Event Notification Report for February 18, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/17/2013 - 02/18/2013
EVENT NUMBERS
48764487654876648768
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48764
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH MAESTAS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH MAESTAS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 02/18/2013
Notification Time: 03:19 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/2013
Event Time: 01:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/2013
Notification Time: 03:19 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/2013
Event Time: 01:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL F. KING (R2DO)
MICHAEL F. KING (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HIGH SEAL LEAKOFF ON REACTOR COOLANT PUMP 3A
"This is an non-emergency event notification to the NRCOC in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) (four hour notification) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid Engineered Safeguards (ESF) actuation due to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) initiation (eight hour notification).
"On 2/18/2013 at 0055 Unit 3 commenced a unit shutdown due to high # 1 seal leak-off on the 3A Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). At 0129 3A RCP #1 seal leak-off exceeded operating limits. Unit 3 reactor was manually tripped. Auxiliary feedwater actuated as designed based on steam generator levels as a result of the trip. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3 and stable.
"No complications were noted as a result of the reactor trip. Steam generator levels are being returned to normal level following the reactor trip. All other plant systems functioned as designed during and after the reactor trip. 3A RCP high #1 seal leak-off is under investigation."
All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Decay heat was removed by AFW to the steam generators out the atmospheric reliefs. There was no primary to secondary leakage. Electrical buses are being supplied via offsite power.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This is an non-emergency event notification to the NRCOC in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a valid actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) (four hour notification) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid Engineered Safeguards (ESF) actuation due to Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) initiation (eight hour notification).
"On 2/18/2013 at 0055 Unit 3 commenced a unit shutdown due to high # 1 seal leak-off on the 3A Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). At 0129 3A RCP #1 seal leak-off exceeded operating limits. Unit 3 reactor was manually tripped. Auxiliary feedwater actuated as designed based on steam generator levels as a result of the trip. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3 and stable.
"No complications were noted as a result of the reactor trip. Steam generator levels are being returned to normal level following the reactor trip. All other plant systems functioned as designed during and after the reactor trip. 3A RCP high #1 seal leak-off is under investigation."
All control rods fully inserted on the trip. Decay heat was removed by AFW to the steam generators out the atmospheric reliefs. There was no primary to secondary leakage. Electrical buses are being supplied via offsite power.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48765
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MARK DODDS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: MARK DODDS
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 02/18/2013
Notification Time: 11:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/2013
Event Time: 03:18 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/2013
Notification Time: 11:35 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/2013
Event Time: 03:18 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DECLARED INOPERABLE
"On February 18, 2013, at 0318 hours (CST), the Main Control Room received an alarm associated with a transfer of the Division 4 Nuclear System Protection System (NSPS) inverter to the alternate source. Plant Technicians were performing a Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance, 'Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased/Neutron Flux Response Time Test,' when a test cable connector contacted a fuse block staple jumper, causing the transfer of the Division 4 NSPS bus from normal inverter source to its alternate source.
"TS 3.8.7, 'Inverters - Operating' Surveillance Requirement 3.8.7.1 is not met with the inverter on the alternate source, and Condition C, requires High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system to be declared inoperable immediately since the Division 4 NSPS bus was not energized from the inverter. Since HPCS is an emergency core cooling system and is a single train safety system, this is a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"At 0925 CST, the Division 4 NSPS bus has been restored to service on the normal source. At 0925 CST, HPCS has been declared Operable.
"The NRC Resident has been notified."
"On February 18, 2013, at 0318 hours (CST), the Main Control Room received an alarm associated with a transfer of the Division 4 Nuclear System Protection System (NSPS) inverter to the alternate source. Plant Technicians were performing a Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance, 'Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased/Neutron Flux Response Time Test,' when a test cable connector contacted a fuse block staple jumper, causing the transfer of the Division 4 NSPS bus from normal inverter source to its alternate source.
"TS 3.8.7, 'Inverters - Operating' Surveillance Requirement 3.8.7.1 is not met with the inverter on the alternate source, and Condition C, requires High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system to be declared inoperable immediately since the Division 4 NSPS bus was not energized from the inverter. Since HPCS is an emergency core cooling system and is a single train safety system, this is a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"At 0925 CST, the Division 4 NSPS bus has been restored to service on the normal source. At 0925 CST, HPCS has been declared Operable.
