Event Notification Report for March 24, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/23/2013 - 03/24/2013
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48846
Facility: SUMMER
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: HARVEY ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-AP1000,[3] W-AP1000
NRC Notified By: HARVEY ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 03/24/2013
Notification Time: 09:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2013
Event Time: 04:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2013
Notification Time: 09:54 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2013
Event Time: 04:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/24/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC START OF AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DUE TO A LIGHTNING STRIKE
"At 0458 [EDT], a lightning strike caused a voltage disturbance on the 115 KV offsite power source and resulted in the automatic start of the 'A' emergency diesel generator on an undervoltage relay actuation. The 'A' emergency diesel generator came up to rated frequency and voltage. The voltage disturbance [duration] was not long enough to cause the normal incoming breaker to the 'A' train 7.2 KV safety related bus (XSW1DA) to open or the 'A' emergency diesel generator output breaker to close.
"The voltage disturbance caused the 'A' safety related chiller and some ventilation fans to trip. These loads were subsequently restarted with no issue.
"The 'A' emergency diesel generator was secured and made ready for autostart at 0520 [EDT].
"The station is in Mode 5 for a mid cycle outage to repair a reactor coolant pump seal.
"This notification is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of an emergency diesel generator."
The unit is in a normal electrical shutdown plant configuration.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the State and Local authorities.
"At 0458 [EDT], a lightning strike caused a voltage disturbance on the 115 KV offsite power source and resulted in the automatic start of the 'A' emergency diesel generator on an undervoltage relay actuation. The 'A' emergency diesel generator came up to rated frequency and voltage. The voltage disturbance [duration] was not long enough to cause the normal incoming breaker to the 'A' train 7.2 KV safety related bus (XSW1DA) to open or the 'A' emergency diesel generator output breaker to close.
"The voltage disturbance caused the 'A' safety related chiller and some ventilation fans to trip. These loads were subsequently restarted with no issue.
"The 'A' emergency diesel generator was secured and made ready for autostart at 0520 [EDT].
"The station is in Mode 5 for a mid cycle outage to repair a reactor coolant pump seal.
"This notification is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of an emergency diesel generator."
The unit is in a normal electrical shutdown plant configuration.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the State and Local authorities.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 49055
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE BURTON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE BURTON
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 05/21/2013
Notification Time: 16:46 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2013
Event Time: 10:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2013
Notification Time: 16:46 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2013
Event Time: 10:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 92 | Power Operation | 92 | Power Operation |
INVALID ACTUATION OF HPCI SUCTION VALVES
"On March 24, 2013, at 1009 EDT, while personnel were entering the torus compartment to perform planned maintenance activities via permanently installed plant ladder, the sensing line to transmitter 2E41-N062D was inadvertently bumped. [This] was confirmed to be the cause for an invalid torus high water level alarm and a HPCI [High Pressure Core Injection] pump suction swap. This resulted in the HPCI suction swapping from its normal lineup, condensate storage tank (CST), to the torus as designed. Once actuated the suction swap occurred as designed. The cause was attributed to the close proximity between an individual descending/ascending the fixed ladder and the affected sensing line in conjunction with a loose tubing restraint which made the line more sensitive to being bumped. After confirming that the actuation on high torus level was invalid, HPCI suction was realigned to the CST.
"The HPCI pump suction was subsequently realigned to the CST and the loose tubing restraints were tightened."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On March 24, 2013, at 1009 EDT, while personnel were entering the torus compartment to perform planned maintenance activities via permanently installed plant ladder, the sensing line to transmitter 2E41-N062D was inadvertently bumped. [This] was confirmed to be the cause for an invalid torus high water level alarm and a HPCI [High Pressure Core Injection] pump suction swap. This resulted in the HPCI suction swapping from its normal lineup, condensate storage tank (CST), to the torus as designed. Once actuated the suction swap occurred as designed. The cause was attributed to the close proximity between an individual descending/ascending the fixed ladder and the affected sensing line in conjunction with a loose tubing restraint which made the line more sensitive to being bumped. After confirming that the actuation on high torus level was invalid, HPCI suction was realigned to the CST.
"The HPCI pump suction was subsequently realigned to the CST and the loose tubing restraints were tightened."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.