Event Notification Report for February 04, 2013
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/03/2013 - 02/04/2013
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48713
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES KURAS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES KURAS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 02/04/2013
Notification Time: 16:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2013
Event Time: 13:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2013
Notification Time: 16:46 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2013
Event Time: 13:40 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE IDENTIFIED ON SEAL INJECTION LINE DRAIN VALVE
"Unit is shut down in Mode 4 and in process of cooling down to Mode 5 for a scheduled refueling outage. During a containment walkdown to inspect for boron leakage, personnel identified that Reactor Coolant Pump 'A' seal injection line drain valve has a crack in the socket weld on the upstream side of the valve with active leakage visible as a fine mist. This valve is part of the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary. TS 3.4.13 requires that the unit be placed in Mode 5 prior to 0140 hours on 2/6/13. All Mode 4 required safety related equipment is operable.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The last primary leak rate test was conducted at 100% power and determined that there was 0.114 gpm of unidentified leakage. The leak location is inside the containment bio-shield and is not accessible at power.
"Unit is shut down in Mode 4 and in process of cooling down to Mode 5 for a scheduled refueling outage. During a containment walkdown to inspect for boron leakage, personnel identified that Reactor Coolant Pump 'A' seal injection line drain valve has a crack in the socket weld on the upstream side of the valve with active leakage visible as a fine mist. This valve is part of the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary. TS 3.4.13 requires that the unit be placed in Mode 5 prior to 0140 hours on 2/6/13. All Mode 4 required safety related equipment is operable.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The last primary leak rate test was conducted at 100% power and determined that there was 0.114 gpm of unidentified leakage. The leak location is inside the containment bio-shield and is not accessible at power.
Part 21
Event Number: 48872
Rep Org: ABB INC.
Licensee: ABB INC.
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: ABB INC.
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DENNIS BATOVSKY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 04/01/2013
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2013
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
PART 21 REACTORS (EMAI)
JAMES DWYER (R1DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
ROBERT DALEY (R3DO)
RAY KELLAR (R4DO)
PART 21 REACTORS (EMAI)
POTENTIAL ISSUE CONCERNING THE ZPA RATING FOR 3 PHASE RELAY TYPE SSC-T
"This letter is to notify you of a potential issue concerning the ZPA [Zero Point Acceleration] rating for our three phase relay type SSC-T.
"During a Customer Audit (week of February 4, 2013 by ABB Inc., Florence, S.C.), we discovered that our Class 1E Certification database showed the ZPA rating of our three phase SSV -T and SSC-T relays was 5.6g, while our most recent qualification (dated June 14, 2012) determined that the ZPA rating was 4.79g.
"A review of our Purchaser records for the last ten years indicates that one (1) affected relay was sold to WESCO:
"SSC-T relay completed 10/5/2007, order number 3365-960825 and serial number 11835.
"ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, so we are informing the purchaser of this determination so that they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(a).
"ABB recommends that the affected licensee evaluate their specific application and determine whether the deviation described in this notice affects their design basis. If the licensee determines that it does, the licensee should contact ABB to determine appropriate corrective action.
"If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact ABB Technical Support at 954-752-6700."
"This letter is to notify you of a potential issue concerning the ZPA [Zero Point Acceleration] rating for our three phase relay type SSC-T.
"During a Customer Audit (week of February 4, 2013 by ABB Inc., Florence, S.C.), we discovered that our Class 1E Certification database showed the ZPA rating of our three phase SSV -T and SSC-T relays was 5.6g, while our most recent qualification (dated June 14, 2012) determined that the ZPA rating was 4.79g.
"A review of our Purchaser records for the last ten years indicates that one (1) affected relay was sold to WESCO:
"SSC-T relay completed 10/5/2007, order number 3365-960825 and serial number 11835.
"ABB does not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if a defect exists, so we are informing the purchaser of this determination so that they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10CFR 21.21(a).
"ABB recommends that the affected licensee evaluate their specific application and determine whether the deviation described in this notice affects their design basis. If the licensee determines that it does, the licensee should contact ABB to determine appropriate corrective action.
"If you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact ABB Technical Support at 954-752-6700."
Agreement State
Event Number: 51726
Rep Org: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: KILGORE FLARES COMPANY, LLC
Region: 1
City: TOONE State: TN
County:
License #: GL 334
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW HOLCOMB
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: KILGORE FLARES COMPANY, LLC
Region: 1
City: TOONE State: TN
County:
License #: GL 334
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANDREW HOLCOMB
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/11/2016
Notification Time: 15:43 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2016
Notification Time: 15:43 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2013
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING NRD IONIZER DEVICE
The following historical information was received from the State of Tennessee via email:
"On March 26, 2013, Kilgore Flares Company and the Division of Radiological Health (DRH) discovered that one of Kilgore's NRD Ionizer devices, model P-2035; S/N A2GK795, was lost. The device contained 40 mCi of Po-210. The device was shipped 10/09/08 from NRD, LLC, located in Grand Island, NY. It was taken out of service in October 2009 when Kilgore renewed the lease for the device. Kilgore was under the impression that the ionizer had been sent back to NRD the previous year. Kilgore did not learn until after the inventory list was sent to DRH February 4, 2013, that NRD had not received them. The device was searched for but could not be located. The boxes that contained the devices sat in the shipping department for some time and this is believed to be where the device came up missing. Kilgore reported that they now keep all devices, being sent back, in the Maintenance Planners office until sealed up for shipping. Kilgore provided a report to DRH on 4/2/13."
State Event Report ID No.: TN-13-048
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following historical information was received from the State of Tennessee via email:
"On March 26, 2013, Kilgore Flares Company and the Division of Radiological Health (DRH) discovered that one of Kilgore's NRD Ionizer devices, model P-2035; S/N A2GK795, was lost. The device contained 40 mCi of Po-210. The device was shipped 10/09/08 from NRD, LLC, located in Grand Island, NY. It was taken out of service in October 2009 when Kilgore renewed the lease for the device. Kilgore was under the impression that the ionizer had been sent back to NRD the previous year. Kilgore did not learn until after the inventory list was sent to DRH February 4, 2013, that NRD had not received them. The device was searched for but could not be located. The boxes that contained the devices sat in the shipping department for some time and this is believed to be where the device came up missing. Kilgore reported that they now keep all devices, being sent back, in the Maintenance Planners office until sealed up for shipping. Kilgore provided a report to DRH on 4/2/13."
State Event Report ID No.: TN-13-048
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf