Event Notification Report for November 27, 2012

LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY- RADIATION MONITOR INOPERABLE DUE TO DATABASE ERROR

"This is a non-emergency notification. At 0900 EST on November 27, 2012, it was discovered that radiation monitor RM-1WV-3546-1, Waste Processing Building Wide Range Gas Monitor was inoperable due to a database error. The database error appears to have occurred at approximately 1724 EST on November 26, 2012. The database error was corrected and the monitor returned to service at 0958 EST on November 27, 2012. This monitor is the only monitor credited in the EALs for monitoring a gaseous release from the Waste Processing Building.

"This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or the operation of the facility because no events occurred during the time the radiation monitor was out of service.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

See EN #48536 for similar report.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO A FATALITY

"At 1720 hours on November 27, 2012 PPL SSES [Susquehanna Steam Electric Station] notified the Occupational Safety and Health Administration that an employee had suffered a fatality.

"On November 27, 2012 at 1313 hours, a PPL employee suffered an apparent heart attack while at the Luzerne County Community College (LCCC) Public Safety Training Institute while performing SCBA [Self Contained Breathing Apparatus] training. The employee was transported to the Geisinger Wyoming Valley hospital and pronounced dead. PPL was notified at 1432 of the fatality.

The LCCC training facility is not located on PPL owned property.

"This ENS report is being made in accordance with 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."

The licensee has also notified the Commonwealth.

CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY START IN PRESSURIZATION MODE

"The control room ventilation system (CRVS) pressurization mode is required to be actuated by a safety injection signal, control room radiation atmosphere air intake, and operator manual actuation in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.7.

"On November 27, 2012 at 2038 hrs. PST, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) identified that none of the CRVS four pressurization fans would operate continuously if they started in response to a safety injection or control room radiation atmosphere intake actuation signal. All of the pressurization fans remain capable of continuous operation via manual actuation. At 2050 PST the Unit 2 CRVS was manually placed in pressurization mode in accordance with TS 3.3.7, ACTION B.1.1.

"This was determined to be caused by a recent flow balancing of the CRVS that raised the static air pressure. The increased system static pressure actuates the fan-run pressure switches for each of the four associated pressurization fans, when only a single pressurization fan is operated. This results in the system logic securing all pressurization fans started by the CRVS automatic actuation signals. If all pressure switches actuate, automatically started pressurization fans will be secured until air pressure decays below the fan-run switch setpoint, at which time the pressurization fan would restart. This would result in cyclic operation of the pressurization fan.

"The fan-run pressure switches are not part of the manual actuation circuitry for the pressurization fans.

"Diablo Canyon (DCPP) is making this 8-hour, non-emergency notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

"Plant personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN DENSITY GAUGE

The following is a summary of a report provided by the State of California:

On the morning of November 27, 2012 a licensee technician was retrieving a gauge from one of its storage locations when it was noticed that the unit had been broken into and a gauge was stolen. There were six gauges at this location and five of them are accounted for.

A review of the gauge locking system was checked / confirmed. The nuclear gauge had two locks with a third lock/cable around the box. The roll-up door was locked and the gate to the storage facility itself was locked. The lock latch to the storage facility was broken. This was the evidence of forced entry into the unit.

The police were notified right away and came out and took a report. The licensee will also be placing a local ad, reporting the stolen gauge and offering a reward for any lead information to the finding of this gauge.

The licensee was able to move to another storage unit to secure the remaining five gauges. The licensee also purchased heavy duty chains or cables to wrap through all gauges at this location and other storage locations.

Gauge Manufacturer: CPN
Model: MC1DR
S/N: MD70108564
Source: Cs-137 10 mCi
AM-241 50 mCi

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNDERDOSE TO PRESCRIBED TREATMENT LOCATION FOLLOWING A BRACHYTHERAPY TREATMENT

The following information was provided via e-mail from the State of Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection:

"At 3:10 PM on Dec 13, 2012 the licensee RSO called the Ohio Department of Health Bureau to report a medical event involving a prostate seed underdose.

