Event Notification Report for November 19, 2012

CONTROL ROD DRIVE CHECK VALVE IN SERVICE LEAK TEST FAILURE

"Control Rod Drive (CRD) Check valves 3-0399-593 and 3-0399-594 are installed on the CRD supply header inside the reactor building to prevent unfiltered radiological release from primary containment past secondary containment through the CRD supply header. The [Design Basis Accident] DBA [Loss of Coolant Accident] LOCA dose analysis does not postulate the CRD supply piping as a release path. These valves were added in response to NRC IN 90-78. Their function is described in the Dresden UFSAR section 4.6.4.6.

"CRD check valves 3-0399-593 and 3-0399-594 failed their as found In Service Testing (IST) seat leakage test during refuel outage D3R22.

"Based on the condition of as-found failed seat leakage tests, Engineering determined that CRD check valves 3-0399-593 and 3-0399-594 would not have been able to perform their design functions as described in the UFSAR to maintain the offsite dose and control room dose within regulatory limits.

"The valves were repaired in D3R22 and successfully retested."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM RILEY RUFFIN TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 5/20/13 AT 1140 EDT * * *

"Based on an evaluation of the current plant design and the overly conservative assumptions made in the 1996 dose estimate, the dose that would be experienced as a result of a DBA LOCA with LOOP [Loss of Offsite Power] due to back leakage through the control rod drive system to the condensate storage tanks [CST] has been reassessed. The initial estimations of dose did not consider the as-built piping configuration of the CRD system. The backflow would be greatly reduced due to the lower differential pressure between the Drywell and CSTs that would exist following a DBA-LOOP. This differential pressure experienced following a DBA-LOOP would not result in a significant backflow due to excess flow check valves and restricting orifices in the current CRD piping configuration. Additionally, in the event that any backflow did occur, the volume of water in the CST would provide a high decontamination factor and dilution. Therefore backflows that could be experienced following a DBA-LOOP would not produce doses that would exceed current limits.

"Based on this assessment, the unanalyzed condition that was reported on March 22 (EN 48845) is being retracted."

The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Kozak).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF A DEVICE CONTAINING AMERICIUM-241

The following information was receive from the State of Arizona via e-mail:

"On May 16th, 2013, the Agency [Arizona Radiation Regulatory] received notification from the State of Texas that an illegal transfer of a device containing 30 millicuries of Americium-241 occurred on November 19, 2012. The device is a Thermo Niton XLP818 and the device serial number is 6380. The device was shipped from Longview Scrap & Metal, Inc. in Texas to an individual. The address that was given was to a mailbox company where the device was picked up. The company was not able to look up the reference number, due to it being 6+ months since the shipping date.

"The Agency continues to investigate the location of the device."

AZ First Notice: 13-010

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

NON-LICENSED CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR TESTS POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL

A non-licensed contract acting supervisor tested positive for alcohol on a random fitness for duty test. The contractor's access to the plant has been denied.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE

"At 1625 CST on 11-19-12, Electrical Maintenance and Power Operations were in the process of changing a circuit breaker in the C-409 facility which supplies power to the C-409 Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS). This UPS supplies power to the C-409 CAAS horns. Procedure CP2-CO-ON3031 was being utilized and the CAAS Horn Power UPS was being monitored continuously to maintain the CAAS operable. As soon as the breaker was opened it was identified that the UPS failed to throw over to battery power. At that point the breaker was re-closed and AC power restored to the CAAS horns. The time that AC power was off the CAAS horns was approximately 3-5 seconds. There were no fissile material operations in progress in the C-409 facility. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR [Technical Safety Requirements] to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."