Event Notification Report for October 13, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/12/2012 - 10/13/2012
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48405
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROY GILES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROY GILES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/13/2012
Notification Time: 11:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2012
Event Time: 03:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2012
Notification Time: 11:33 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2012
Event Time: 03:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/13/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 91 | Power Operation | 91 | Power Operation |
PORTIONS OF ONSITE TELEPHONE SYSTEMS NOT RESPONDING NORMALLY
"At approximately 0320 CDT on 10/13/2012, Cooper Nuclear Station personnel identified portions of the onsite telephone system are not responding normally, following reports of a lightning strike in the vicinity of the meteorological tower. Personnel performed checks of onsite and offsite communications capability, and determined the normal method of contacting the state and local agencies would not function. Alternate methods were checked, and found to be only partially functional. This is considered to be a major loss of the offsite communications capability, and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Alternate methods of contacting state and local agencies are available using working phones and the site cell phone system to obtain an offsite phone line and dial the direct line as listed in the emergency telephone directory. State and local agencies must be contacted individually. The capability to activate the ERO paging backup system per the implementing procedures is not affected by this condition.
"Communication personnel will respond to the site to correct the condition."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying state and local agencies.
* * * UPDATE FROM ROY GILES TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1617 ON 10/13/2012 * * *
"This is a follow-up notification to EN 48405. At 1407 CDT on 10/13/2012, the normal method of contacting state and local agencies during an emergency has been restored."
The licensee has notified state and local agencies and will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hagar).
"At approximately 0320 CDT on 10/13/2012, Cooper Nuclear Station personnel identified portions of the onsite telephone system are not responding normally, following reports of a lightning strike in the vicinity of the meteorological tower. Personnel performed checks of onsite and offsite communications capability, and determined the normal method of contacting the state and local agencies would not function. Alternate methods were checked, and found to be only partially functional. This is considered to be a major loss of the offsite communications capability, and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Alternate methods of contacting state and local agencies are available using working phones and the site cell phone system to obtain an offsite phone line and dial the direct line as listed in the emergency telephone directory. State and local agencies must be contacted individually. The capability to activate the ERO paging backup system per the implementing procedures is not affected by this condition.
"Communication personnel will respond to the site to correct the condition."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying state and local agencies.
* * * UPDATE FROM ROY GILES TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1617 ON 10/13/2012 * * *
"This is a follow-up notification to EN 48405. At 1407 CDT on 10/13/2012, the normal method of contacting state and local agencies during an emergency has been restored."
The licensee has notified state and local agencies and will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Hagar).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48581
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: HENK VERWEY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: HENK VERWEY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/12/2012
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2012
Event Time: 02:18 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2012
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2012
Event Time: 02:18 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/12/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
60 DAY REPORT- INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"Event Summary: On October 13, 2012, at approximately 0218 [EST], a full reactor scram signal was received in the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) control room. At the time of this event, the plant was in cold shutdown (Mode 4) and refueling outage 20 (R20) was in progress. The scram signal occurred because Reactor Vessel Scram & Primary Containment Isolation Level Transmitter (02-3LT-101C) and Reactor Vessel Scram & Primary Containment Isolation Level Transmitter EQ (02-3LT-101D) momentarily failed downscale, and then immediately recovered.
"02-3LT-101C is an 'A' division component and 02-3LT-101D is a 'B' division component. Therefore, both the 'A' and 'B' divisions of reactor protection actuated providing a full reactor scram and outboard primary containment isolation signal. AOP-15, 'Isolation Verification and Recovery' verified that the proper containment isolation response was received. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) because it resulted in the invalid actuation of the reactor protection system while the reactor was already shut down.
"Apparent Cause: A Failure Mode Analysis and Apparent Cause Evaluation were performed to determine the most likely cause of both level transmitters to momentarily spike downscale. It was concluded that the most probable cause was due to a worker inadvertently coming into contact with the level transmitters' exposed sensing lines. Contributing to this event was the misjudgment by the Operations individual reviewing the work package, on the risk significance of the instrumentation in the vicinity of the work area. As a result, the work area was not constructed in a manner to preclude interference with the level transmitters or associated sensing lines.
