Event Notification Report for April 11, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/10/2013 - 04/11/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
4891448915489164891749103
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48914
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES KURAS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES KURAS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/11/2013
Notification Time: 16:47 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2013
Event Time: 15:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2013
Notification Time: 16:47 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2013
Event Time: 15:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/12/2013
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
ART HOWELL (RA)
DAN DORMAN (NRR)
JOHN MONNINGER (NRR)
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
ART HOWELL (RA)
DAN DORMAN (NRR)
JOHN MONNINGER (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
UNUSUAL EVENT FOR A FIRE LASTING GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES
"The fire started at 1455 CDT in the turbine building southeast stairwell and on the auxiliary boiler room roof. Fire fighting efforts continue as fire exists inside the wall between the turbine building and the auxiliary boiler room.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local governments.
Notified DHS, FEMA, and the NICC.
* * * UPDATE FROM WARREN BRANDT TO PETE SNYDER AT 0100 EDT ON 4/12/13 * * *
"Wolf Creek declared a NOUE at 15:10 CDT on 4/11/13 due to a fire that started at 14:55 [CDT] in the Turbine Building SE stairwell and on the Auxiliary Boiler room roof. The fire was extinguished at 15:19 [CDT], and cool to the touch at 16:48 [CDT]. No offsite fire response support was required. The fire did not impact any safety related equipment.
"The NOUE was terminated at 17:03 CDT 4/11/13. The cause of the fire is under investigation."
Notified R4DO (Deese), NRR EO (Monninger), IRD (Marshall), DHS, FEMA and NICC (via email).
* * * UPDATE FROM PIERCE MOORE TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1400 EDT ON 4/12/13 * * *
"Update to Termination of NOUE due to Fire on roof of Auxiliary Boiler.
"Wolf Creek declared a NOUE at 15:10 CDT on 4/11/13 due to a fire that started at 14:55 [CDT] in the Turbine Building SE stairwell and on the Auxiliary Boiler room roof. The fire was extinguished at 15:19 [CDT], and cool to the touch at 16:48 [CDT]. The Offsite Fire Department was called and responded but their support in fire suppression was not required, they did assist in clean up and fire investigation efforts. The fire did not impact any safety related equipment.
"The NOUE was terminated at 17:03 CDT 4/11/13. The cause of the fire is under investigation."
Notified R4DO (Deese), NRR EO (Monninger), IRD (Marshall) via email.
"The fire started at 1455 CDT in the turbine building southeast stairwell and on the auxiliary boiler room roof. Fire fighting efforts continue as fire exists inside the wall between the turbine building and the auxiliary boiler room.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local governments.
Notified DHS, FEMA, and the NICC.
* * * UPDATE FROM WARREN BRANDT TO PETE SNYDER AT 0100 EDT ON 4/12/13 * * *
"Wolf Creek declared a NOUE at 15:10 CDT on 4/11/13 due to a fire that started at 14:55 [CDT] in the Turbine Building SE stairwell and on the Auxiliary Boiler room roof. The fire was extinguished at 15:19 [CDT], and cool to the touch at 16:48 [CDT]. No offsite fire response support was required. The fire did not impact any safety related equipment.
"The NOUE was terminated at 17:03 CDT 4/11/13. The cause of the fire is under investigation."
Notified R4DO (Deese), NRR EO (Monninger), IRD (Marshall), DHS, FEMA and NICC (via email).
* * * UPDATE FROM PIERCE MOORE TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1400 EDT ON 4/12/13 * * *
"Update to Termination of NOUE due to Fire on roof of Auxiliary Boiler.
"Wolf Creek declared a NOUE at 15:10 CDT on 4/11/13 due to a fire that started at 14:55 [CDT] in the Turbine Building SE stairwell and on the Auxiliary Boiler room roof. The fire was extinguished at 15:19 [CDT], and cool to the touch at 16:48 [CDT]. The Offsite Fire Department was called and responded but their support in fire suppression was not required, they did assist in clean up and fire investigation efforts. The fire did not impact any safety related equipment.
"The NOUE was terminated at 17:03 CDT 4/11/13. The cause of the fire is under investigation."
