Event Notification Report for November 20, 2012

LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY - RADIATION MONITOR DECLARED INOPERABLE

"This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 0434 [EST] on November 20, 2012, radiation monitor RM-1WV-3547-1, Waste Processing Building Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) was declared inoperable due to a loss of sample flow. This monitor is the only monitor credited in the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) for monitoring a gaseous release from the radiochemistry facility.

"This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for EAL classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Revision 2. This condition does not affect the health or safety the public or the operation of the facility. An alternative method for sampling and determination of activity levels has been implemented. Actions are being taken to restore the monitor functional status.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

CONDITION THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED AUTOMATIC ISOLATION OF REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM

"Susquehanna Unit 2 discovered a condition that could have prevented the primary containment isolation valves for the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system from automatically isolating on a high differential flow instrumentation signal.

"The RWCU system high differential flow signal was found to be indicating downscale due to an instrument failure. Both divisions of the RWCU high differential flow isolation logic utilize the same differential flow instrument loop. Thus, this single instrument failure would have prevented automatic isolation of the RWCU inboard and outboard primary containment isolation valves on a high differential flow signal.

"The other RWCU primary containment isolation instrumentation functions remained operable and the associated RWCU system primary containment isolation valves were capable of being remotely closed by the control room operators.

"At the time of discovery, Unit 2 was in Mode 2 due to an unplanned shutdown and all control rods had already been fully inserted as part of a soft shutdown sequence."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM DUTTRY TO KLCO ON 1/11/13 AT 2155 EST * * *

"Following the ENS report (EN 48525), Susquehanna determined that although the RWCU high differential flow isolation instrumentation would have prevented automatic isolation of the RWCU inboard and outboard primary containment isolation valves on a high differential flow signal, the RWCU high flow isolation instrumentation would detect a high flow condition and generate an isolation signal that would close the isolation valves.

"The RWCU high differential flow instrumentation is downstream of the RWCU pumps and it calculates the difference (delta) in flow between the inlet and the outlet of the RWCU heat exchangers. The SSES [Susquehanna Steam Electric Station] Technical Specification (TS) Bases Section 3.3.6.1 states that the RWCU Differential Flow signal is to detect a break in the RWCU system (pipe severance and separation). Engineering analysis determined that the RWCU pumps would run-out if a break occurs downstream of the pumps and the RWCU system flow rate would be approximately 1000 gpm, with one RWCU pump in operation. The flow rate would be higher for two RWCU pumps in operation.

"Therefore, RWCU isolation would occur from the RWCU Flow - High isolation signal due to a flow rate that is greater than 472 gpm (TS Table 3.3.6.1-1). This high flow isolation does not rely on the RWCU high differential flow instrumentation. The above analysis is consistent with the FSAR discussion in section 7.3.1.1a.2.4.1.9.3.

"Based on the above, Susquehanna has determined that the RWCU isolation function would still be completed if a pipe break occurred downstream of the RWCU heat exchangers and the RWCU high differential flow instrumentation is inoperable. Since there was no loss of safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material, this ENS report is retracted."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

DRYWELL RADIATION MONITOR INOPERABLE

"At 1321 [CST] hours on November 20, 2012, the 1B Drywell Radiation Monitor exhibited degraded performance at the conclusion of surveillance testing. This monitor provides the input into one division of the primary containment isolation logic for a Group II isolation. As a result, the channel was placed in a tripped condition in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Condition B.

"Given both divisions are required to complete the Group II isolation logic, this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"The station is currently taking action to troubleshoot and restore the 1B Drywell Radiation Monitor to an operable condition."

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE AT 1303 EST ON 01/16/13 FROM DEREK DROCKELMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *

"ENS Retraction - Drywell Radiation Monitor Inoperable

"The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS Report made on November 20, 2012, at 1827 EST hours (ENS Report # 48527).

"Further evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station confirms the 1B Drywell Radiation Monitor would have performed its safety function when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report # 48527 is being retracted.

"Note: On November 21, 2012, the 1B Drywell Radiation Monitor was successfully repaired and returned to Operable status."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Bloomer).

POTENTIAL LOST OR STOLEN C-14 SOURCE

The licensee is reporting approximately 1.35 mCi of C-14 in liquid form that is missing from it's Menlo Park facility.

On March 18, 1991, it was reported by the licensee to the Menlo Park Radiation Safety Committee that they had in their possession 9.3 mCi of C-14 which exceeded their maximum possession limit for their permit. At the time they recorded that, they had ordered, or logged as ordered, 5 mCi and 0.25 mCi of C-14. However, the licensee could not find any records that those isotopes had been actually received.

The RSO believes that the cause of the discrepancy between the quantity they actually have on-hand and the quantity that should be in inventory, as indicated by records, is due to a bookkeeping error. On November 7, 1990, the records show that they transferred 1.725 mCi which would leave a balance of 2.171 mCi. This transfer does not show up on the records until August 20, 1991. The quantity was adjusted on the record to 2.173 mCi. They believe that back in 1991 they misreported the amount of Carbon-14 that they actually had in inventory and the error was carried forward.

The licensee is going to start doing physical inventories of all isotopes on a 6-month basis as a corrective action.

* * * RETRACTION FROM HENDRICKSON TO SNYDER AT 1658 ON 2/27/13 * * *

This report was made due to an inventory error. This is event is retracted.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source