Event Notification Report for April 24, 2013

UNQUALIFIED RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER AT A NON-POWER REACTOR

Based on a review of qualifications of the current RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) at the Rhode Island Nuclear Science Center, it was determined that the individual did not meet the licensee's Technical Specification 6.2.2 for education or experience requirements. This review is a follow-up to an NRC inspection report dated March 25, 2013.

This non-compliance is reportable in accordance with licensee Technical Specifications 1.25, item 8, which delineates administrative and procedural requirements. Immediate actions was to shut down operations until such time that inadequacies can be remedied.

NON-LICENSED EMPLOYEE SUPERVISOR CONFIRMED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL

"A non-licensed, supervisory employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been restricted."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

VALID ACTUATION OF AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DUE TO A LOSS OF TRAIN A RESERVE FEED TO THE SITE

"On 4/24/13 at 1411 EDT, a fault occurred on the Unit 1 101 CD Reserve Auxiliary Transformer causing the 12 CD 34kV Reserve Feed Breaker to open resulting in a loss of Train A Reserve Feed to Unit 1 and Unit 2. The cause of the fault is still under investigation.

"Unit 2 remains stable in 100% power. Unit 2 entered LCO 3.8.1, AC Source - Operating, Condition A, one required offsite circuit inoperable Restore Unit 2 reserve feed to operable status within 72 hours.

"Unit 1 is currently in a refueling outage and offline. Unit 1 CD Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) automatically started and loaded as expected.

"North Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Train lost power due to a load shed, which resulted in a 2 degree Fahrenheit rise in the Spent Fuel Pool Temperature. The North Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Pump was restarted on 1 CD EDG at 1447 EDT. South Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Train remained in-service the entire time.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

LOADING PROCEDURE FOR ISFSI MULTI-PURPOSE CANISTERS PLACED THEM IN AN UNANALYZED CONDITION

"On April 24, 2013, at 09:02 PDT, Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) determined that the loading procedure for the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) multi-purpose canisters (MPCs) placed the MPCs in an unanalyzed condition. The procedure (approved for use in 2009) contained steps to install vent caps on the MPC vents while the MPC contained an air/water mixture. This placed the MPC in an isolated condition without any relief path while water was in the MPC (a condition previously not analyzed in the DCPP ISFSI FSAR).

"The MPC vents that prevent MPC over pressurization were disabled while the vent caps were installed with no alternative over pressurization protection provided, therefore the condition is a 24-hour reportable event under 10 CFR 72.75(d)(1).

"This process was used for 23 casks, beginning in 2009. The amount of time each cask was isolated was approximately 40 - 60 minutes. DCPP expects that no appreciable MPC pressure increase occurred, since the MPC contains an air void, and the activity is performed expeditiously. Based on engineering judgment, a conservative evaluation of the potential pressure rise during this period shows an increase of less than 2 psig. Since the MPC is vented prior to isolation, a 2 psig increase does not challenge the MPC design pressure of 100 psig. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the integrity of any of the 23 previously loaded MPCs has been challenged at the DCPP ISFSI.

"This evaluation will be confirmed and documented in a formal calculation as part of issue resolution."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PROSTATE SEED IMPLANT EARLY TERMINATION

"A prostate seed implant procedure was terminated after the insertion of 2 needles. Only 5 of 106 intended seeds were implanted (1.55mCi of 32.86mCi). The patient's anatomy (pubic arch) presented interference to the placement of needles/seeds for proper dose distribution. The patient will now be treated with external beam IMRT [intensity modulated radiation therapy] once post implant CT and dose assessment have been performed in approximately 3 weeks. The patient and referring physician have been notified. The facility notified NYS DOH [New York State Department of Health] same day, written report with corrective actions has been received. To prevent recurrence the urologist will verify during planning volume study that there are no anatomical obstructions to needle placement."

