Event Notification Report for April 14, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/13/2013 - 04/14/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
48921489224892348924
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48921
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KARL COSSEY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: KARL COSSEY
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 04/14/2013
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2013
Event Time: 06:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2013
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2013
Event Time: 06:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
CONTAINMENT SPRAY CHEMICAL ADDITION FLOW PATH ISOLATED
"At 0620 CDT on 4/14/13, the Unit 1 Sodium Hydroxide Tank outlet valve was found to be shut. This valve isolated the flow path for both trains of containment spray chemical addition and resulted in LCO 3.6.7 (Spray Additive System) not being met, which resulted in a condition reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"At 0651 CDT on 4/14/13, the Unit 1 Sodium Hydroxide Tank outlet valve was restored to its required locked open position and TSAC [Technical Specification Action Conditions] 3.6.7.8 was exited."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0620 CDT on 4/14/13, the Unit 1 Sodium Hydroxide Tank outlet valve was found to be shut. This valve isolated the flow path for both trains of containment spray chemical addition and resulted in LCO 3.6.7 (Spray Additive System) not being met, which resulted in a condition reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).
"At 0651 CDT on 4/14/13, the Unit 1 Sodium Hydroxide Tank outlet valve was restored to its required locked open position and TSAC [Technical Specification Action Conditions] 3.6.7.8 was exited."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48922
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY ROSE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY ROSE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 04/14/2013
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2013
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2013
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2013
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/17/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNAVAILABILITY OF TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM DUE TO SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
"At 1400 EDT on Sunday, April 14, 2013, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems will be removed from service for scheduled maintenance.
"Under certain accident conditions, the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary.
"TSC ventilation system maintenance and post maintenance testing is scheduled to be completed by 1400 EDT on Wednesday, April 17, 2013.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."
* * * UPDATE FROM GREGORY KANDA TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1456 EDT ON 4/17/13 * * *
"The Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and filtration systems have been returned to service following maintenance. The TSC is fully functional.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. "
Notified R3DO (Orth).
"At 1400 EDT on Sunday, April 14, 2013, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems will be removed from service for scheduled maintenance.
"Under certain accident conditions, the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary.
"TSC ventilation system maintenance and post maintenance testing is scheduled to be completed by 1400 EDT on Wednesday, April 17, 2013.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."
* * * UPDATE FROM GREGORY KANDA TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1456 EDT ON 4/17/13 * * *
"The Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and filtration systems have been returned to service following maintenance. The TSC is fully functional.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. "
Notified R3DO (Orth).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48923
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN WHALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN WHALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/15/2013
Notification Time: 02:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2013
Event Time: 22:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2013
Notification Time: 02:01 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2013
Event Time: 22:17 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/15/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | N | 0 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATIONS WHILE SHUTTING DOWN
"On Sunday, April 14, 2013 at 2217 hours, with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in Start-up, the turbine generator previously removed from service, and the reactor sub-critical on Intermediate Range Monitors Range 2 and lowering, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to reactor pressure lowering beyond established control bands. At the time of the manual reactor scram PNPS was conducting a planned reactor shutdown to commence refueling outage (RFO) -19. All control rods fully inserted and Primary Containment Isolation System Group II (Reactor Building) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup System) actuations occurred as designed due to the expected reactor water level shrink associated with the scram signal. All plant systems responded as designed. Off-site power was unaffected and was supplied by the start-up transformer (normal power supply for refuel and reactor shutdown operations).
"The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) were manually closed to terminate the reactor pressure reduction and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was manually started in the reactor pressure control mode. The Reactor Protection System (RPS) was reset as were the reactor building and reactor water clean-up system isolation signals. Currently, the plant cooldown is continuing with the HPCI system in pressure control and reactor water level being maintained within normal bands with the condensate and feedwater system. The cause of the lowering reactor pressure has not been determined and remains under review.
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.
"This 8-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will also be notifying state authorities.
"On Sunday, April 14, 2013 at 2217 hours, with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in Start-up, the turbine generator previously removed from service, and the reactor sub-critical on Intermediate Range Monitors Range 2 and lowering, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to reactor pressure lowering beyond established control bands. At the time of the manual reactor scram PNPS was conducting a planned reactor shutdown to commence refueling outage (RFO) -19. All control rods fully inserted and Primary Containment Isolation System Group II (Reactor Building) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup System) actuations occurred as designed due to the expected reactor water level shrink associated with the scram signal. All plant systems responded as designed. Off-site power was unaffected and was supplied by the start-up transformer (normal power supply for refuel and reactor shutdown operations).
