Event Notification Report for April 12, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/11/2013 - 04/12/2013
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48918
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DALE BISAILLON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DALE BISAILLON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/12/2013
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2013
Event Time: 10:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2013
Notification Time: 14:45 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2013
Event Time: 10:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION - MISSING BACKFLOW PREVENTER
"On 4/12/2013 at 1010 EDT, it was determined that a floor drain line between the Turbine Building and Intermediate Building did not have a backflow preventer as expected. Backflow protection is provided to prevent the possible spread of a fire via the drain system. The Turbine Building and the Intermediate Building are considered two different fire areas within the scope of the fire protection program. The discovery of this condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"In accordance with the Technical Requirements Manual, an hourly fire watch inspection and fire detector operability verification have been established until an equivalent level of protection is provided or until permanent corrective actions can be implemented.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On 4/12/2013 at 1010 EDT, it was determined that a floor drain line between the Turbine Building and Intermediate Building did not have a backflow preventer as expected. Backflow protection is provided to prevent the possible spread of a fire via the drain system. The Turbine Building and the Intermediate Building are considered two different fire areas within the scope of the fire protection program. The discovery of this condition is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"In accordance with the Technical Requirements Manual, an hourly fire watch inspection and fire detector operability verification have been established until an equivalent level of protection is provided or until permanent corrective actions can be implemented.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48919
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW QUICK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW QUICK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/13/2013
Notification Time: 03:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2013
Event Time: 22:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2013
Notification Time: 03:18 [ET]
Event Date: 04/12/2013
Event Time: 22:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO ISOLATED DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH ON SAFETY RELIEF VALVE TAILPIPE
"On April 12th, 2013 at 2200 CDT, investigation into the inability to complete a Safety/Relief Valve (S/RV) discharge line excess flow check valve test determined that a relief valve discharge monitoring instrument valve had been inappropriately closed since late June, 2011. The closed valve isolated two differential pressure switches that impact the operation of 'E' Low-Low Set (LLS) valve. The LLS logic and instrumentation were affected by the loss of two 'E' S/RV tailpipe discharge pressure switches which indicate S/RV open status and start two inhibit timers which prevent plant operators or the LLS S/RV logic from immediately re-opening the valve to allow the water leg in the S/RV discharge line to recede. The LLS logic and instrumentation is designed to mitigate the effects of postulated thrust loads on the S/RV discharge lines by preventing subsequent actuations with an elevated water leg in the S/RV discharge line. It also mitigates the effects of postulated pressure loads on the torus shell or suppression pool by preventing multiple actuations in rapid succession of the S/RVs subsequent to their initial actuation. The valve found closed has been returned to its normal open position. This condition resulted in the 'E' S/RV LLS function being aligned contrary to its design configuration and as such is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On April 12th, 2013 at 2200 CDT, investigation into the inability to complete a Safety/Relief Valve (S/RV) discharge line excess flow check valve test determined that a relief valve discharge monitoring instrument valve had been inappropriately closed since late June, 2011. The closed valve isolated two differential pressure switches that impact the operation of 'E' Low-Low Set (LLS) valve. The LLS logic and instrumentation were affected by the loss of two 'E' S/RV tailpipe discharge pressure switches which indicate S/RV open status and start two inhibit timers which prevent plant operators or the LLS S/RV logic from immediately re-opening the valve to allow the water leg in the S/RV discharge line to recede. The LLS logic and instrumentation is designed to mitigate the effects of postulated thrust loads on the S/RV discharge lines by preventing subsequent actuations with an elevated water leg in the S/RV discharge line. It also mitigates the effects of postulated pressure loads on the torus shell or suppression pool by preventing multiple actuations in rapid succession of the S/RVs subsequent to their initial actuation. The valve found closed has been returned to its normal open position. This condition resulted in the 'E' S/RV LLS function being aligned contrary to its design configuration and as such is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.