Event Notification Report for February 28, 2013

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - IRRADIATOR RACK FAILED TO LOWER

The following was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On March 1, 2013, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee that at 2358 hours on February 28, 2013, one of the two sources failed to full lower into its storage pool. The rack had dropped 11 of 24 feet when it became stuck.

"The operator determined that the drive had failed, disengaged the motor from the drive mechanism, and the source lowered into the fully shielded position on its own. The licensee stated all alarms and interlocks functioned as designed. No exposure was received by any individual as a result of this event.

"The licensee stated that on March 1, 2013, they replaced the drive motor and successfully tested it. The licensee has not determined the cause for the motor failure. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I-9047

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DOOR INTERLOCK MALFUNCTION

"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. An employee entered a secondary containment interlock and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the main control room supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately 10 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor building differential pressure, as observed in the main control room, has remained less than -0.25" H2O at all times. Initial investigation determined that a mechanical interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the mechanical interlock."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY PUMP FAILURE

"On February 28, 2013, at 1319 EST, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) experienced a failure of 2CSH*P2, High Pressure Core Spray System Pressure Pump. The HPCS system was currently inoperable for planned maintenance for planned pump room unit cooler maintenance with a 14 day completion time per Technical Specification 3.5.1.

"Shortly after the starting of the HPCS pump as part of routine surveillance testing, the system pressure pump failed. Initial troubleshooting has found the pump motor windings to be shorted. Initial investigation identified smoke in the HPCS pump room, no indications of fire were identified. No breaker failures were identified. All other plant systems functioned as required."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

CLOSED COOLING WATER ISOLATION VALVE FAILS LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST

"On February 28, 2013, at 1155 EST, with the unit in Refueling Mode, a determination was made that reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) isolation valve (2P42-F051) exceeded its acceptance criteria for designed leakage when performing local leak rate testing. Diagnostic testing confirmed that all the leakage from its test boundary is going through this valve with an 'as found' leakage of >200,000 sccm at 32.87 psig. This valve is the outboard isolation barrier for that affected primary containment penetration with the inboard barrier being the RBCCW system itself as a 'closed' system.

"Previous practice is to conservatively include any leakage through this valve when performing as found leak rate tests as part of the primary containment leakage summary or as part of 0.6La. This is considered conservative since the RBCCW system inside containment is assumed to remain intact following a design basis accident (DBA) loss of coolant accident (LOCA). If the closed system remains intact there is no path for leakage to exit primary containment through this system.

"Since the past practice is to include the 'as found' leakage through this valve as part of 0.6La and since the 'as found' leakage would result in exceeding La, this condition is being considered a condition that results in the principal safety barriers being seriously degraded. This leakage would represent a loss of the containment function since the leak rate exceeded the Technical Specification limiting condition for operation (LCO) for primary containment. Further investigation is underway to determine if leakage through this single containment barrier is required to be included in the Appendix J primary containment leakage summary, since it is associated with a closed system."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION ON 3/15/13 AT 1607 EDT FROM KENNY HUNTER TO DONG PARK * * *

"Further investigation revealed an Appendix J exemption that was granted for the Hatch Unit 2 local leak rate test (LLRT) program in the 1978 time frame that specifically addressed the primary containment penetration that has primary containment isolation valve (PCIV) 2P42-F051 as its outboard barrier and the 'closed' system as its inboard barrier. The exemption recognizes that this system is designed to be intact and water filled post-LOCA, allows testing of the of the PCIV with water and states that the leakage through this PCIV is not included in the 0.6 La total.

"Since the Hatch RBCCW system supplying components inside primary containment is a 'closed' system and remains intact and water filled post-LOCA, there is no leakage path from primary containment through this RBCCW penetration. Since no leakage from primary containment can occur through this penetration in its 'as found' state, this condition does not represent a condition that seriously degrades a principal safety barrier. As such this condition has been determined to no longer meet reporting requirement 10CFR50.72(b)(3) and is therefore not reportable. Based on this information the previous notification is being retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue).

EMERGENCY BUS INADVERTENTLY DE-ENERGIZED WITH UNIT DEFUELED

"On February 28, 2013, at 2154 PST, Unit 2 4kV ESF Bus G deenergized while attempting a repair to the bus automatic transfer circuitry. The deenergization of 4kV ESF Bus G initiated a start signal to Diesel Generator 2-1, which supplies emergency power to 4kV ESF Bus G. Diesel Generator 2-1 did not start due to being placed in manual control to prevent starting automatically during the repair. However, a valid actuation signal was generated to start Diesel Generator 2-1. As the Diesel Generator was shut down and in manual control, no actuation occurred.

"This is reportable as a valid system actuation that was not part of a pre-planned sequence during testing.

"Unit 2 is currently defueled, with the core offloaded into the spent fuel pool. No loss of cooling occurred as spent fuel pool cooling equipment had been selected to unaffected buses.

"The NRC resident has been notified."

INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP

"This is a 60-day optional telephonic notification of an invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump (TDAFWP). This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

"On 28 February 2013, at 1534 CST, during restoration of the Unit 1 TDAFWP from steam admission valve maintenance, steam was inadvertently admitted to the TDAFWP turbine, resulting in the TDAFWP delivering auxiliary feed water flow to the steam generators.

"On 28 February 2013, the Unit 1 TDAFWP was removed from service for replacement of the hand switch and air-supply solenoid to the TDAFWP steam admission valve. The tagout utilized for this maintenance closed the TDAFWP trip-throttle valve to ensure that steam remained isolated from the TDAFWP. During the replacement of the hand switch and air-supply solenoid, the normally closed steam admission valve failed to the open position. This went unnoticed by Operations personnel. When the TDAFWP trip throttle valve was reopened during post-maintenance restoration, the failed-open steam admission valve provided a steam path to the TDAFWP. The TDAFWP started and supplied approximately 60-70 gpm feed water flow to each steam generator for approximately one minute prior to being secured by the operators. No main turbine load reduction was required to maintain reactor power within limits.

"This was an invalid actuation of the TDAFWP due to no automatic actuation signals being present and no operator actions being taken with the intent of starting the TDAFWP.

"During a normal TDAFWP start, the steam admission valve is opened in concert with steam supply valves aligned in series with the steam admission valve. During this event, the steam supply valves remained closed (steam flow bypassed these valves through normally open warm-up valves). Therefore, this event was a partial actuation of the TDAFWP.

"The TDAFW Pump is a third, independent train of AFW. No other portions of the auxiliary Feed Water System actuated or received actuation signals during this event.

"The primary cause of this event was determined to be not complying with the tagging checklist when sequencing the tagout restoration steps. Corrective actions are scheduled to complete on 30 May 2013."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.