Event Notification Report for December 06, 2012

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LEAKING SOURCE

Georgia Tech was wipe testing the Ni-63 source from a gas chromatograph. The source was determined to be leaking and had contaminated an adjacent counter top.

The source was last "refoiled" in May 2011.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STATIC ELIMINATOR MISSING

The licensee reported to the State of Iowa that they could not account for one static eliminator, NRD model P-2021, which contains a nominal 10 mCi Po-210 source. The State is investigating and will update this report when more information is obtained.

* * * UPDATE FROM RANDAL DAHLIN TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/10/12 AT 1527 EST * * *

The following information was received by facsimile:

"AGRI Industrial Plastics reported the loss of an NRD static eliminator model P-2021, serial number A2HW186 that contained a nominal activity of 0.37 GBq (10 mCi) Po-210 sealed source. The general license registrant had received seven static eliminators from NRD on October 12, 2011. The RSO for the facility discovered the device in question to be lost on December 6, 2012. The apparent cause for the lost device is human error and inattention to detail. The remaining six devices were shipped back to NRD on December 7, 2012. The corrective action for this event is that AGRI Industrial Plastics will no longer use static eliminators that contain radioactive material."

Notified the R3DO (Cameron) and the FSME Resources via email.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

RADIATION MONITOR INOPERABLE FOR PRE-PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 0700 EST on December 6, 2012, radiation monitor RM-01TV-3536-1, Turbine Building Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) was declared inoperable for pre-planned maintenance to perform surveillance testing. The surveillance test is scheduled to take approximately four hours.

"This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health or safety of the public or the operation of the facility.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

ESI REFURBISHED EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CYLINDER HEAD WITH FOREIGN MATERIAL IN INTAKE PORT

The following information is a summary of a Part 21 Report from Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) concerning a condition reportable under 10 CFR 21.

ESI reports that they received notification about foreign material found within a refurbished cylinder head supplied to the Cooper Nuclear Station by ESI. Specifically, Cooper discovered two hand tools (picks) within the intake port on the cylinder head. The tools were discovered by Cooper after installation of the head onto the diesel engine and while attempting to adjust the intake valve backlash.

ESI supplied the refurbished cylinder head for a Cooper-Bessemer KSV engine to Cooper Nuclear Station (Part Number 13-KSV-11-6, Serial Number 6K2201) in August 2010. The refurbishment activity was performed at the Cameron Compression (OEM) facility in Casper, Wyoming.

The most likely scenario is that the cylinder head was oriented with the inlet port facing up during installation of the valve spring keeper seals. After installation of the seals, the tools were placed on top of the cylinder head. It is presumed the tools fell into the inlet port and settled in the intake valve seating area. The tools are small in size (approximately 5 inches long with a 5/8 inch handle) and were not visible from the exterior of the head.

ESI considers this occurrence to be an isolated incident and that Cooper Nuclear Station is the only affected customer. Previous shipments of similar cylinder heads are not suspect.

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CONDITIONS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMIT

"50.55(e) initial notification for failure to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VII for procurement of safety-related components associated with AP1000 Nuclear Power Plant construction by CB&I (formerly Shaw Nuclear).

"This 50.55(e) initial notification addresses a failure to comply by CB&I, an agent of Southern Company for Vogtle 3&4, to meet the requirements of Appendix B, Criterion VII. It is concluded that the QA programmatic issues, as identified by the root cause analysis associated with NRC violation 05200025/2012-004-02, could have produced a defect and this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The root cause of the programmatic procurement problems was that the existing Shaw Nuclear procurement and quality oversight and inspection program did not include a sufficiently strategic, integrated, and graded approach to assure the required quality of material, equipment, and services. This notification closes the interim report submitted on February 4, 2013 by Southern Company.

"This 50.55(e) initial notification is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CONDITIONS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMIT

"50.55(e) initial notification for failure to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VII for procurement of safety-related components associated with AP1000 Nuclear Power Plant construction by CB&I (formerly Shaw Nuclear).

"This 50.55(e) initial notification addresses a failure to comply by CB&I, an agent of South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G) for Virgil C. Summer 2 & 3, to meet the requirements of Appendix B, Criterion VII. It is concluded that the QA programmatic issues, as identified by the root cause analysis associated with NRC violation 05200025/2012-004-02, could have produced a defect and this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The root cause of the programmatic procurement problems was that the existing Shaw Nuclear procurement and quality oversight and inspection program did not include a sufficiently strategic, integrated, and graded approach to assure the required quality of material, equipment, and services. This notification closes the interim report submitted on February 4, 2013 by SCE&G.

"This 50.55(e) initial notification is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.