"Corrective Actions: Immediate corrective actions were to walk down the affected instrument lines to ensure no damage had been caused. Additional corrective actions were to install signs near the level transmitters and exposed sensing lines. The signs denote that sensitive instrument lines are present. Future corrective actions include a walk down by engineering and operations to identify other areas in the plant where sensitive instrument lines are present and place additional signs or barriers as appropriate."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Event Summary: On October 13, 2012, at approximately 0218 [EST], a full reactor scram signal was received in the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) control room. At the time of this event, the plant was in cold shutdown (Mode 4) and refueling outage 20 (R20) was in progress. The scram signal occurred because Reactor Vessel Scram & Primary Containment Isolation Level Transmitter (02-3LT-101C) and Reactor Vessel Scram & Primary Containment Isolation Level Transmitter EQ (02-3LT-101D) momentarily failed downscale, and then immediately recovered.
"02-3LT-101C is an 'A' division component and 02-3LT-101D is a 'B' division component. Therefore, both the 'A' and 'B' divisions of reactor protection actuated providing a full reactor scram and outboard primary containment isolation signal. AOP-15, 'Isolation Verification and Recovery' verified that the proper containment isolation response was received. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) because it resulted in the invalid actuation of the reactor protection system while the reactor was already shut down.
"Apparent Cause: A Failure Mode Analysis and Apparent Cause Evaluation were performed to determine the most likely cause of both level transmitters to momentarily spike downscale. It was concluded that the most probable cause was due to a worker inadvertently coming into contact with the level transmitters' exposed sensing lines. Contributing to this event was the misjudgment by the Operations individual reviewing the work package, on the risk significance of the instrumentation in the vicinity of the work area. As a result, the work area was not constructed in a manner to preclude interference with the level transmitters or associated sensing lines.
"Corrective Actions: Immediate corrective actions were to walk down the affected instrument lines to ensure no damage had been caused. Additional corrective actions were to install signs near the level transmitters and exposed sensing lines. The signs denote that sensitive instrument lines are present. Future corrective actions include a walk down by engineering and operations to identify other areas in the plant where sensitive instrument lines are present and place additional signs or barriers as appropriate."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48575
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN HARKINS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JOHN HARKINS
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 12/10/2012
Notification Time: 21:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2012
Event Time: 18:41 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2012
Notification Time: 21:40 [ET]
Event Date: 10/13/2012
Event Time: 18:41 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID MULTIPLE SYSTEM ACTUATIONS
"On Saturday, October 13, 2012, Unit 1 was operating at 100% power. At 1841 [EDT], the 1A RPS/UPS inverter tripped and the automatic transfer of the RPS and UPS 120 VAC distribution panel (1A-Y160) loads to the primary alternate AC power source was delayed. The delay in automatic load transfer caused the RPS series breakers to trip on undervoltage. The failure caused a loss of power to Division IA and IIA RPS relays and Division IA and IIA NS4 relays. This caused primary containment isolation valves (PClVs) to automatically close on more than one system. The IB and IIB channels were unaffected.
"The most probable cause for the delayed load transfer was a failed logic power supply with a momentary loss of synchronization. Troubleshooting continues [in order] to confirm the specific cause of the component failure. The distribution panel loads are currently supplied by an installed alternate AC power source.
"The portion of the primary containment isolation system that received an actuation signal functioned successfully. All of the affected open isolation valves automatically closed. The isolation was a partial actuation.
"This 60-day ENS report is being made per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to report invalid automatic actuations of systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B). The listed system that actuated was general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) closed on drywell chilled water (DWCW), reactor enclosure cooling water (RECW), primary containment instrument gas (PCIG), Unit 1 containment leak detector, and Unit 2 containment leak detector."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On Saturday, October 13, 2012, Unit 1 was operating at 100% power. At 1841 [EDT], the 1A RPS/UPS inverter tripped and the automatic transfer of the RPS and UPS 120 VAC distribution panel (1A-Y160) loads to the primary alternate AC power source was delayed. The delay in automatic load transfer caused the RPS series breakers to trip on undervoltage. The failure caused a loss of power to Division IA and IIA RPS relays and Division IA and IIA NS4 relays. This caused primary containment isolation valves (PClVs) to automatically close on more than one system. The IB and IIB channels were unaffected.
"The most probable cause for the delayed load transfer was a failed logic power supply with a momentary loss of synchronization. Troubleshooting continues [in order] to confirm the specific cause of the component failure. The distribution panel loads are currently supplied by an installed alternate AC power source.
"The portion of the primary containment isolation system that received an actuation signal functioned successfully. All of the affected open isolation valves automatically closed. The isolation was a partial actuation.
"This 60-day ENS report is being made per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to report invalid automatic actuations of systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B). The listed system that actuated was general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) closed on drywell chilled water (DWCW), reactor enclosure cooling water (RECW), primary containment instrument gas (PCIG), Unit 1 containment leak detector, and Unit 2 containment leak detector."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.