Event Notification Report for March 01, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/28/2013 - 03/01/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
48801488024879848799
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48801
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KENNETH GRACIA
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: KENNETH GRACIA
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/01/2013
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2013
Event Time: 10:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2013
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2013
Event Time: 10:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation |
24 HOUR NOTIFICATION OF INOPERABLE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME VALVE BASED ON NRC BULLETIN 80-14
"Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Valve Declared Inoperable.
"On March 1, 2013 at 1045 hours, with the reactor at 94% core thermal power (CTP), a scram discharge volume valve, CV-302-22B was declared inoperable as required by station procedural direction due to an observed degradation in opening stroke timing during performance of a compensatory surveillance test of the Scram Discharge Instrument Volume Vent and Drain Valve. This report is provided consistent with NRC IE Bulletin 80-14.
"Currently, station engineering is evaluating the valve stroke time trend data of CV-302-22B and plans to address this issue will be developed as part of the Corrective Action Program (CAP). Pilgrim Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.G applies due to the inoperability of CV-302-22B.
"This notification is being made in accordance with the NRC IE Bulletin 80-14, 'Degradation of BWR Scram Discharge Volume Capability,' Part A.3., which states, 'By procedures, require that the SDV vent and drain valve be normally operable, open and periodically tested. If these valves are not operable or are closed for more than 1 hour in any 24 hour period during operation, the reason shall be logged and the NRC notified within 24 hours (Prompt Notification).'
"A similar event report was generated for the same valve on February 18, 2013. Compensatory measures applicable to the original event report included a revised lubrication application and additional surveillance testing. Although surveillance tests subsequent to the original February 18, 2013 tested demonstrated valve operability, the initial March 1, 2013 test did not meet opening stroke time operability requirements for the valve. Subsequent stroke time testing has met the opening stroke time operability requirements for the valve.
"This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public.
"The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
See similar event EN #48766.
"Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Valve Declared Inoperable.
"On March 1, 2013 at 1045 hours, with the reactor at 94% core thermal power (CTP), a scram discharge volume valve, CV-302-22B was declared inoperable as required by station procedural direction due to an observed degradation in opening stroke timing during performance of a compensatory surveillance test of the Scram Discharge Instrument Volume Vent and Drain Valve. This report is provided consistent with NRC IE Bulletin 80-14.
"Currently, station engineering is evaluating the valve stroke time trend data of CV-302-22B and plans to address this issue will be developed as part of the Corrective Action Program (CAP). Pilgrim Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.G applies due to the inoperability of CV-302-22B.
"This notification is being made in accordance with the NRC IE Bulletin 80-14, 'Degradation of BWR Scram Discharge Volume Capability,' Part A.3., which states, 'By procedures, require that the SDV vent and drain valve be normally operable, open and periodically tested. If these valves are not operable or are closed for more than 1 hour in any 24 hour period during operation, the reason shall be logged and the NRC notified within 24 hours (Prompt Notification).'
"A similar event report was generated for the same valve on February 18, 2013. Compensatory measures applicable to the original event report included a revised lubrication application and additional surveillance testing. Although surveillance tests subsequent to the original February 18, 2013 tested demonstrated valve operability, the initial March 1, 2013 test did not meet opening stroke time operability requirements for the valve. Subsequent stroke time testing has met the opening stroke time operability requirements for the valve.
"This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public.
"The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
See similar event EN #48766.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48802
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC MARTINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC MARTINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 03/02/2013
Notification Time: 00:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2013
Event Time: 22:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2013
Notification Time: 00:25 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2013
Event Time: 22:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/18/2013
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
ELMO COLLINS (R4RA)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
JASON KOZAL (IRD)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
ELMO COLLINS (R4RA)
ERIC LEEDS (NRR)
JASON KOZAL (IRD)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO LOSS OF BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS
On 3/1/2013 at 2242 CST, Wolf Creek Unit 1 declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) due to both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) being unavailable: With the 'A' EDG out of service for planned maintenance, the 'B' EDG was discovered to have high governor oil level and was declared inoperable at 2235 CST.
The governor oil level was adjusted and the 'B' EDG was declared operable at 2307 CST. The NOUE was terminated on 3/21/2013 at 2321 CST. Normal offsite power was maintained to the plant and no offsite assistance was requested.