Notified R4DO (Deese), NRR EO (Monninger), IRD (Marshall) via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48915
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: LEWIS ROGERS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: LEWIS ROGERS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/11/2013
Notification Time: 18:19 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2013
Event Time: 15:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/11/2013
Notification Time: 18:19 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2013
Event Time: 15:41 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/11/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
MALCOLM WIDMANN (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER COOLERS OUT OF SERVICE
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, based on 'Loss of Assessment' capability.
"This is a non-emergency notification. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. At approximately 15:41 EDT on 4/11/2013, AH-11 and AH-17, Technical Support Center (TSC) Air Handling Units' coolers were not working. The cause of the condition has not been identified. However, troubleshooting efforts are being planned and will be worked immediately.
"TSC functionality requires all areas of the TSC be maintained between 60.8 degrees F and 82.4 degrees F. Actual TSC area temperatures have reached 77 degrees F. If the facility were activated with a full staff, temperatures could rise above the 82.4 degree F limit. Should the TSC need to be activated for an event, we have compensatory measures which would include relocating the TSC to the Alternate Emergency Facility per PEP-240. This decision would be based on the existing event conditions and coordinated with the Emergency Response Manager, SEC-MCR, and Radiological Control Manager. The Alternate TSC has been verified to have electrical power, ventilation, and communication capability. The Technical Support Center-Site Emergency Coordinator has been notified."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, based on 'Loss of Assessment' capability.
"This is a non-emergency notification. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility. At approximately 15:41 EDT on 4/11/2013, AH-11 and AH-17, Technical Support Center (TSC) Air Handling Units' coolers were not working. The cause of the condition has not been identified. However, troubleshooting efforts are being planned and will be worked immediately.
"TSC functionality requires all areas of the TSC be maintained between 60.8 degrees F and 82.4 degrees F. Actual TSC area temperatures have reached 77 degrees F. If the facility were activated with a full staff, temperatures could rise above the 82.4 degree F limit. Should the TSC need to be activated for an event, we have compensatory measures which would include relocating the TSC to the Alternate Emergency Facility per PEP-240. This decision would be based on the existing event conditions and coordinated with the Emergency Response Manager, SEC-MCR, and Radiological Control Manager. The Alternate TSC has been verified to have electrical power, ventilation, and communication capability. The Technical Support Center-Site Emergency Coordinator has been notified."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48916
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KEVIN HOLLE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KEVIN HOLLE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/11/2013
Notification Time: 21:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2013
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2013
Notification Time: 21:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2013
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/03/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DEGRADED ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS
"On April 11, 2013, at 1300 hours, during the performance of On-Line Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Blowdown Logic Testing, two poor wiring connections were identified (the electrical leads were not properly compressed at their termination point). The electrical leads are associated with the B and C ADS valves. Quad Cities has five ADS valves which can be used to depressurize the Reactor Pressure Vessel under accident conditions. While the solenoids of these valves were actuated successfully during the recent Unit 1 refueling outage (which ended on April 8, 2013), the less than optimum configuration could have prevented the valves from actuating under design basis conditions. The degraded wiring for both valves was restored at 1741 hours [CDT].
"Given the potential impact on the ADS depressurization function, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 6/3/13 AT 1138 EDT FROM FRED SWIHART TO DONG PARK * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS Report made on April 11, 2013, at 2110 EDT (ENS Report # 48916).
"Further evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station confirms the Unit 1, 3B and 3C Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) valves would have performed their safety functions when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report # 48916 is being retracted.
"Note: On April 11, 2013, at 1741 CDT the degraded wiring for the Unit 1, 3B and 3C ADS valves was repaired and both valves were returned to operable status."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Orth).
"On April 11, 2013, at 1300 hours, during the performance of On-Line Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Blowdown Logic Testing, two poor wiring connections were identified (the electrical leads were not properly compressed at their termination point). The electrical leads are associated with the B and C ADS valves. Quad Cities has five ADS valves which can be used to depressurize the Reactor Pressure Vessel under accident conditions. While the solenoids of these valves were actuated successfully during the recent Unit 1 refueling outage (which ended on April 8, 2013), the less than optimum configuration could have prevented the valves from actuating under design basis conditions. The degraded wiring for both valves was restored at 1741 hours [CDT].
"Given the potential impact on the ADS depressurization function, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 6/3/13 AT 1138 EDT FROM FRED SWIHART TO DONG PARK * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS Report made on April 11, 2013, at 2110 EDT (ENS Report # 48916).
"Further evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station confirms the Unit 1, 3B and 3C Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) valves would have performed their safety functions when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report # 48916 is being retracted.
