Event Notification Report for April 02, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/01/2013 - 04/02/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
488824887748878488794889949084
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48882
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: REESE KILIAN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: REESE KILIAN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/03/2013
Notification Time: 14:13 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2013
Event Time: 16:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/03/2013
Notification Time: 14:13 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2013
Event Time: 16:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/03/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT - LICENSED EMPLOYEE ARRESTED FOR POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
A licensed employee was arrested for possession of a controlled substance while off-duty. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A licensed employee was arrested for possession of a controlled substance while off-duty. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48877
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN FINLAY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN FINLAY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/02/2013
Notification Time: 15:52 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2013
Event Time: 13:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2013
Notification Time: 15:52 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2013
Event Time: 13:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT INVOLVING DISCOVERY OF AN ALCOHOL CONTAINER INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA
During remodeling of a bathroom on the third floor of the Administrative Building which is located inside the Protective Area, workers discovered a very old container of gin after removing the ceiling tiles. This item will be entered into the licensee corrective actions program for follow up.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
During remodeling of a bathroom on the third floor of the Administrative Building which is located inside the Protective Area, workers discovered a very old container of gin after removing the ceiling tiles. This item will be entered into the licensee corrective actions program for follow up.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48878
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GARRISON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GARRISON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/02/2013
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2013
Notification Time: 16:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM OUT OF SERVICE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"This is a non emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"Planned maintenance activities are being performed on 4/3/13 to be Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work includes removal of a pressurizing ventilation fan and opening ventilation system ductwork. The planned work activity duration is approximately 48 hours.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The State of North Carolina will be notified."
"This is a non emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.
"Planned maintenance activities are being performed on 4/3/13 to be Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work includes removal of a pressurizing ventilation fan and opening ventilation system ductwork. The planned work activity duration is approximately 48 hours.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The State of North Carolina will be notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48879
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM HOLLAND
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIM HOLLAND
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/02/2013
Notification Time: 20:30 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2013
Event Time: 17:07 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2013
Notification Time: 20:30 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2013
Event Time: 17:07 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 88 | Power Operation | 88 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ELECTRICAL FAULT IN SWITCHYARD RESULTING IN PERSONNEL INJURIES
"At 1707 CDT on 4/2/13 an arc flash occurred at the 'B' safeguards transformer (XMDV24) in the plant switchyard at Callaway. At the time of the flash, ground straps were being placed on the 'B' safeguards transformer which had been removed from service for maintenance. The event resulted in a loss of power to areas/buildings outside the power block. There was no impact to equipment and systems in the plant.
"Four workers were injured or affected by the flash. The extent of the electrical-related injuries has not been determined. However, based on reports from the scene, all of the workers were conscious and walked away from the scene. One person was transported by helicopter and two by ambulance to a local hospital. The fourth person experienced only a minor injury.
"The hazard has been isolated and investigation of the cause is in progress.
"Notifications of this event are planned to be made to OSHA and the Missouri Public Service Commission."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ROB STOUGH TO VINCE KLCO AT 1955 EDT ON 4/4/2013 * * *
"Ameren Missouri issued a press release about the event described above at approximately 1507 CDT on April 4, 2013.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
Notified the R4DO (Kellar).
"At 1707 CDT on 4/2/13 an arc flash occurred at the 'B' safeguards transformer (XMDV24) in the plant switchyard at Callaway. At the time of the flash, ground straps were being placed on the 'B' safeguards transformer which had been removed from service for maintenance. The event resulted in a loss of power to areas/buildings outside the power block. There was no impact to equipment and systems in the plant.
"Four workers were injured or affected by the flash. The extent of the electrical-related injuries has not been determined. However, based on reports from the scene, all of the workers were conscious and walked away from the scene. One person was transported by helicopter and two by ambulance to a local hospital. The fourth person experienced only a minor injury.
"The hazard has been isolated and investigation of the cause is in progress.