The licensee notified state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA (email).
* * * RETRACTION FROM JIM KURAS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 04/18/13 AT 1322 EDT * * *
"Further evaluation by the Engineering department determined that the 'B' EDG was available with the high governor oil level. Testing was performed at an offsite facility, which confirmed that the 'B' EDG was capable of performing its specified safety function with the as-found oil level. As a result, the condition has been determined to not be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i)."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Drake), NRR EO (Skeen) and IRD MOC (Grant).
On 3/1/2013 at 2242 CST, Wolf Creek Unit 1 declared a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) due to both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) being unavailable: With the 'A' EDG out of service for planned maintenance, the 'B' EDG was discovered to have high governor oil level and was declared inoperable at 2235 CST.
The governor oil level was adjusted and the 'B' EDG was declared operable at 2307 CST. The NOUE was terminated on 3/21/2013 at 2321 CST. Normal offsite power was maintained to the plant and no offsite assistance was requested.
The licensee notified state and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified DHS, FEMA, DHS NICC and NuclearSSA (email).
* * * RETRACTION FROM JIM KURAS TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 04/18/13 AT 1322 EDT * * *
"Further evaluation by the Engineering department determined that the 'B' EDG was available with the high governor oil level. Testing was performed at an offsite facility, which confirmed that the 'B' EDG was capable of performing its specified safety function with the as-found oil level. As a result, the condition has been determined to not be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i)."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Drake), NRR EO (Skeen) and IRD MOC (Grant).
Part 21
Event Number: 48798
Rep Org: CURTISS WRIGHT FLOW CONTROL CO.
Licensee: CRYDOM, INC
Region: 1
City: DANBURY State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WEINSTEIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: CRYDOM, INC
Region: 1
City: DANBURY State: CT
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WEINSTEIN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/01/2013
Notification Time: 11:40 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2015
Notification Time: 11:40 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/20/2015
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
PART 21 - DUAL ALARM MODULES THAT MAY CONTAIN FAULTY DIODES IN SINGLE STATE RELAYS
The following is excerpted from a facsimile received from Curtis Wright:
"Crydom Inc., the sole supplier to Scientech of D4D07 Solid State Relays (SSRs) since before
2009, has informed Scientech that SSRs provided with date codes between 0908 (August 2009) and 1004 (April 2010) may have included faulty diodes which resulted in reduced reliability (early failure) of their SSRs.
"The mode of failure is that the module output may not be able to maintain voltage sufficient to activate its external load. It appears that this failure occurs randomly after some duration of operation, typically weeks or months. No common cause has been found.
"Scientech screens components for infantile failure by burning-in modules for a minimum of 48 hours prior to final test. There were no SSR failures during burn-in of potentially affected modules; therefore burn-in was not an effective screen for this issue.
"Prior to January 2013, Scientech did not track SSRs by date code. In establishing conservative boundaries for product shipped with suspect SSRs, Scientech can be certain that no suspect SSRs were shipped in Scientech products prior to August 2009 (the earliest suspect date code). It was determined in September 2012 that Scientech did not have any SSRs with a date code of 2010 or earlier in inventory or work-in-progress. Scientech can therefore determine that products shipped after September 2012 do not contain suspect SSRs."
Affected components:
DAM801, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM801 (/1 optional),
Part number EIP-E287PA-1
SAM801, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM801 (11 optional),
Part number EIP-E289PA-1
DAM502, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM502, Part number
EIP-E297DD-1, -2, -3
SAM502, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM502, Part number
EIP-E297DD-4
DAM503, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM503, Part number
EIP-E304DD-1, -2, -3
SAM503, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM503, Part number
EIP-E304DD-4, -20
DAM504, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM504, Part number
NUS-A131PA
Affected Facilities:
Beaver Valley
Farley
Ginna
Indian Point 2/3
Kewaunee
North Anna
Prairie Island
Surry
Turkey Point
* * * UPDATE AT 1625 EDT ON 3/20/2015 FROM VINCE CHERMAK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via fax. Only information that has changed is being attached below.