Report No. NY-13-02

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUND RADIUM 226 SOURCE

"On April 24, 2013, The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment [Department] received notification from the Mesa County Landfill located in Grand Junction, Colorado, that a load of trash had alarmed the gate monitor. The roll-off in question came from a residential spring clean-up event sponsored by the city of Grand Junction.

"That same day, a member of the Department responded to the alarm and the roll-off was moved to a secure location after an initial radiation survey on the outside of the roll-off had been completed.

"On May 7, 2013, members of the Department examined the contents or the roll-off and a small section of plastic pipe (1 foot length) and a small source bound with tape were identified. It appeared that the source had been taped to the side of the plastic pipe at one time, and the word 'source' was written on the pipe. Using an Identifinder multi-channel analyzer, the isotope was identified as Ra-226.

"Dose rates were measured at greater than 200 millirem per hour on contact with the source (the limit of the inspector's instrument), and 10 millirem per hour at 1 foot. The dimensions of the source appeared to be approximately 3 mm by 2 cm. The source is currently stored in a secured location.

"The Department is conducting an investigation, and a press release is being issued to encourage anyone with information about the source to contact the Department."

* * * UPDATE FROM ED STROUD TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/29/13 AT 1459 EDT * * *

The following information was received by email:

"Following the initial event notification on 5/15/13 regarding a found Ra-226 source in Grand Junction, CO, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment issued a press release that requested anyone with additional information to please contact the DOH. Several days later a member of the public contacted DOH with a possible lead. Using that information, inspectors were able to trace the source back to a private residence in Grand Junction. On 5/24/13, inspectors visited a house in a residential neighborhood and found additional radioactive materials in the attached garage. However, the inspectors were not permitted to enter the residence. Radioactive materials found included 2 more Ra-226 sources and a half dozen small jars containing an unknown radioactive powder, which appeared to be uranium mill tailings. The radioactive materials were removed by the inspectors and taken to a secure storage location where additional measurements/analysis can be conducted. The elderly female resident at the house told inspectors that her late husband and his business associates manufactured Geiger counters during the uranium boom years.

"Additional information will follow as it is obtained."

Notified R4DO (Azua) and FSME Resources via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to report an event involving an invalid actuation signal affecting the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) and Essential Service Water (ESW) systems.

"Initial conditions on 04/24/2013: refueling outage was in progress, there was no fuel in the reactor vessel (No MODE), a B safety-related train outage was in progress, and the A ESW train was in operation to support cooling of the A train safety-related equipment. Some separation group 2 bistables were in a tripped condition because instrument power bus NN02 was de-energized.

"At approximately 0400 [CDT] on 04/24/2013, Separation Group 4 DC bus NK04 experienced a ground condition. Plant personnel were using a plant procedure to search for the ground. When breaker NK5409 was opened, some unexpected Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) signals occurred. Opening the breaker removed power to the B ESFAS cabinet. With power removed to the B ESFAS cabinet, the circuit cards that generate cross-train trips failed to a tripped condition (thus generating cross-train trip signals) which resulted in some A train ESFAS actuations, in particular, auxiliary feedwater actuations for the A motor-driven and the turbine-driven AFW pumps. Additionally, an AFW Low Suction Pressure (LSP) circuit card tripped, and when combined with the bi-stable that was in a tripped state because bus NN02 was de-energized, the 2-out-of-3 logic was made up, resulting in an auxiliary feedwater LSP actuation. The LSP actuation resulted in the A Train ESW pump receiving a start signal, and the A motor-driven and the turbine-driven AFW pump suction supply valves receiving an actuation signal to transfer the suction supply from the normal source to the ESW system.

"Neither the motor-driven nor the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps started because they had been properly removed from service earlier in the outage. The A ESW pump was already running. No water was transferred from the ESW system to the AFW system since system tagging had been previously placed to isolate the two systems.

"The actuations were considered invalid because they were caused by opening breaker NK5409 which resulted in loss of power to the B ESFAS cabinet.

"The Senior Resident Inspector was notified."