Event Notification Report for October 25, 2012

PARTIAL LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT DURING PLANNED MODIFICATIONS

"On October 25, 2012, Callaway Plant will begin implementation of a modification to the plant computer system. The Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and plant computer stations in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be unavailable during the modification. Plant computer stations will remain available in the Control Room. The period of unavailability is anticipated to be approximately 12 hours on October 25, 2012, with an additional 8 hours for system testing on October 26, 2012.

"During the modification process, the TSC and EOF will remain functional and available for use. Plant procedures provide guidance for manual data collection and sending ERDS data to the NRC.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE FROM SHANNON GAYDOS TO PETE SNYDER AT 2123 ON 10/25/12 * * *

"Based on the current work progress on the plant computer system, the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and the plant computer stations in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will not be available until early evening on October 26, 2012."

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified R4DO (Hagar).

* * * UPDATE FROM DAVID LANTZ TO DONG PARK AT 2033 EDT ON 10/26/12 * * *

"Modification has been completed on the plant computer system. The Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and the plant computer stations in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) have been restored to normal operation."

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Notified R4DO (Hagar).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - HIGH PORTAL MONITOR READINGS AT SCRAP YARD

The State of North Carolina reported the following via email:

"NC Radiation Protection Section received a call from Gerdau Charlotte regarding a load of scrap tire-wire that tripped their portal monitor. [An individual] measured 10 mR/hr on contact at the rear of the truck trailer using a handheld meter (Ludlum 192, background reported at 3 mR/hr). The shipment originated from Liberty Tire in Atlanta, GA.

"[The shipment] will be returned to Liberty Tire, Atlanta, GA, via CRCPD exemption NC-GA-12-01."

CONFIRMED POSITIVE FITNESS FOR DUTY

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN X-RAY FLUORESCENCE ANALYZER

The following was submitted by the State of Georgia via email:

"Around noon time on 10/26/12, [a licensee representative] called and notified the Department [Georgia Radioactive Material Program] that upon his arrival at work that morning around 8:30 am, he discovered that his office was vandalized, and the Niton Model # XP300A/Serial # 22283 Lead Paint Analyzer radioactive device was stolen. He indicated that his door was left unlocked that night. When he walked in the two drawer file where the gauge was stored, was opened. The intruder was able to locate the key to the cabinet and the key was still in the open drawer. The device was locked in the carrying case, and the case was also stolen. The licensee stated that the device was last used on 10/25/12, and returned to storage around 5:00 pm before leaving work on that day. The device contains a Cadmium 109, 40 mCi source, Serial # TR0380."

Georgia incident ID: GA-2012-30i

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID ACTUATION OF THE ESSENTIAL SPRAY POND SYSTEM

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"This telephone notification is being made pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 essential spray pond system (SP) which serves as the ultimate heat sink as described in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(9).

"On October 25, 2012, at approximately 2108, Mountain Standard Time, during refueling outage 2R17, Unit 2 experienced an invalid actuation of the train B essential spray pond system. Testing of the train B engineered safeguards features actuation system (ESFAS) was in progress. During the test, following activities to reset the train B containment spray actuation signal (CSAS), the procedure required a check of contact status on a relay contact which provides input to the train B Load Sequencer. The guidance required the use of a digital multi-meter to perform the contact status check. When the digital multi-meter test leads were landed and removed from the circuit, the train B Load Sequencer changed output modes which resulted in automatic starting of the train B essential chilled water system, essential cooling water system, essential fuel building air filtration unit and essential spray pond system.

"This was a partial actuation of the train B ESF equipment and all the affected equipment responded as designed. No equipment failures resulted from the event. The event was entered into the PVNGS corrective action program. The invalid actuation was caused by an incorrect testing methodology in the procedure instructions which resulted in the unintended interaction of the digital multi-meter and the digital train B Load Sequencer. The inadequate procedures will be revised to modify the testing methodology for verification of relay contact status."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

DEFECT DISCOVERED IN COM-5 AND SSC-T PROTECTIVE RELAYS DISTRIBUTED BY ABB, INC.

The following information was obtained by ABB, Inc. via fax:

"ABB Coral Springs received notice from ABB Inc. in Florence, South Carolina of a return request by NextEra Energy (Point Beach Nuclear Plant) for one of [their] COM-5 relays. The customer complaint was identified as 'A pin on the telephone relay fell out'.

"ABB Coral Springs received the relay on October 25, 2012 with the telephone relay armature and armature pivot pin disassembled. The assembly process for the telephone relay armature calls for the armature pivot pin to have a knurl at one end and a flare at the opposite end. The knurl and flare secures the armature to the pivot pin. [ABB's] investigation found that on this telephone relay, the pivot pin was flared on the same end as that which had the knurl. It was determined that this was due to an operator error while performing a secondary operation.

"The telephone relay was stamped with a manufacturing date code 08-38, indicating the thirty-eighth week of 2008. It is important to note the date of manufacture, as in mid-2010 the supplier and the assembly manufacturing process of the pin was changed. The hole and flaring was changed such that it is performed prior to cutting the pin to length, eliminating the secondary operation and potential for error.

"In addition to the change to the flaring process described above, corrective action includes the addition of an additional step to [ABB's] final Product Inspection procedure where all telephone relays are verified to have the knurl at one end of the armature pivot pin and a flare at the opposite end.

"Inspection of [ABB's] stock identified no similar condition.

"[ABB has] identified COM-5 and SSC-T relays which shipped that may have a telephone relay of the same vintage as that of the subject telephone relay. There were eleven orders shipped, totaling twenty-five units to three customers; ABB Inc. Florence, S.C., Exelon Business Services and WESCO Distribution, Inc.. ABB has determined that it does not have the capability to perform an evaluation to determine if a defect exists, and therefore in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(b), [ABB is] notifying [their] affected customers so that they may evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10 CFR 21(a).

"A failure of the Telephone Relay to operate on either the COM-5 or SSC-T relay can result in the breaker not tripping during an overload condition. This condition could compromise the ability of the relay to perform its intended safety function.

"[ABB is] providing [their] customers with the option of inspecting for evidence of the knurl and flare or returning the relays so [they] may perform the inspection."