Event Notification Report for April 09, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/08/2013 - 04/09/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
48905489014907748900
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48905
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNETH P. BRESLIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNETH P. BRESLIN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/09/2013
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 04/09/2013
Event Time: 13:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2013
Notification Time: 17:08 [ET]
Event Date: 04/09/2013
Event Time: 13:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM TELEPHONE
"On April 9, 2013 at 1315 [EDT] Hope Creek Operations personnel identified that the NRC ENS phone line was unavailable for Hope Creek Generating Station. The loss of the NRC ENS line was verified by the Hope Creek Shift Manager via backup land line communication to the NRC Operation Center at 1355 [EDT]. At that time, the NRC Operations Center submitted a repair ticket to the phone service provider. NRC ENS phone availability was verified restored to service at 1618 [EDT] with the NRC Operations Center.
"The loss of the phone line had no effect on plant operations and the unit remains at 100% power.
"Additionally, Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) capability was verified to remain intact during this time period and was available to transmit data.
"No personnel injuries resulted from the event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On April 9, 2013 at 1315 [EDT] Hope Creek Operations personnel identified that the NRC ENS phone line was unavailable for Hope Creek Generating Station. The loss of the NRC ENS line was verified by the Hope Creek Shift Manager via backup land line communication to the NRC Operation Center at 1355 [EDT]. At that time, the NRC Operations Center submitted a repair ticket to the phone service provider. NRC ENS phone availability was verified restored to service at 1618 [EDT] with the NRC Operations Center.
"The loss of the phone line had no effect on plant operations and the unit remains at 100% power.
"Additionally, Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) capability was verified to remain intact during this time period and was available to transmit data.
"No personnel injuries resulted from the event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48901
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW BUSCH
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MATTHEW BUSCH
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/09/2013
Notification Time: 09:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/09/2013
Event Time: 02:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2013
Notification Time: 09:42 [ET]
Event Date: 04/09/2013
Event Time: 02:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POWER LOST TO METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION
"At 0235 EDT on 4-9-13, due to an offsite power transformer fault, power was lost to site support buildings and all meteorological instrumentation. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3), major loss of emergency assessment capabilities.
"At 0455 EDT, power was restored to meteorological instrumentation in the control room. During the power outage, limited meteorological data remained available via telephone from the National Weather Service and the Fitzpatrick site met tower. Plant operations at both units 1 and 2 were not affected. Both units remain at full power."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0235 EDT on 4-9-13, due to an offsite power transformer fault, power was lost to site support buildings and all meteorological instrumentation. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3), major loss of emergency assessment capabilities.
"At 0455 EDT, power was restored to meteorological instrumentation in the control room. During the power outage, limited meteorological data remained available via telephone from the National Weather Service and the Fitzpatrick site met tower. Plant operations at both units 1 and 2 were not affected. Both units remain at full power."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49077
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRAIN MAZE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRAIN MAZE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/29/2013
Notification Time: 11:06 [ET]
Event Date: 04/09/2013
Event Time: 05:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2013
Notification Time: 11:06 [ET]
Event Date: 04/09/2013
Event Time: 05:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
BRIAN BONSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
60 DAY REPORT OF AN INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM ISOLATION SIGNAL
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"On April 9, 2013, at 0506 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), during placement of clearance 2-TO-2013-0003, section 2-099-0001, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 2, received Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals. The PCIS Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations caused the initiation of all three trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem 'A', and isolations of the BFN, Unit 2, Reactor Zone ventilation and BFN, Units 1, 2, and 3, Refuel Zone ventilation. Operations personnel responded to the PCIS initiation, ensured all equipment operated as designed, and stopped the clearance placement.
"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.
"The apparent cause for this condition was the outage tagging personnel did not prepare clearance 2-TO-2013-0003 section 2-099-0001 as a stand alone clearance, detail the effect on PCIS initiation on cover placement instructions, place clearance 2-TO-2013-0003 in the right sequence, and perform a thorough review of clearance 2-TO-2013-0003 section 2-099-0001 to identify the missing detail related to PCIS initiation. Personnel performance issues are being addressed in accordance with the Tennessee Valley Authority policies and processes.
"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
"This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Problem Evaluation Report 711266.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"On April 9, 2013, at 0506 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), during placement of clearance 2-TO-2013-0003, section 2-099-0001, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 2, received Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals. The PCIS Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations caused the initiation of all three trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem 'A', and isolations of the BFN, Unit 2, Reactor Zone ventilation and BFN, Units 1, 2, and 3, Refuel Zone ventilation. Operations personnel responded to the PCIS initiation, ensured all equipment operated as designed, and stopped the clearance placement.
"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.
"The apparent cause for this condition was the outage tagging personnel did not prepare clearance 2-TO-2013-0003 section 2-099-0001 as a stand alone clearance, detail the effect on PCIS initiation on cover placement instructions, place clearance 2-TO-2013-0003 in the right sequence, and perform a thorough review of clearance 2-TO-2013-0003 section 2-099-0001 to identify the missing detail related to PCIS initiation. Personnel performance issues are being addressed in accordance with the Tennessee Valley Authority policies and processes.
"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
"This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Problem Evaluation Report 711266.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48900
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN PULS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN PULS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/09/2013
Notification Time: 09:05 [ET]
Event Date: 04/09/2013
Event Time: 07:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2013
Notification Time: 09:05 [ET]
Event Date: 04/09/2013
Event Time: 07:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/09/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
AUXILIARY BUILDING VENT MONITOR OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"On April 9, 2013, at approximately 0730 hours [CDT], the Kewaunee Power Station declared the Auxiliary Building Vent Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' Radiation Monitor (Mid and Hi Range) nonfunctional for planned maintenance. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the Auxiliary Building Vent SPING nonfunctionality due to planned maintenance.
"The SPING is expected to be out of service for approximately 3 hours.
"Although manual 'grab samples' could be used as a backup, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify the upper two emergency action levels for offsite radiation conditions).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
See similar EN #48881 and 48891.
* * * UPDATE FROM GARY AHRENS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1018 EDT ON 4/9/13 * * *
SPING was returned to service at 0819 CDT. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Passehl).
"On April 9, 2013, at approximately 0730 hours [CDT], the Kewaunee Power Station declared the Auxiliary Building Vent Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas 'SPING' Radiation Monitor (Mid and Hi Range) nonfunctional for planned maintenance. The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) team has been notified of the Auxiliary Building Vent SPING nonfunctionality due to planned maintenance.
"The SPING is expected to be out of service for approximately 3 hours.
"Although manual 'grab samples' could be used as a backup, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability (unable to sufficiently identify the upper two emergency action levels for offsite radiation conditions).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
See similar EN #48881 and 48891.
* * * UPDATE FROM GARY AHRENS TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1018 EDT ON 4/9/13 * * *
SPING was returned to service at 0819 CDT. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Passehl).