"A prostate seed implant procedure performed on 11/27/2012 was found to have failed the prescribed dose-volume criteria via post-implant CT performed on 12/10/2012. The target prescription was 160 Gy to the prostate. The patient was implanted with 88 Iodine-125 seeds with a total activity of 33.44 mCi (0.38 mCi / seed). The post-implant dosimetry was shown to have a D90 of ~40% of the prescription dose with a number of seeds outside of the prostate. The actual implanted activity in the prostate gland was 27.36 mCi. Sixteen seeds were found in the perineum outside the target volume of the prostate + 1 cm as PTV. The dose to this area unintended to receive radiation was about 20Gy to the periphery of the contour volume containing all the 16 seeds.

"The physician was informed of the discrepancy on 12/12/2012 and the patient was informed on 12/13/2012. There is no negative impact expected to the patient, the physician indicates. The patient will be re-implanted to correct for the D90 discrepancy.

"The Bureau of Radiation Protection will be sending an inspector the week of December 17 to investigate the incident."

Ohio Report Reference Number: 2012-040


A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON PROCESS GAUGE

The following information was received from the Louisiana Department of Environment Quality via facsimile:

"On 11/27/2012, the RSO for BASF called in a preliminary report about a shutter on a fixed level gauge utilized in their processes in the chemical plant. There is no possible exposure to the plant workers because the gauge [is] installed on a remote process [tank inaccessible by plant personnel] and, [consequently], the shutter remaining open and operating [should not be] a problem. . . . The gauge is a Berthold, model #LB-7440D loaded with 150 mCi of Cs-137. [A manufacturer service technician] has been contacted to repair the level gauge. The manufacturer's service tech stated that [the stuck shutter] appears [to be the result of exposure to] the elements. The Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality considers this item closed and the records will be reviewed during the next inspection."

Louisianan Incident Number: T145017

PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING PERFORMANCE OF NPT STAMPED CAVITROL III PLUGS AT CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

The following report was received via fax:

"Fisher Information Notice: FIN 2012-05
19 December, 2012

"Subject: Instrument & Valve Services Company (Columbia, South Carolina location), Job 400000838 for Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Catawba Nuclear Station

"From:

Chad Engle
Nuclear Business Unit Director
Fisher Controls International LLC
205 South Center Street
Marshalltown, IA 50158
Fax: (641) 754-2854

"Equipment Affected By This Information Notice:

Items provided solely to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Catawba Nuclear Station per Instrument & Valve Services Company (Columbia; South Carolina location) Job 400000838 (Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Catawba Nuclear Station PO 00161159). Specifically, the affected parts are two hard faced NPT stamped Cavitrol III plugs, piece serial numbers 400838-1-2A and 400838-1-3A (part number 24A3784X152).

"Purpose:

The purpose of this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) is to alert Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Catawba Nuclear Station (Duke) that as of 27 November 2012, Fisher Controls International LLC (Fisher) became aware of the possibility of a situation which may affect the performance of the aforementioned equipment.

Out of an abundance of caution, Fisher is informing you of this situation in accordance with Section 21.21 (b) of 10CFR21.

"Applicability:

This FIN applies only to the subject equipment supplied by Fisher, as identified above, provided to Duke pursuant to PO 00161159 and affects no other materials provided to Duke or any other utility.

"Discussion:

It was determined by Fisher that two hard faced NPT stamped Cavitrol III Plugs, piece serial numbers 400838-1-2A and 400838-1-3A, were delivered to Duke after being repaired by a welder that, at the time of shipment, was not qualified in accordance with ASME B&PVC Section IX for the base metal thickness welded to affect the repair.

Upon discovery, Duke was notified and segregated the affected parts for return to the Instrument & Valve Services Company's Columbia, South Carolina location.

"Action Required:

Duke has returned the parts to Instrument & Valve Services Company's Columbia, South Carolina location. The parts have been labeled as nonconforming and have been segregated.

The welder involved has subsequently successfully completed a welding qualification test meeting the requirements of ASME B&PVC Section IX (such testing included the base metal thickness applicable to the affected equipment).

The welder qualifications and the nonconformance report will be submitted to the ANI and to Duke for review and approval. Fisher is completing a Corrective Action Report to prevent a similar situation from reoccurring in the future.

"10CFR21 Implications:

Fisher requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10CFR21.

If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact:

Guy Scaggs
Quality Manager
Instrument & Valve Services Company
757 Old Clemson Road
Columbia, SC 29229
Fax: (803) 736-3105
Phone: (803) 736-3101
Guy.Scaggs@emerson.com"