"Note: On April 11, 2013, at 1741 CDT the degraded wiring for the Unit 1, 3B and 3C ADS valves was repaired and both valves were returned to operable status."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Orth).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 48917
Rep Org: U.S. ARMY
Licensee: U.S. ARMY
Region: 1
City: CAMP LEJEUNE State: NC
County:
License #: 21-32838-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GIZICKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: U.S. ARMY
Region: 1
City: CAMP LEJEUNE State: NC
County:
License #: 21-32838-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GIZICKI
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 04/12/2013
Notification Time: 11:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2013
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2013
Notification Time: 11:46 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2013
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/24/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
TRITIUM LAMP BROKEN DURING MAINTENANCE OF A MORTAR SIGHT
On 4/11/13 at 1300 EDT, a 1 Ci tritium lamp was broken during routine maintenance on a M64 mortar sight unit. The sealed source tritium lamp broke when a wrench hit the tritium module. Surveys were conducted, but the results will not be available until next week. Bioassays are being perform on 4 individuals and based on historic records, the RSO expects minimal intake of less than 5 mrem. The device was bagged, tagged and placed in a secure storage area for future disposal.
The licensee attempted to notify R3 (McCraw).
* * * RETRACTION FROM THOMAS GIZICKI TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/24/13 AT 1004 EDT * * *
The US ARMY is retracting this event due to a miniscule bio-assay indicated dose rate to the four workers (maximum dose of 0.9 mRem to an individual) and survey results of the maintenance shop indicating no contamination. The device has been secured and properly stored for future disposal.
The licensee notified R3 (McCraw).
Notified the R1DO (Joustra), R3DO (Hills) and FSME Events Resource via email.
On 4/11/13 at 1300 EDT, a 1 Ci tritium lamp was broken during routine maintenance on a M64 mortar sight unit. The sealed source tritium lamp broke when a wrench hit the tritium module. Surveys were conducted, but the results will not be available until next week. Bioassays are being perform on 4 individuals and based on historic records, the RSO expects minimal intake of less than 5 mrem. The device was bagged, tagged and placed in a secure storage area for future disposal.
The licensee attempted to notify R3 (McCraw).
* * * RETRACTION FROM THOMAS GIZICKI TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/24/13 AT 1004 EDT * * *
The US ARMY is retracting this event due to a miniscule bio-assay indicated dose rate to the four workers (maximum dose of 0.9 mRem to an individual) and survey results of the maintenance shop indicating no contamination. The device has been secured and properly stored for future disposal.
The licensee notified R3 (McCraw).
Notified the R1DO (Joustra), R3DO (Hills) and FSME Events Resource via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49103
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE PETZEL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: STEVE PETZEL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 06/10/2013
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2013
Event Time: 01:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2013
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 04/11/2013
Event Time: 01:28 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/10/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
HEATHER GEPFORD (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting the emergency feedwater system.
"While the plant was in Mode 5 on 4/11/2013, during performance of a maintenance procedure for AMSAC system logic verification, an invalid MDAFAS occurred. (Note: AMSAC is ATWAS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry and MDAFAS is Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal). Both trains of the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (MDAFPs) started. While generation of the actuation signal is an expected result of the procedure, the actuation occurred several steps earlier in the procedure than expected. Additionally, the Control Room Operators were not expecting the MDAFPs to start. The pumps were manually stopped.
"The actuation was caused by procedural guidance not containing a sufficiently prescribed sequence of activities that should occur when simulating plant conditions leading to the intended actuation of the AMSAC system. The plant was not in a condition where feedwater was required.
"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting the emergency feedwater system.
"While the plant was in Mode 5 on 4/11/2013, during performance of a maintenance procedure for AMSAC system logic verification, an invalid MDAFAS occurred. (Note: AMSAC is ATWAS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry and MDAFAS is Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal). Both trains of the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (MDAFPs) started. While generation of the actuation signal is an expected result of the procedure, the actuation occurred several steps earlier in the procedure than expected. Additionally, the Control Room Operators were not expecting the MDAFPs to start. The pumps were manually stopped.
"The actuation was caused by procedural guidance not containing a sufficiently prescribed sequence of activities that should occur when simulating plant conditions leading to the intended actuation of the AMSAC system. The plant was not in a condition where feedwater was required.
"The Senior NRC Resident Inspector was notified."