Event Notification Report for November 07, 2012

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DOSE TO EMBRYO/FETUS

The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via facsimile:

"A lung cancer patient [underwent] PET and CT [scans and received] a calculated dose of 2 Rem to [her] embryo. The patient was asked if she was pregnant and she replied no. The dose was calculated to be 8.8 mGy from CT and 11.5 mGy from PET."

The patient was notified.

PART 21 REPORT- COMMERCIAL GRADE DEDICATION NOT PROPERLY APPLIED TO BUTTERFLY VALVES

The following information was received by facsimile:

"While reviewing an order for a Type 9200 Butterfly Valve, it was discovered that some parts [shipped from Marshalltown, Iowa from 2009-present] had not been identified for Commercial Grade Dedication, These parts were considered Essential-to-Function and were needed for the valve assembly to perform its safety-related function(s).

"[The vendor] then extended its review to all safety-related orders going back to 2009. This review confirmed that the failure to dedicate was not confined to Type 9200 butterfly valves. The beginning of 2009 was selected because [an audit follow-up was] performed in January, 2009. A key point of emphasis during the audit was commercial grade dedication, with a recommended outcome being the addition of guidance on commercial grade dedication with all new quotations. Therefore, the 2009 audit brought clarity and consistency in approach, that was not always applied correctly between January, 2009 thru October, 2012.

"It is [vendor's] opinion that while the affected equipment identified as safety-related was not properly dedicated, the failure to dedicate does not appear to pose an inherent safety risk based on currently available Information. The reason being that much of the equipment affected by [the vendor's] error were items such as mounting kits, wherein [the vendor] failed to dedicate the hardware used to mount the instrument (i.e., the bracket and screws), but did properly dedicate the instrument. Additionally, in forming this opinion, [the vendor] has taken into account that there are no known field issues with the affected equipment and all such possibly non-dedicated equipment passed the required standard testing."

U.S. nuclear plants affected include the following:

D.C. Cook; Millstone; Surry; McGuire; San Onofre; Indian Point; Palisades; Clinton; Peach Bottom; Beaver Valley; Cooper; Palo Verde; Brunswick; Hope Creek/Salem and Watts Bar. It is noted that numerous foreign facilities are also affected.

If there are any technical question, contact the Fisher Quality Manager (George Baitinger) : Fax: (641) 754-2854 or Phone: (641) 754-2026.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The following was received from the State of Texas via email:

"On November 7, 2012, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee that one of its Troxler model 3411B moisture/density gauges had been damaged. The gauge contained one 8 milliCurie cesium-137 source and one 40 milliCurie americium-241/beryllium source. The operator had stepped aside to a nearby wall to get location information. A bulldozer operator assumed that this meant that the test was finished and drove into the area, impacting the gauge. The gauge was not run over, but suffered a bent top and damaged electronics. The licensee performed a survey and determined that the integrity of the sources and shielding were not impacted. The licensee has performed a leak test and will be returning the device to the manufacturer for evaluation. The investigation into this event is ongoing."

Texas Incident Number: I-9009

LIQUID PENETRANT SURFACE INDICATIONS FOUND ON CONTROL ROD DRIVE RETURN NOZZLE SAFE END TO PIPE WELD

"Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station is currently in Cold Shutdown executing Refueling Outage 1R24, which includes in-service inspections.

"At 1240 EST, General Electric notified Oyster Creek Management of surface indications that were detected by dye penetrant testing. The indications are in the adjacent base material area of the System Pressure Boundary weld. The indications are located Top Dead Center (TDC) of the 3 inch pipe. Indication #1 is upstream 0.7 inches away from the weld toe, the indication is 1.5" long. Indication #2 is downstream 0.2 inches away from the weld toe, the indication is 2.5" long. The depth of the indications are unknown at this time.

"Initial investigation revealed that there was no moisture or leakage found in the area of the indications. Further investigation is in progress to better characterize the indications. The cause is under investigation and corrective action plans are being developed.

"The surface defects have been evaluated by Exelon and determined to meet the criteria for reporting identified in NUREG-1022: Welding or material defects in the primary coolant system that cannot be found acceptable under ASME Section XI. IWB-3600, 'Analytical Evaluation of Flaws,' or ASME Section XI, Table IWB-3410-1, 'Acceptable Standards'."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

PLANNED OUTAGE OF EMERGENCY SIRENS

"A planned outage of all FCS [Fort Calhoun Station] sirens is to occur at 0900 CST today to replace required router power supplies. Based on the planned maintenance, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) will be nonfunctional. Prior notifications and coordination with Local Law Enforcement have been completed with compensatory measures established to support notification of the public in case of an actual emergency during the scheduled maintenance.

"The planned maintenance is expected to take three hours with a projected completion time of 1200 CST. Also, contingencies have been established with the maintenance to back out if required in support of Law Enforcement activities.

"This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for: 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability'."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and local counties.

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN FICKLE TO CHARLES TEAL ON 11/7/12 AT 1246 EST * * *

"At 1129 CST, maintenance was completed with all sirens restored to functional status. Local Law Enforcement has been notified and relaxed required compensatory actions. NRC Resident informed."

Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).

MANUAL REACTOR SHUTDOWN DUE TO HYDROGEN IN-LEAKAGE TO STATOR WATER COOLING SYSTEM

"At 09:21 EST 11/7/12, the reactor mode switch was taken to shutdown and the main turbine generator was manually tripped in response to hydrogen gas in-leakage into the stator water cooling system from the main turbine generator. The scram was uncomplicated, and all control rods, except one, fully inserted into the core. One control rod stopped at position 02 and was manually inserted. The lowest reactor vessel water level reached was 125 inches, and as expected, HPCI & RCIC did not actuate. No safety relief valves (SRV) actuated. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal band using the control rod drive and reactor feedwater systems. All isolations and actuations for reactor water level 3 occurred as expected.

"The cause of the increased hydrogen gas in-leakage into stator water cooling is under investigation. At the time of the manual scram, all Emergency Diesel Generators were operable. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems were available and no significant safety related equipment was out of service. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as an event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical."

The MSIVs are open with decay heat being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves. The plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.