Event Notification Report for December 28, 2012

FITNESS FOR DUTY - ACCESS DENIED

On December 28, 2012, at approximately 1410 hours CDT, Dresden Station was informed by Station Security that a Contract Supervisory (non-licensed) individual had a confirmed positive Fitness-For-Duty test for a controlled substance.

This event affects both Dresden and Braidwood Stations. The individuals access to both Dresden and Braidwood Stations has been terminated.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspectors.

COMPUTER PROGRAM ERROR IDENTIFIED IN THE FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAM

"On December 28, 2012 at approximately 1100 [EST], Susquehanna discovered a computer program error that affected the Susquehanna Fitness for Duty (FFD) program. Specifically, thirty-nine Behavioral Observation Program (BOP) inquiries were without proper documentation of the required need to continue unescorted access (UA) and without verification of an actual observation within the required thirty day timeframe. The computer error resulted in answers for two of the three questions on the Behavior Observation Inquiry form not being recorded when the form was submitted by the supervisor. This resulted in the thirty-nine security accounts being re-zeroed and allowing UA for an additional thirty days. All thirty-nine BOP supervisors were contacted, and it was determined that thirty-six of the individuals were intended to continue with UA. The remaining three accounts should have terminated to prevent UA; however, none of these three individuals gained unauthorized access to the Protected Area after their UA should have been terminated. Seven of the thirty-six intended to continue with UA did access the Protected Area, but per follow-up with the Behavior Observation Supervisors, these individuals were in compliance with the BOP. In accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4), this report is being made based on being a potential programmatic failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program. The [NRC] Resident Inspector and the Branch Chief for the Region I Division of Reactor Safety were briefed."

LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS WITH ALL EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE SIRENS

"Limerick and associated local counties have lost communications with all Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) sirens for greater than 1 hour. This exceeds the 25% notification threshold. The contract vendor is responding to the loss to determine repair actions and timeline.

"The EPZ plan contains alternate methods of notifying the public in the event of an evacuation.

"Notifications have been made to the State and local agencies regarding this loss of Emergency Preparedness capability at 0913 EST on 12/28/12, which constitutes the 'Offsite Notification' per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)."

The licensee has notified Montgomery, Chester, Burkes counties, and the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1258 EST ON 12/28/12 FROM DAN WILLIAMSON TO HUFFMAN * * *

Communications with all EPZ sirens have been restored. The licensee will notify the affected counties and the NRC Resident Inspector.

R1DO (Conte) notified.

AGREEMENT STATE - STUCK SOURCE ON A RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

The following is a summary of a report received via email by the North Carolina Division of Radiation Protection Radioactive Material Branch concerning a source that became stuck while using a radiography camera at a Flowserve facility in Raleigh, NC.

On December 28, 2012 at 3:15 pm during radiographic operations with a Co-60 projector model number 741AE s/n A218 containing a Co-60 source, a stuck source equipment incident occurred when the source failed to retract into the shielded position at the permanent radiographic facility located at Flowserve Flow Control Division in Raleigh, NC.

The licensee implemented its source retrieval procedures and successfully retrieved the source back into the projector without exposure to the staff involved.

Inspection of the guide tube setup identified that the connector that connected the flexible guide tubes was not fully engaged.

All radiographers and assistants were briefed on the stuck source equipment incident and all conditions found. The importance of daily checks was stressed along with the need to perform an inspection of your guide tube setup when making any type of change. All radiographers and assistants were involved in the inspection of the two flexible guide tubes and comparison to our other guide tubes and nothing was identified as a potential problem.

The incident was monitored by the RSO at each stage from beginning to end to ensure that all possible safety and security concerns were adequately addressed.

It is the determination of the RSO that at no time was the safety of the employees, radiographers or the public at risk as a result of this incident.