"Notifications of this event are planned to be made to OSHA and the Missouri Public Service Commission."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ROB STOUGH TO VINCE KLCO AT 1955 EDT ON 4/4/2013 * * *
"Ameren Missouri issued a press release about the event described above at approximately 1507 CDT on April 4, 2013.
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
Notified the R4DO (Kellar).
Agreement State
Event Number: 48899
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: ALPHA-OMEGA SERVICES, INC.
Region: 4
City: BELLFLOWER State: CA
County:
License #: LA-10025-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: ALPHA-OMEGA SERVICES, INC.
Region: 4
City: BELLFLOWER State: CA
County:
License #: LA-10025-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 04/08/2013
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2013
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/08/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
PATTI SILVA (NMSS)
RICK DEESE (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
PATTI SILVA (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A MIS-DELIVERED SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The following information was provided by the State of Louisiana via email:
"Event date and Time: On 04/02/2013 [the] RSO for A & O [Alpha-Omega Services, Inc.] called in a mis-delivery of an Ir-192 source intended for Radiation Oncology Center of Nevada (ROCN). ROCN is a client/customer of A & O, but [the common carrier] delivered the source to Cardinal Health (CH). ROCN and CH are both radioactive material licensees and both have facilities in Las Vegas, NV.
"Event Location: Around the Las Vegas, NV area. The source was intended for ROCN in Las Vegas, NV, but was delivered to Cardinal Health, [also in] Las Vegas, NV. The source delivery occurred in the morning to CH. CH notified ROCN that their source was delivered to CH by [the common carrier]. [The common carrier] was notified and picked up the source at 1300 [PDT] and delivered it to ROCN.
"Event type: Delivery of a radioactive source by the [common] carrier to the wrong licensee. Except during transport, the source was in possession of someone who was a licensee and well trained in radiation safety practices.
"Notifications: A notification was made to LA DEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] Radiation Assessment after the incident was basically over and entirely under control. The notification was made to [a Louisiana representative] located in [the Louisiana] Southwest Regional office. A & O was involved in the recovery of the source by phone after learning of the mis-delivery. The source was delivered to the wrong licensee. CH, the licensee where the source was delivered, was licensed for radioactive material and well trained in the handling of radioactive material.
"Event description: [An] Ir-192 source was delivered to the wrong licensee by [the common carrier]. When the error was discovered by CH, CH notified ROCN that they were in possession of licensed radioactive material that belonged to ROCN. [The common carrier] was called and they picked up the source and delivered it to ROCN around 1300 [PDT]. The source shielding and shipping container was intact during the entire incident. It was not damaged nor was the container opened.
"Transport vehicle description: [The common carrier] picked up the source from the A & O facility [in] Venton, LA which was being shipped to a client, ROCN [in] Las Vegas, NV. [The common carrier] delivered the Ir-192 source to the wrong address. The source was delivered to Cardinal Health (CH), [also in] Las Vegas, NV."
Event Report ID No.: LA-120015
The following information was provided by the State of Louisiana via email:
"Event date and Time: On 04/02/2013 [the] RSO for A & O [Alpha-Omega Services, Inc.] called in a mis-delivery of an Ir-192 source intended for Radiation Oncology Center of Nevada (ROCN). ROCN is a client/customer of A & O, but [the common carrier] delivered the source to Cardinal Health (CH). ROCN and CH are both radioactive material licensees and both have facilities in Las Vegas, NV.
"Event Location: Around the Las Vegas, NV area. The source was intended for ROCN in Las Vegas, NV, but was delivered to Cardinal Health, [also in] Las Vegas, NV. The source delivery occurred in the morning to CH. CH notified ROCN that their source was delivered to CH by [the common carrier]. [The common carrier] was notified and picked up the source at 1300 [PDT] and delivered it to ROCN.
"Event type: Delivery of a radioactive source by the [common] carrier to the wrong licensee. Except during transport, the source was in possession of someone who was a licensee and well trained in radiation safety practices.
