Event Notification Report for January 22, 2013

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECT

The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email:

"On January 22, 2013, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that a radiography crew performing radiography operations at a field location experienced a source disconnect. The crew was using an INC IR 100 exposure device containing a iridium - 192 source. The crew had performed nine or ten exposures and was moving the camera to the next location when they discovered the source was still in the guide tube. A source recovery team was sent to the location and the source was returned to the exposure device and locked in the fully shielded position. The RSO did not know how the crew discovered the source was still in the guide tube. The RSO stated that the self reading dosimeter of the radiographer who moved the exposure device was reading off scale and that his personnel dosimeter was being sent to the dosimetry processor for immediate processing. The RSO stated that the radiographer did not perform a post exposure radiation survey prior to moving the camera and that the radiographer stated that their alarming dosimeter did not alarm. The RSO stated that he did not know how long or how close the radiographer was to the source while they were moving the exposure device. The RSO stated that the radiographer has been removed from all duties involving exposure to radiation. The RSO stated that no other individual received an exposure of concern. The RSO stated that the device would be returned to the manufacturer for inspection. The licensee is conducting an investigation into the event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident Number: I-9035

* * * UPDATE ON 1/25/2013 AT 1305 EST FROM ART TUCKER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following information was received via fax:

"On January 25, 2013, the RSO stated the dosimetry processor reported the dose received by the individual who relocated the exposure device was 791 millirem DDE [deep dose equivalent]. The RSO stated that their investigation into the event is ongoing. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA - 300."

Notified the R4DO (Okeefe) and FSME Events Resource.

AUTOMATIC REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION

"On January 22, 2013, at approximately 0332 hours [EDT], an automatic Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation occurred at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. At the time of the event, the plant was in Mode 1 at 100% power. All control rods are inserted into the reactor core and the plant is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) with reactor pressure and level being maintained in the normal shutdown range.

"The RPS actuation was initiated by a low reactor water level (Level 3 - 178") signal. In response to the RPS actuation and subsequent reactor Level 2 (130") signal, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system both actuated and injected to maintain reactor coolant level. The reactor level is currently being maintained in its normal band by the feedwater system and decay heat is being removed by [turbine bypass valves to] the condenser (both HPCS and RCIC have been returned to standby). The plant is in a normal electrical line-up with all three Emergency Diesel Generators operable and available, if needed. The Containment Isolation Valves (responded to the Level 2 and 3) isolation signals as designed.

"The cause of the RPS actuation is under investigation.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PRESSURE POSITIVE FOR 12 SECONDS

"On 01/22/2013 at 00:30 Reactor building HVAC tripped due to low outside air temperature and Standby Gas Treatment system was manually started and maintained Reactor Building differential pressure negative. At 01:13 secondary containment pressure went positive during restart of the Center Reactor Building HVAC Train. This is a loss of secondary containment function. In a 12 second time span secondary containment pressure went above 0 inches WC [Water Column] to +0.17 inches WC and then decreased to < 0 inches WC remaining stable during the Reactor Building HVAC restart. The Center Reactor Building HVAC Exhaust Fan Discharge Damper opened after the Supply Fan discharge damper; this condition would produce the indications noted.

"The System was returned to normal with two Reactor Building HVAC trains running and the Standby Gas Treatment System shutdown and in standby. Reactor building pressure is stable with differential pressure negative < - 0.30 inches WC.

"The loss of Secondary Containment function is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNANALYZED CONDITION - BASED ON ONGOING INTEGRATED ANALYSIS REVIEW

"During the ongoing Integrated Analysis (ISA) review, it was identified that a fire in labs adjacent to the Dry Scrap Recovery (DSR) area could impact the DSR. The existing masonry wall between DSR and the lab has several openings that are closed with plywood. With plywood in place, unicones (uranium storage containers) stored against the wall in DSR would not meet performance criteria for the accident sequence of a fire in the adjacent lab. The uranium containers have been removed from the storage area until the wall is upgraded to meet performance requirements. Other processes remain operational. A review has begun which will provide additional corrective actions, if required, and extent of condition."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PROCESS METER SOURCE SUBJECTED TO INTENSE FIRE AT WELL SITE

The following information was obtained from the State of Utah via facsimile:

"The Utah Division of Radiation Control was notified at 3:40 p.m. MST on January 22, 2013 of a fire at a natural gas well. Notification was provided by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer. This incident report is the initial notification to the NRC Operations Center.

On January 22, 2013, a representative of Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. radiation safety called the Division to report a fire involving a natural gas well. The fire erupted about 6:00 a.m. that morning. The licensee was using a truck with a slurry densimeter (Sealed Source Device Registry Number NR-340-D-101-G) in-line after a chicksan on a down-hole pump. The truck was parked approximately 40 feet from the blowout preventer (well head). An 8.8 milliCurie cesium-137 sealed source (Gammatron GT-GHP) is contained within the slurry densimeter. As of Thursday afternoon, January 24, 2013, the fire continued to occasionally flare, but a Halliburton representative was able to gain brief access to the slurry densimeter. He reported to a Department of Environmental Quality representative (on-scene presence) that the sealed source is not leaking and the device containment housing was still intact. Fire control operations continue and efforts to drag the licensee's truck away from the drill rig may occur on Friday, January 25, 2013.

Utah Report No: UT130002