. During this evolution all critical safety functions remained green and all systems responded as expected to the Essential Bus transfer. The cause of the sequence of events that led to the Bus 15 loss of power is being investigated.
"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv) as an event that results in a valid actuation of 12 Emergency Diesel Generator. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49067
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL SHUMATE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL SHUMATE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/24/2013
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2013
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2013
Notification Time: 13:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2013
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INTAKE BARRIER BEING STRUCK BY OIL TANKER
"At 0835 CDT, the Entergy Transmission Operations Center notified the Waterford 3 control room that a crude oil tanker had struck the dolphins at the cooling water intake structure on the Mississippi River. There were 4 out of 5 dolphins damaged, with 3 of these having substantial damage.
"The dolphins are hard structures anchored around the cooling water intake structure [which provide] protection from river traffic.
"Waterford 3 operations was unaffected by this event and thermal power remains at 100%. The intake structure, including the Circulating Water System, was unaffected by this event.
"Possible near-term effects of the event are a loss of protective barrier between river traffic and the intake structure due to the physical damage to the dolphins and hazards to navigation due to the loss of the dolphin lights.
"At 1230 CDT, the United States Coast Guard was notified of this event in accordance with Waterford 3 procedures. This notification is subsequent to the notification of the United States Coast Guard per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0835 CDT, the Entergy Transmission Operations Center notified the Waterford 3 control room that a crude oil tanker had struck the dolphins at the cooling water intake structure on the Mississippi River. There were 4 out of 5 dolphins damaged, with 3 of these having substantial damage.
"The dolphins are hard structures anchored around the cooling water intake structure [which provide] protection from river traffic.
"Waterford 3 operations was unaffected by this event and thermal power remains at 100%. The intake structure, including the Circulating Water System, was unaffected by this event.
"Possible near-term effects of the event are a loss of protective barrier between river traffic and the intake structure due to the physical damage to the dolphins and hazards to navigation due to the loss of the dolphin lights.
"At 1230 CDT, the United States Coast Guard was notified of this event in accordance with Waterford 3 procedures. This notification is subsequent to the notification of the United States Coast Guard per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49068
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB MEIXELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: BOB MEIXELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 05/24/2013
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2013
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2013
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2013
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HEATING VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITION SYSTEM INADEQUATELY ANALYZED FOR HEAT LOAD
"There is no current event in progress at Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS). This notification is [being made] to complete a required 10 CFR 50.72 report that was not made at the time of discovery. During a review of the guidance in NUREG 1022, Rev. 2, ONS recognized conditions that were reported to the NRC in LER 269/2013-001-00 on April 8, 2013, (ADAMS Accession ML13101A307), which met the 8-hour reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) -- 'Unanalyzed Condition,' and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A,B,C&D) -- 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' but were not previously reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3).
LER 269/2013-001-00 previously documented Duke Energy's conclusion that emergency power equipment could be adversely impacted by a licensee identified, original design issue involving inadequate analysis of electrical equipment heat loads and weaknesses in the Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system design. Nothing in this notification modifies or supplements the information provided in LER 269/2013-001-00. This legacy event notification completes the action required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A,B,C&D). The need to perform a 10 CFR 50.72 notification was not recognized during the reportability evaluation.
"Initial Safety Significance: None. This is a legacy event notification. Oconee's emergency power equipment is currently operable, but nonconforming with Oconee's license.
"Corrective Action(s): Compensatory measures are in place, and modifications are in progress to address the legacy design issue. The issue of not reporting as required under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) is entered into Duke Energy's corrective action program.
"The Oconee NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"There is no current event in progress at Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS). This notification is [being made] to complete a required 10 CFR 50.72 report that was not made at the time of discovery. During a review of the guidance in NUREG 1022, Rev. 2, ONS recognized conditions that were reported to the NRC in LER 269/2013-001-00 on April 8, 2013, (ADAMS Accession ML13101A307), which met the 8-hour reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) -- 'Unanalyzed Condition,' and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A,B,C&D) -- 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' but were not previously reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3).
LER 269/2013-001-00 previously documented Duke Energy's conclusion that emergency power equipment could be adversely impacted by a licensee identified, original design issue involving inadequate analysis of electrical equipment heat loads and weaknesses in the Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system design. Nothing in this notification modifies or supplements the information provided in LER 269/2013-001-00. This legacy event notification completes the action required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A,B,C&D). The need to perform a 10 CFR 50.72 notification was not recognized during the reportability evaluation.
"Initial Safety Significance: None. This is a legacy event notification. Oconee's emergency power equipment is currently operable, but nonconforming with Oconee's license.
"Corrective Action(s): Compensatory measures are in place, and modifications are in progress to address the legacy design issue. The issue of not reporting as required under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) is entered into Duke Energy's corrective action program.
"The Oconee NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."