Event Notification Report for February 06, 2013

UNUSUAL EVENT - LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER TO ESSENTIAL BUSES FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES

"At 1132 CST on 2/6/13, Point Beach Unit 1 experienced a loss of all offsite power due to the loss of 1X-03 High Voltage Station Aux Transformer. The high side circuit switcher opened. However, the 1X-03 transformer did not lock out resulting in G-01 and G-03 Emergency Diesels energizing the 1A-05 and 1A-06 4160 VAC busses (safety related)."

The cause of the loss of offsite power is being investigated. In order to exit the event, the plant requires either 345 kV power to be restored or cross-tie plant power between the units. If cross-tied, Technical Specifications require the gas turbine to be placed on the cross-tie within 24 hours. The plant remained at 100% power and there was no effect on Unit 2.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and the Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).

* * * UPDATE AT 1500 ON 2/6/2013 FROM JAMIE WEIGANDT TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"There were specified system actuations with the original event. Emergency diesel generators [EDG] G-01, 2, 3, and 4 started on the undervoltage conditions with G-01 and G-03 loading onto their respective buses. 1P-53, motor driven aux feed pump started as designed on the EDG breaker closures. Offsite power has been restored to safeguards buses and the EDGs have been removed from the buses. Troubleshooting continues on the initial fault. All other systems functioned as designed. The unusual event has been terminated as of 1340 CST on 2/6/13."

The safeguards buses are being powered from Unit 2 through the electrical cross-tie.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R3DO (Kunowsky), NRR EO (Evans), IRD (Marshall), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and the Nuclear SSA (via e-mail).

PLANNED MAINTENANCE ON PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER

"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant will perform planned maintenance on the Unit 2 Plant Process Computer (PPC) and associated network infrastructure on February 06, 2013. The maintenance will remove the Unit 2 PPC for a planned duration of 12 hours and will render the Unit 2 SPDS out of service for this timeframe. Once the maintenance starts, the effected equipment and functions, including SPDS, can be returned to service within five minutes, if required.

"Should an emergency be declared during this period, the control room will continue to have the capability to retrieve plant data inputs to assess plant conditions and perform core damage assessment at all times. Control room emergency response personnel will use emergency response procedures to disseminate plant parameter data points to the affected Emergency Response Facilities until the U-2 PPC is restored. MIDAS (Meteorological Data) and Unit 2 ERDS [Emergency Response Data System] data transmission will remain functional during the maintenance window. All work associated with this plant data network software installation will be performed in an expeditious manner consistent with the goal of minimizing unavailability of the systems listed above. Back-out criteria has been identified as part of the work package. A test of all systems will be performed at the completion of the upgrade."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1713 EST ON 2/6/2013 FROM AMY CORDNER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The plant process computer was returned to service at 1700 EST.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R1DO (Powell).

UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION

"On February 06, 2012, at 1524 PST, engineers reviewing dose analyses for non-LOCA, non-fuel handling accident analyses identified deficiencies in the analyses. The analyses of concern include a locked reactor coolant pump rotor, a control rod ejection accident, main steam line break, and steam generator tube rupture. These deficiencies brought into question whether the 30 day control room operator dose received following one of these accidents would meet the station licensing basis limits of up to 5 rem whole body or its equivalent.

"In response to this concern, plant operators placed the control room ventilation system in its safeguards alignment, thereby ensuring the events would continue to be bounded by the analysis of the large break loss of coolant accident.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM DAVID BAHNER TO CHARLES TEAL ON 02/28/13 AT 1815 EST * * *

"Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) is correcting the event date in the above Description to February 06, 2013, and is retracting EN 48726 based on the results from reanalysis of each affected non-loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) event (i.e., steam generator tube rupture, main steam line break, control rod ejection, and reactor coolant pump locked rotor) for potential impact on control room operator dose. The new dose assessment determined that control room dose consequences from a large-break LOCA bound the non-LOCA events as assumed in the original analyses. Accordingly, PG&E concludes the Diablo Canyon Power Plant control room ventilation system remains capable of maintaining control room dose limits within General Design Criteria-19.

"Plant personnel notified the NRC resident inspector."

