Event Notification Report for December 13, 2012

60-DAY INTERIM REPORT INVOLVING AN EVALUATION OF A DESIGN CHANGE TO MAGNE-BLAST CIRCUIT BREAKERS

The following information was received via fax:

"Summary

"GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) is investigating the adequacy of a Design Change in AM 4.16-350-2C and AM 4.16-350-2H Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers as a result of a breaker failure at a BWR Licensee.

"GEH has not completed the evaluation of this condition to determine reportability under 10 CFR Part 21 and is therefore issuing this 60-day Interim Notification. GEH will close or issue an update on this matter on or before June 14, 2013. Given the early status of the evaluation, GEH has no recommended actions at this time. This 60-day Interim Notification is issued in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.21(a)(2), and will be sent to all GE BWR/2-6 plants and all PWRs.

"Recommendation

"GEH advises licensees to take no action at this time. However, if licensees wish to determine if the extent of this issue is present at their respective plants, they may identify breaker models AM 4.16-350-2H/2C with a date of manufacture prior to October 6, 1971. Other AM breaker styles do not use the booster cylinder as designed in breaker model AM 4.16-350-2H/2C and are not included in this concern. Therefore the extent is limited to the AM 4.16-350-2H/2C models manufactured prior to October 6, 1971.

"US Plants Potentially Affected

"Nine Mile Point 1-2, Fermi 2, Columbia, Grand Gulf, River Bend, FitzPatrick, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, Clinton, Dresden 2-3, LaSalle 1-2, Limerick 1-2, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom 2-3, Quad Cities 1-2, Perry 1, Duane Arnold, Cooper, Susquehanna 1-2, Brunswick 1-2, Hope Creek, Hatch 1 - 2, Browns Ferry 1-3, Monticello, Callaway, Palo Verde 1-3 , Calvert Cliffs 1-2, Ginna, Arkansas Nuclear One 1-2, Indian Point 2-3, Millstone 2, Millstone 3, North Anna 1-2, Palisades, Surry 1-2, Waterford 3, Catawba 1-2, Oconee 1-3, McGuire 1-2, Braidwood 1-2, Exelon Byron 1-2 , Three Mi le Island 1, Beaver Valley 1-2, Davis-Besse, Seabrook, St. Lucie 1-2, Turkey Point 3-4, Point Beach 1-2, DC Cook 1-2, Prairie Island 1-2, Fort Calhoun, Diablo Canyon 1-2, Crystal River 3, Robinson, Shearon Harris, Salem 1, Salem 2, Summer, South Texas Project 1-2, San Onofre 2-3, Farley 1-2, Vogtle 1-2, Sequoyah 1-2, Watts Bar 1, Comanche Peak 1-2, and Wolf Creek.

"If you have an questions, please call me at (910) 819-4491.

Dale E. Porter
Safety Evaluation Program Manager
GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy Americas LLC"

Hitachi Reference Number: MFN-128 R0

* * * RETRACTION FROM DALE PORTER TO NESTOR MAKRIS ON 6/12/13 AT 0959 EDT * * *

The following information was received via fax:

"[GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy] GEH has completed all testing and evaluations and has determined that the condition previously described in MFN 12-128 R0 is not a reportable condition under 10 CFR Part 21. This information will be sent to all GE BWR/2-6 plants and all PWRs that were previously notified under the 10CFR21.21(a)(2) communication."

Notified R1DO (Dentel), R2DO (Ehrhardt), R3DO (Lara), R4DO (Gepford), and Part 21 Group via email.

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE

"Planned maintenance activities are being performed today (December 13, 2012) to Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. This work activity is planned to be performed and completed expeditiously within about 8 hours including establishing and removing the clearances, and performing post maintenance testing.

"If an emergency condition occurs that requires activation of the TSC, plans are to utilize the TSC during the time this work activity is being performed, as long as habitability conditions allow. The Emergency Response Organization duty team members will be relocated to alternate locations if required by habitability conditions in accordance with emergency implementing procedures.

"This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM JOSEPH MCKED TO JOHN KNOKE AT 2000 EST ON 12/13/12 * * *

The licensee reported that the planned maintenance activities have been completed to the Technical Support Center's HVAC.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

R2DO (Blamey) notified.

SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM INOPERABLE FOR PRE-PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 11:00 EST on December 13, 2012, the Seismic Monitoring System was declared inoperable for pre-planned preventative maintenance, MPT-10240 Triaxial Time History Accelerograph. The preventive maintenance is expected to last approximately 5 to 6 hours.

"The Seismic Monitoring System is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-l022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health of safety of the public or the operation of the facility.