"Thirteen plants were notified during the original notification. On March 10, 2015, one affected plant reported that when one SSR failed, its output consisted of high frequency noise at a reduced duty cycle. This noise caused overheating and failure of resistors in an RC filter connected to the alarm module output. Plants experiencing SSR failures should check downstream elements for possible consequential damage. Scientec has not received any other reports of this condition. The condition was reevaluated and the Part 21 evaluation was revised. The evaluation concluded that this newly identified condition does not impact the original defect as reported."
Notified the R1DO (Dental), R2DO (Desai), R3DO (Roach), and Part-21 Group (via e-mail).
The following is excerpted from a facsimile received from Curtis Wright:
"Crydom Inc., the sole supplier to Scientech of D4D07 Solid State Relays (SSRs) since before
2009, has informed Scientech that SSRs provided with date codes between 0908 (August 2009) and 1004 (April 2010) may have included faulty diodes which resulted in reduced reliability (early failure) of their SSRs.
"The mode of failure is that the module output may not be able to maintain voltage sufficient to activate its external load. It appears that this failure occurs randomly after some duration of operation, typically weeks or months. No common cause has been found.
"Scientech screens components for infantile failure by burning-in modules for a minimum of 48 hours prior to final test. There were no SSR failures during burn-in of potentially affected modules; therefore burn-in was not an effective screen for this issue.
"Prior to January 2013, Scientech did not track SSRs by date code. In establishing conservative boundaries for product shipped with suspect SSRs, Scientech can be certain that no suspect SSRs were shipped in Scientech products prior to August 2009 (the earliest suspect date code). It was determined in September 2012 that Scientech did not have any SSRs with a date code of 2010 or earlier in inventory or work-in-progress. Scientech can therefore determine that products shipped after September 2012 do not contain suspect SSRs."
Affected components:
DAM801, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM801 (/1 optional),
Part number EIP-E287PA-1
SAM801, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM801 (11 optional),
Part number EIP-E289PA-1
DAM502, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM502, Part number
EIP-E297DD-1, -2, -3
SAM502, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM502, Part number
EIP-E297DD-4
DAM503, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM503, Part number
EIP-E304DD-1, -2, -3
SAM503, a Single Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model SAM503, Part number
EIP-E304DD-4, -20
DAM504, a Dual Alarm Module, manufactured by Scientech, Model DAM504, Part number
NUS-A131PA
Affected Facilities:
Beaver Valley
Farley
Ginna
Indian Point 2/3
Kewaunee
North Anna
Prairie Island
Surry
Turkey Point
* * * UPDATE AT 1625 EDT ON 3/20/2015 FROM VINCE CHERMAK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The following information was received via fax. Only information that has changed is being attached below.
"Thirteen plants were notified during the original notification. On March 10, 2015, one affected plant reported that when one SSR failed, its output consisted of high frequency noise at a reduced duty cycle. This noise caused overheating and failure of resistors in an RC filter connected to the alarm module output. Plants experiencing SSR failures should check downstream elements for possible consequential damage. Scientec has not received any other reports of this condition. The condition was reevaluated and the Part 21 evaluation was revised. The evaluation concluded that this newly identified condition does not impact the original defect as reported."
Notified the R1DO (Dental), R2DO (Desai), R3DO (Roach), and Part-21 Group (via e-mail).
Agreement State
Event Number: 48799
Rep Org: NJ RAD PROT AND REL PREVENTION PGM
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: PORT ELIZABETH State: NJ
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PATRICIA GARDNER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 1
City: PORT ELIZABETH State: NJ
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PATRICIA GARDNER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 03/01/2013
Notification Time: 11:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2013
Notification Time: 11:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/01/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHIPMENT CONTAINING CESIUM-137 FOUND
The following was received from the State of New Jersey via email:
"Provided below is a summary of the Bureau of Environmental Radiation (BERad) response received today. The owner of the shipment is International Forest Products Corporation (IFP) located in Massachusetts. Therefore, the State of Massachusetts Radiation Control Program was contacted. MA staff contacted IFP who determined that the shipment was originally sent to China and rejected. IFP was informed of this rejection, but was not given a reason for the rejection. The bails of paper came from Connecticut. Because Connecticut is not an Agreement State, the NRC Region 1 was contacted to determine if there was a licensee at that location. State of Connecticut radiation control staff were contacted.
"The source is shielded, secure and awaiting disposition. At this time it has not been determined who will hire the licensed contractor to package and ship the material for disposal, nor who the contractor will be.