Notified R4DO (Allen).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED

The following information was received from the California Radiologic Health Branch via e-mail:

"On February 6, 2013, the licensee notified the California Department of Public Health that one of their moisture density gauges (CPN MC-1DRP, 10 mCi Cs-137, 50 mCi Am:Be-241, S/N MD00605734) was struck by a small bobcat tractor at a construction site at approximately 2:00 P.M. The gauge user had placed the gauge on the ground by the back bumper as he went to retrieve something from the cab of this truck. He no sooner started walking from the back of the truck to the side of the truck when the bobcat ran over the gauge.

"The RSO reported that although the gauge's guide tube was broken off, the body of the gauge itself was not damaged and the Cs-137 and Am-241:Be sources remained fully shielded. The external shutter, however, was slightly open. The gauge was returned to the transport case and was transported back to the licensee's facility. The RSO then contacted the manufacturer, InstroTek who instructed the RSO on how to close the shutter safely. There was no additional exposure through the external shutter even though it was slightly open because the internal shutter had remained closed during the entire event as the source rod was in the 'safe' position.

"The gauge user was wearing a whole body dosimeter which was immediately sent in for immediate processing. On February 7, 2013, [representatives from] the California Department of Public Health met with the licensee. All survey measurements were as expected for this type of gauge and there was no removable contamination found. An additional piece of lead was taped to the external shutter as a precaution during transit. The dose to any individual from this incident is estimated to be less than 0.5 millirem. The gauge is being shipped to InstroTek later today for repair."

California Report 020613

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGN

The following information was received by email:

"Oregon Radiation Protection Services was notified by email on 2/20/13 at 11:28 a.m. [PDT], by Curtis Kreil, RSO, a representative of Carestream Health, Inc., of one tritium exit sign discovered missing during a 6-month radioactive material inventory check on 2/6/13. The sign was last inventoried on 8/1/12. A site-wide email alert was issued regarding the missing sign.

"Exit sign details are:
Manufacturer: SRB Technologies
Model: Betalux E
Serial Numbers: 258030
Radioactive material: H-3
Activity: Nominal 20 Ci (on 10/2/02), currently 11.2 Ci (2/20/13)

"Engineers and technicians are currently aware of the location of the [remaining] exit signs and monitor their presence. The licensee added discussion information into their Radiation Safety Training document regarding the exit signs and awareness of their location to assist in timely reporting of any future issues as a corrective action."

Oregon Incident: OR-13-0011

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN SENORX GAMMA FINDER II SURVEY METER RECOVERED

The following information is a synopsis of information received from the State of Louisiana:

On 2/6/2013 at 1752 CST, the Iberia Parish Sheriff's Office (IPSO) notified the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) that radioactive material had been found in a vehicle which had been towed and impounded by IPSO. LDEQ personnel conducted an investigation on 2/8/2013 at the IPSO.

A metal briefcase containing a SenoRx Gamma Finder II survey meter and two calibration sources was found in the impounded vehicle by the IPSO. Survey readings done at a local hospital before LDEQ was called read 0.008 mR/hr for the two calibration sources. The briefcase containing the survey meter and calibration sources was then taken to the IPSO.

Description of the first source: Co-57, serial number D-138-21, last calibration date 10/21/2008, activity 11.5242 microCuries. Description of the second source: Co-57, serial number D-139-6, last calibration date 10/22/2008, activity 1.1419 microCuries. The IPSO traced the serial numbers and found that the survey meter and calibration sources belonged to Bard Biopsy Systems in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The IPSO confirmed that Bard Biopsy Systems had reported the survey meter and calibration sources stolen from their location in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 2009. A report had been filed with the Philadelphia Police Department, District 26, at that time.

LDEQ personnel performed a survey on both calibration sources using a Ludlum 14C survey meter. The first source read 0.05mR/hr on the surface and the second source read 0.03 mR/hr on the surface. A background reading of 0 mR/hr was noted during these readings.

The Philadelphia PD, District 26 is following up on the stolen equipment. The IPSO will ship the survey meter and sources to the Philadelphia PD. Philadelphia PD will return the survey meter and calibration sources to the owner.