Event Notification Report for November 06, 2012

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION ACTUATION SIGNAL

"On Tuesday, November 06, 2012, at 00:06 EST, during the application of a tag-out associated with feedwater level control, the 12 feedwater flow control valve (FCV-29-137) unexpectedly partially opened. As a result, reactor vessel water level rose to the high level turbine trip set point causing the main turbine to trip. The turbine trip signal then resulted in the initiation of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) channels 11 and 12 logic. No actual system component starts or actuations occurred as a result of the logic initiation and no actual HPCI injection occurred due to the system configuration, nor was injection required.

"Actions were taken to manually isolate the 12 feedwater flow control valve and reactor vessel water level was restored to normal.

"This meets NRC 8-Hour reporting criteria per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to a valid actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM JERRY HELKER TO CHARLES TEAL ON 12/17/12 AT 1543 EST * * *

"This notification is being made to retract Event Notification (EN) #48481, which reported an automatic actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system initiation logic.

"The HPCI system is automatically initiated based on conditions representing a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The initiation signals are:

- Low reactor water level - This is a direct indication of a potential loss of adequate core cooling.
- Turbine trip - During a LOCA within the drywell, high drywell pressure due to the line break will cause a reactor scram, which causes a turbine trip, which then by design initiates the HPCI system.

"The event occurred with the reactor in the cold shutdown condition, with the main turbine and main turbine shaft-driven feedwater pump (#13) out of service. In the cold shutdown condition, the probability of a LOCA is low and the HPCI system is not required by the Technical Specifications to be operable. Neither of the conditions requiring actuation of the safety function of the HPCI system (high drywell pressure or low reactor water level) was present. Although the turbine trip signal was in response to an actual sensed high reactor water level condition, high reactor water level is not a plant condition satisfying the requirement for actuation of the safety function of the HPCI system. With reactor vessel water level high, the safety function of the HPCI system (i.e. to provide adequate core cooling) was already completed. Thus, the HPCI initiation signal was invalid, and the event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified the R1DO (Hunegs).

* * * UPDATE FROM JOHN APRIL TO VINCE KLCO ON 4/24/13 AT 0158 EDT * * *

"Upon further review, it has been determined the event did constitute a valid actuation of the HPCI system and is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(4)(A)."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R1DO (Joustra).

AIRLINE UNDERGOING RE-ORGANIZATION UNABLE TO LOCATE VARIOUS RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

A representative for Pinnacle Airlines called to report that the company has records of various radioactive sources which cannot be located and are presumed lost. The airline is undergoing bankruptcy reorganization. The individual noted that the sources were previously registered under a company called Mesaba Airlines. Mesaba Airlines was at one time associated with Northwest Airlines. The individual believes that the devices were originally registered with the NRC as general licensed material. The material records indicate that the company was in the possession of 10 "Tritium Light Comparators" of approximately 1 curie each. The company has been able to locate 5 of these sources: In Knoxville TN; Memphis TN; Detroit MI; and Ft. Wayne IN. In addition, the company states that it had five explosive detector sources that are unaccounted for and (10 millicuries Nickel - 63 each) were last stored in Michigan (Esbaneba, Muskegon Kincheloe, and Gwinn MI). There may also be some missing Tritium Exit signs but the licensee has not been able to determine how many or where they were last located.

At this time, the licensee believes that this material is lost and that the responsible reporting agency is the NRC. The sources are registered on the generally licensed source tracking list. The licensee has discussed this information with NRC Region 3 (Reichhold).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source