"Licensee has available redundant seismic indication and the on-site Emergency Response Organization has been notified.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified." TEST2

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE

"An increased usage of Nitrogen to maintain Primary Containment pressure within specification was noticed during steady state operation. Investigation into the extra Nitrogen usage revealed that Primary Containment Leakage was in excess of that allowed per Technical Specification 3.3.3.a. No action statement is provided for leakage in excess of Technical Specification 3.3.3.a; therefore in accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.1, the reactor shall be placed in an operational condition in which the specification is not applicable. This requires the plant to be shutdown and cooled down to less than 216 degrees F.

"Additionally, this is reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of a system needed to control the release of radioactive material.

"The primary containment was declared inoperable at 1630 EST and a normal orderly plant shutdown was commenced at 1645 EST and will be less than 215 degrees F within 10 hours.

"Investigation of containment leakage is in progress.

"An update will be provided when the plant is in an operational condition in which Technical Specification 3.3.3.a is not applicable."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Licensee has notified the State of New York.

* * * UPDATE AT 0011 EST ON 12/14/12 FROM CHRISTOPHER GRAPES TO BILL HUFFMAN * * *

"As of 2333 EST on 12/13/2012, the reactor is below 215 degrees F, and containment is no longer required to be operable by Technical Specification 3.3.3. As part of the shutdown, a manual reactor scram was initiated as part of the pre-planned shutdown sequence and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink.

"HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 1913 EST, RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point and the HPCI system initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the turbine bypass valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to the scram.

"Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Cold Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via shutdown cooling (SDC). The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State authorities. Notified R1DO (Holody) and NRR EO (Lund).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDERDOSE DURING MEDICAL PROCEDURE

"On December 13, 2012, a patient received a permanent implant of I-125 seeds to the prostate as part of a combined external beam treatment and brachytherapy. It was determined during a post-surgical CT that the tumor may have been underdosed and a follow-up MRI was performed. As a result of the MRI, it was discovered, on February 21, 2013, that the dose received for the brachytherapy was 70 percent of the written directive. The licensee will submit a written report to the Virginia Radiation Materials Program."

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - OPEN TRANSPORT VEHICLE WITH RAD LEVELS EXCEEDING LIMITS

The following information was received from the Washington State Division of Radiation Protection via e-mail:

"Shipment number GE-IL-120712-USEW arrived at the US Ecology waste site on the morning of December 11, 2012. The shipment manifest listed Zn-65 and Co60 as the isotopes. The material is NARM material. Total activity 3.02E6 MBq. Total volume 6.07 m3. Total weight 15,082 Kg. Waste class A- stable. The drums were accelerator targets from GE Healthcare in Illinois and New Jersey, loaded in boxes, which were again loaded in drums and cemented in place. The outer drums were DOT 7A containers. The entity signing the shippers certification on the manifest was GE Healthcare in Illinois.

"US Ecology staff conducted surveys of the shipping vehicle, and reported to Washington State Department of Health that the dose rate on the bottom of the truck was greater than 200 mr/hr with a side wall GM detector. Washington State Department of Health inspector used an Eberline RO2 ion chamber to get a more accurate measurement, and found that the dose rate measured with the meter bottom flush with the bottom of the floor I beams was 250 mr/hr.

"The shipment shifted in transportation, and was not braced to withstand conditions of normal transportation. The shipment contained drums strapped to small pallets. Upon inspecting the shipment, the drums were not tightly contained in the trailer, noted by gaps between the toe boards and the drums, loose straps in the rear of the drums, and large spaces between the load locks and the drums. The driver was asked if his trip was normal, without any abnormal stops, turns, stops or bumps, and he said it was a very smooth ride, all on interstate, but he picked the load up in Iowa after the 1st truck had mechanical issues. One large drum in the center of the shipment had lead shielding blankets underneath the pallet it was on, and this drum could be rocked back and forth a few inches, while it was still strapped in the truck.

"A more detailed inspection of the packages occurred on the December 12th and 13th, including using the RO2 on the bottom of drums that exhibited higher than manifested dose rates. Two drums were found to have external, on contact dose rates of 1.5 R/hr.

"One drum's lid was not correctly installed. While there was no evidence of leakage, nor did the lid come off, it was not properly installed. The shipment required the use of 7A containers.

"One drum could not be correlated to the manifest, as there was a transposition error in the drum number. A call to the generator corrected the problem.

"The dose rate at the drivers area and the outside of the shipment vehicle were within the limits for transportation. No material was detected to have leaked from the containers. There is no suspected overexposures caused by this incident."


Washington State Report WA-12-081