"Notifications: A notification was made to LA DEQ [Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality] Radiation Assessment after the incident was basically over and entirely under control. The notification was made to [a Louisiana representative] located in [the Louisiana] Southwest Regional office. A & O was involved in the recovery of the source by phone after learning of the mis-delivery. The source was delivered to the wrong licensee. CH, the licensee where the source was delivered, was licensed for radioactive material and well trained in the handling of radioactive material.
"Event description: [An] Ir-192 source was delivered to the wrong licensee by [the common carrier]. When the error was discovered by CH, CH notified ROCN that they were in possession of licensed radioactive material that belonged to ROCN. [The common carrier] was called and they picked up the source and delivered it to ROCN around 1300 [PDT]. The source shielding and shipping container was intact during the entire incident. It was not damaged nor was the container opened.
"Transport vehicle description: [The common carrier] picked up the source from the A & O facility [in] Venton, LA which was being shipped to a client, ROCN [in] Las Vegas, NV. [The common carrier] delivered the Ir-192 source to the wrong address. The source was delivered to Cardinal Health (CH), [also in] Las Vegas, NV."
Event Report ID No.: LA-120015
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49084
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JERRY HELKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JERRY HELKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/31/2013
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2013
Event Time: 09:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2013
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 04/02/2013
Event Time: 09:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
6O-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On April 2, 2013, Nine Mile Point 2 (NMP2) received a Division 2 reactor building area high ambient temperature isolation signal when lifting a lead for trip unit E31-N638B while performing surveillance N2-IPS-LDS-Q010, Reactor Building General Area Temperature Instrumentation Channel Functional Test. The isolation signal provided a closure signal to two Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) valves, and three Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system containment isolation valves.
"As a result of the isolation signal one of the RCIC containment isolation valves, 2ICS*MOV128 closed. The other four valves were already in their normal closed position. The RHR system valves are associated with the RHR Shutdown Cooling System and second RCIC isolation valve is used to warmup and place the RCIC system in standby following an isolated condition. All affected isolation valves responded as designed. As a result of 2ICS*MOV128 closing the RCIC system was declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.5.3, RCIC System, Condition A was entered. Action A.1 required verifying the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) was operable immediately. Action A.2 requires restoring RCIC to operable within 14 days.
"After the instrumentation system was restored to normal, the RCIC system was subsequently restored to available later that day at 1205 [EDT] and operable at 1500 [EDT].
"The actuation signal was not valid because it resulted from maintenance activities when leads were lifted, and the trip unit had not been bypassed as required by the procedure. There were no isolation logic signals in response to actual plant conditions or parameters.
"This event was entered into the corrective action system as Condition Report (CR) 2013-002461. There were no actual safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State.
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On April 2, 2013, Nine Mile Point 2 (NMP2) received a Division 2 reactor building area high ambient temperature isolation signal when lifting a lead for trip unit E31-N638B while performing surveillance N2-IPS-LDS-Q010, Reactor Building General Area Temperature Instrumentation Channel Functional Test. The isolation signal provided a closure signal to two Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) valves, and three Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system containment isolation valves.
"As a result of the isolation signal one of the RCIC containment isolation valves, 2ICS*MOV128 closed. The other four valves were already in their normal closed position. The RHR system valves are associated with the RHR Shutdown Cooling System and second RCIC isolation valve is used to warmup and place the RCIC system in standby following an isolated condition. All affected isolation valves responded as designed. As a result of 2ICS*MOV128 closing the RCIC system was declared inoperable. Technical Specification 3.5.3, RCIC System, Condition A was entered. Action A.1 required verifying the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS) was operable immediately. Action A.2 requires restoring RCIC to operable within 14 days.
"After the instrumentation system was restored to normal, the RCIC system was subsequently restored to available later that day at 1205 [EDT] and operable at 1500 [EDT].
"The actuation signal was not valid because it resulted from maintenance activities when leads were lifted, and the trip unit had not been bypassed as required by the procedure. There were no isolation logic signals in response to actual plant conditions or parameters.
"This event was entered into the corrective action system as Condition Report (CR) 2013-002461. There were no actual safety consequences or impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State.