"The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) were manually closed to terminate the reactor pressure reduction and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was manually started in the reactor pressure control mode. The Reactor Protection System (RPS) was reset as were the reactor building and reactor water clean-up system isolation signals. Currently, the plant cooldown is continuing with the HPCI system in pressure control and reactor water level being maintained within normal bands with the condensate and feedwater system. The cause of the lowering reactor pressure has not been determined and remains under review.
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.
"This 8-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A)."
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will also be notifying state authorities.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48924
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL McDONNELL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL McDONNELL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 04/15/2013
Notification Time: 06:04 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2013
Event Time: 22:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2013
Notification Time: 06:04 [ET]
Event Date: 04/14/2013
Event Time: 22:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/13/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT AIR LOCK FAILED INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST
"On Sunday, April 14, 2013 at 2216 hours, with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in Start-up, the turbine generator previously removed from service, and the reactor sub-critical on Intermediate Range Monitors Range 2 and lowering, the PNPS Containment Personnel Air Lock failed integrated air lock testing as required by TS 4.7.A.2.
"10CFR50 Appendix J requires that primary reactor containment meet certain leakage rate testing requirements. These test requirements ensure that 1) Leakage through the containment or systems and components penetrating the containment do not exceed allowable leakage rates specified in Technical Specifications and 2) The integrity of the containment structure is maintained during its service life. The test requirements include local leakage rate testing of containment air locks. The test criteria establishes a limit of less than or equal to 10.525 SLM, actual leakage was 16.7 SLM.
"PNPS was in the process of shutting down for a scheduled Refueling Outage during the scheduled testing.
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.
"The USNRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
"This 8-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c)."
* * * RETRACTION FROM BOB O'NEILL TO PETE SNYDER AT 1700 ON 6/13/13 * * *
"Subsequent investigation of the test failure determined that an o-ring in the Airlock Inner Pressure Equalizing Device (PED) was not properly seated resulting in exceeding the established leakage rate limit. Leakage was not observed on the Airlock Outer Boundary Surface. Thus, with the Airlock Outer Boundary Surface intact, the Airlock was capable of performing the safety function to control the release of radioactive material.
"In addition, even with the Airlock leakage of 16.7 standard liters per minute (SLM), the Technical Specification Primary Containment As-Found Minimum Pathway Leakage Limit of 0.6 La for all Type B and C leakage tests was not exceeded.
"Therefore, the initial 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) report is being retracted."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Dentel).
"On Sunday, April 14, 2013 at 2216 hours, with the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) Reactor Mode Select Switch (RMSS) in Start-up, the turbine generator previously removed from service, and the reactor sub-critical on Intermediate Range Monitors Range 2 and lowering, the PNPS Containment Personnel Air Lock failed integrated air lock testing as required by TS 4.7.A.2.
"10CFR50 Appendix J requires that primary reactor containment meet certain leakage rate testing requirements. These test requirements ensure that 1) Leakage through the containment or systems and components penetrating the containment do not exceed allowable leakage rates specified in Technical Specifications and 2) The integrity of the containment structure is maintained during its service life. The test requirements include local leakage rate testing of containment air locks. The test criteria establishes a limit of less than or equal to 10.525 SLM, actual leakage was 16.7 SLM.
"PNPS was in the process of shutting down for a scheduled Refueling Outage during the scheduled testing.
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public.
"The USNRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
"This 8-hour notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(c)."
* * * RETRACTION FROM BOB O'NEILL TO PETE SNYDER AT 1700 ON 6/13/13 * * *
"Subsequent investigation of the test failure determined that an o-ring in the Airlock Inner Pressure Equalizing Device (PED) was not properly seated resulting in exceeding the established leakage rate limit. Leakage was not observed on the Airlock Outer Boundary Surface. Thus, with the Airlock Outer Boundary Surface intact, the Airlock was capable of performing the safety function to control the release of radioactive material.
"In addition, even with the Airlock leakage of 16.7 standard liters per minute (SLM), the Technical Specification Primary Containment As-Found Minimum Pathway Leakage Limit of 0.6 La for all Type B and C leakage tests was not exceeded.
"Therefore, the initial 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) report is being retracted."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Dentel).