"At 1453 on 2/28/13, RMP [New Jersey Radioactive Materials Program] personnel received notification from the Communication Center that an international shipping container on a truck was being held at Port Elizabeth due to elevated levels of Cs-137. The FBI, Union City Bomb Squad, Fire Department, EMS, and DEP [Department of Environmental Protection] emergency response responded. Per direction from the FBI, the truck was unloaded at the U.S. Customs East Coast Warehouse at the Port. The container was opened and the contents, which was found to be bales of paper, were unloaded and surveyed. An approximately 6 inch object wrapped in cardboard and duct tape was identified as the source of the elevated readings. The source was isolated and secured by Emergency response personnel, who placed the source in a lead pig (which was shorter than the source), then placed the pig in a 5 gallon pail filled with vermiculite.
"On 3/1/13, RMP personnel responded to the U.S. Customs East Coast Warehouse to obtain readings and confirm the information that had been reported. DEP emergency response personnel were also at the site today. The highest reading on the outside of the bucket was 220 uR/hr, compared with a background of 10uR/hr. The highest reading with the lid of the bucket removed was 300 uR/hr. Emergency Response placed the bottom part of a second lead pig on top the pig they used yesterday in order to ensure the entire source was covered. The two pieces were then taped together.
"The highest reading when the source was out of the pig was 2.5 mR/hr on contact. A wipe indicated that the source was not leaking. The highest reading once the source was shielding by the pigs was 20 uR/hr. The pigs were placed in the 5 gallon pail which was then placed in a 55 gallon drum filled with vermiculite. The highest reading on the 55 gallon drum was 15 uR/hr. All readings were obtained with a Victoreen Model 450P ion chamber.
"A spectrum of the source, taken with an identiFinder, identified the nuclide as Cs-137."
The following was received from the State of New Jersey via email:
"Provided below is a summary of the Bureau of Environmental Radiation (BERad) response received today. The owner of the shipment is International Forest Products Corporation (IFP) located in Massachusetts. Therefore, the State of Massachusetts Radiation Control Program was contacted. MA staff contacted IFP who determined that the shipment was originally sent to China and rejected. IFP was informed of this rejection, but was not given a reason for the rejection. The bails of paper came from Connecticut. Because Connecticut is not an Agreement State, the NRC Region 1 was contacted to determine if there was a licensee at that location. State of Connecticut radiation control staff were contacted.
"The source is shielded, secure and awaiting disposition. At this time it has not been determined who will hire the licensed contractor to package and ship the material for disposal, nor who the contractor will be.
"At 1453 on 2/28/13, RMP [New Jersey Radioactive Materials Program] personnel received notification from the Communication Center that an international shipping container on a truck was being held at Port Elizabeth due to elevated levels of Cs-137. The FBI, Union City Bomb Squad, Fire Department, EMS, and DEP [Department of Environmental Protection] emergency response responded. Per direction from the FBI, the truck was unloaded at the U.S. Customs East Coast Warehouse at the Port. The container was opened and the contents, which was found to be bales of paper, were unloaded and surveyed. An approximately 6 inch object wrapped in cardboard and duct tape was identified as the source of the elevated readings. The source was isolated and secured by Emergency response personnel, who placed the source in a lead pig (which was shorter than the source), then placed the pig in a 5 gallon pail filled with vermiculite.
"On 3/1/13, RMP personnel responded to the U.S. Customs East Coast Warehouse to obtain readings and confirm the information that had been reported. DEP emergency response personnel were also at the site today. The highest reading on the outside of the bucket was 220 uR/hr, compared with a background of 10uR/hr. The highest reading with the lid of the bucket removed was 300 uR/hr. Emergency Response placed the bottom part of a second lead pig on top the pig they used yesterday in order to ensure the entire source was covered. The two pieces were then taped together.
"The highest reading when the source was out of the pig was 2.5 mR/hr on contact. A wipe indicated that the source was not leaking. The highest reading once the source was shielding by the pigs was 20 uR/hr. The pigs were placed in the 5 gallon pail which was then placed in a 55 gallon drum filled with vermiculite. The highest reading on the 55 gallon drum was 15 uR/hr. All readings were obtained with a Victoreen Model 450P ion chamber.
"A spectrum of the source, taken with an identiFinder, identified the nuclide as Cs-137."