"The NRC Resident has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48766
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MIKE HETTWER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MIKE HETTWER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/18/2013
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/2013
Event Time: 05:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/2013
Notification Time: 16:30 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/2013
Event Time: 05:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24 HOUR NOTIFICATION OF INOPERABLE SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME VALVE BASED ON NRC BULLETIN 80-14
"On February 18, 2013 at 0515 hours, with the reactor at 100% core thermal power, a scram discharge volume valve, CV-302-22B was declared inoperable as required by station procedural direction due to an observed degradation in opening stroke time during performance of quarterly surveillance testing of the Scram Discharge Instrument Volume Vent and Drain Valves. This action was taken consistent with NRC IE Bulletin 80-14.
"Currently, station engineering is evaluating the valve stroke time trend data of CV-302-22B and a plan to address this issue will be developed as part of the Corrective Action Program. Pilgrim Technical Specification 3.3.G applies due to the inoperability of CV-302-22B.
"This notification is being made in accordance with NRC IE Bulletin 80-14, 'Degradation of BWR Scram Discharge Volume Capability,' Part A.3, which states, 'By procedures, require that the SDV [scram discharge volume] vent and drain valves be normally operable, open and periodically tested. If these valves are not operable or are closed for more than 1 hour in any 24 hour period during operation, the reason shall be logged and the NRC notified within 24 hours (Prompt Notification).
"This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
The licensee will inform the State.
"On February 18, 2013 at 0515 hours, with the reactor at 100% core thermal power, a scram discharge volume valve, CV-302-22B was declared inoperable as required by station procedural direction due to an observed degradation in opening stroke time during performance of quarterly surveillance testing of the Scram Discharge Instrument Volume Vent and Drain Valves. This action was taken consistent with NRC IE Bulletin 80-14.
"Currently, station engineering is evaluating the valve stroke time trend data of CV-302-22B and a plan to address this issue will be developed as part of the Corrective Action Program. Pilgrim Technical Specification 3.3.G applies due to the inoperability of CV-302-22B.
"This notification is being made in accordance with NRC IE Bulletin 80-14, 'Degradation of BWR Scram Discharge Volume Capability,' Part A.3, which states, 'By procedures, require that the SDV [scram discharge volume] vent and drain valves be normally operable, open and periodically tested. If these valves are not operable or are closed for more than 1 hour in any 24 hour period during operation, the reason shall be logged and the NRC notified within 24 hours (Prompt Notification).
"This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
The licensee will inform the State.
Agreement State
Event Number: 48768
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: K & S ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 1
City: NASHVILLE State: TN
County:
License #: R-19136-B15
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LAURA TURNER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: K & S ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 1
City: NASHVILLE State: TN
County:
License #: R-19136-B15
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LAURA TURNER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/19/2013
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/19/2013
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/18/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/19/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
TODD JACKSON (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (E-MA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - BEAM IRRADIATOR EQUIPMENT FAILURE
The following event notification was received from Tennessee Division of Radiological Health via e-mail:
"On Monday, February 18, 2013, the Division of Radiological Health received notification regarding K&S's Eldorado 78 device, and the failure of the source drawer not moving to the ON position. After the Eldorado device was turned on, the console indicated all interlocks were clear, however, when the beam was activated the source drawer did not move to the ON position. A Foss Therapy Technician was contacted and will make a service call on Wednesday February 20, 2013. The device is identified as Foss Therapy Services, Inc., Eldorado 78 Beam Irradiation Device, containing an International Isotopes Idaho, Inc. Co-60 source. Model and Serial No., INIS-SF-X.X-YY-Z.
"A written report is being prepared and will be sent to the Tennessee Division of Radiological Health."
Tennessee Report: TN-13-028
The following event notification was received from Tennessee Division of Radiological Health via e-mail:
"On Monday, February 18, 2013, the Division of Radiological Health received notification regarding K&S's Eldorado 78 device, and the failure of the source drawer not moving to the ON position. After the Eldorado device was turned on, the console indicated all interlocks were clear, however, when the beam was activated the source drawer did not move to the ON position. A Foss Therapy Technician was contacted and will make a service call on Wednesday February 20, 2013. The device is identified as Foss Therapy Services, Inc., Eldorado 78 Beam Irradiation Device, containing an International Isotopes Idaho, Inc. Co-60 source. Model and Serial No., INIS-SF-X.X-YY-Z.
"A written report is being prepared and will be sent to the Tennessee Division of Radiological Health."
Tennessee Report: TN-13-028