Event Notification Report for October 10, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/09/2012 - 10/10/2012
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48397
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GEORGE LESTER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: GEORGE LESTER
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 10/10/2012
Notification Time: 18:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2012
Event Time: 16:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2012
Notification Time: 18:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2012
Event Time: 16:33 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
REDUCED RADIATION MONITORING CAPABILITY FOR AUXILIARY BUILDING AND CONTAINMENT VENT STACKS
"On October 10, 2012, at 1633 [CDT], Kewaunee Power Station staff identified (in response to concerns raised by the NRC Resident Inspector) that the Containment and Auxiliary Building SPING (Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas) units could likely not have been relied upon to determine Emergency Classifications based on the Kewaunee Emergency Action (EAL) Level Matrix. This was due to these SPINGs having been nonfunctional during the period from 2/28/2011 at 0150 [CDT] until 3/30/2011 at 1845 [CDT]. Alternate radiation monitoring capability remained available to provide indication of radiation levels in the Auxiliary Building and Containment vent stacks; however, they would not have been sufficient to identify the upper two emergency action levels. Alternate means (e.g., grab samples) could also have been used to make the appropriate declarations. However, use of the alternate means could potentially impair the plant's ability to declare an emergency in a timely manner.
"These SPING units had been returned to service on 3/30/2011 and were subsequently available for EAL classifications. However, the ramification of this condition was not fully recognized until today.
"This condition is being conservatively reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On October 10, 2012, at 1633 [CDT], Kewaunee Power Station staff identified (in response to concerns raised by the NRC Resident Inspector) that the Containment and Auxiliary Building SPING (Special Particulate Iodine Noble Gas) units could likely not have been relied upon to determine Emergency Classifications based on the Kewaunee Emergency Action (EAL) Level Matrix. This was due to these SPINGs having been nonfunctional during the period from 2/28/2011 at 0150 [CDT] until 3/30/2011 at 1845 [CDT]. Alternate radiation monitoring capability remained available to provide indication of radiation levels in the Auxiliary Building and Containment vent stacks; however, they would not have been sufficient to identify the upper two emergency action levels. Alternate means (e.g., grab samples) could also have been used to make the appropriate declarations. However, use of the alternate means could potentially impair the plant's ability to declare an emergency in a timely manner.
"These SPING units had been returned to service on 3/30/2011 and were subsequently available for EAL classifications. However, the ramification of this condition was not fully recognized until today.
"This condition is being conservatively reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 48398
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: DEREK WARFORD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: DEREK WARFORD
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 10/10/2012
Notification Time: 22:43 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2012
Event Time: 13:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2012
Notification Time: 22:43 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2012
Event Time: 13:05 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
ROBERT JOHNSON (NMSS)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
ROBERT JOHNSON (NMSS)
DOUBLE CONTINGENCY CONTROL FOR EMPTY CYLINDERS NOT MAINTAINED
"At 1305 CDT, on 10-10-12 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that during reviews of paperwork for a customer, it was discovered that four clean, empty cylinders used for transfer did not have a hydrocarbon test performed prior to filling, in violation of NCSA 360-005. NCSA 360-005 requires a test for never used non-USEC owned cylinders prior to filling to detect the presence of hydrocarbons. The presence of moderator in the cylinders could lead to either an 'explosion' that ruptures the cylinder and releases UF6 or criticality from moderation of greater than a safe mass of uranium. The controls ensure that double contingency exits to prevent filling a cylinder containing enough moderator to support criticality.
"Cylinders affected are GE0195, GE0191, JM0226, and GE0407 and were filled on 9/16/12 and 9/22/12.
"Since one leg of double contingency was lost, this is being reported to the NRC as a 24-hour Event Report in accordance with NRC BL 91-01 Supplement 1.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-12-2554; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2012-06.
"Responsible Division: Production Support & Product Scheduling
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: A control relied upon for double contingency was violated. A cold pressure check and cylinder weight check performed prior to initial transfer of UF6 did not indicate the presence of moderator, and customer compliance with ANSI N14.1 also ensures that cylinders received at PGDP would not contain moderator. There was no indication of an adverse reaction noted during the filling of the cylinders. A cold pressure check performed after filling and cooldown did not indicate that an adverse reaction associated with UF6 and moderator had occurred. The introduction of UF6 eliminates the possibility of any residual moderator remaining in the cylinder; therefore, the cylinders are now in compliance with double contingency.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: In order for criticality to be possible, sufficient undetected moderator would have to be present in the cylinder prior to the initial transfer of UF6. Although a control was violated, the cold pressure check ensured the moderation parameter was not exceeded.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: Double contingency for this scenario is provided by two controls on moderation.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: 20,000 lbs. of UF6 at approximately 4.0% U235 enrichment. Plant limit is 5.5 wt.% U235 enrichment
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency is based on cylinder compliance with ANSI N14.1 and the performance of a cold pressure check prior to initial transfer of UF6. ANSI N14.1 compliance ensures that the cylinders are clean and free of moderator. The cold pressure check provides a positive indication that no moderator is present inside the cylinder. The cold pressure check was adequately performed prior to initial UF6; therefore, this control was not violated.
"The second leg of double contingency is based on performing a hydrocarbon test on the internal valve opening of the UF6 cylinder prior to initial transfer of UF6. The presence of hydrocarbon material in a UF6 cylinder could result in a cylinder rupture or criticality prior to initial transfer of UF6. The hydrocarbon test will give telltale signs that the inside of the cylinder may contain oil or other potential moderators. The hydrocarbon test was not performed; therefore, this control was violated. This leg of double contingency is considered to have been lost.
"Since double contingency for this scenario is based on two controls on one parameter and a control was violated, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: None are needed."
"At 1305 CDT, on 10-10-12 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that during reviews of paperwork for a customer, it was discovered that four clean, empty cylinders used for transfer did not have a hydrocarbon test performed prior to filling, in violation of NCSA 360-005. NCSA 360-005 requires a test for never used non-USEC owned cylinders prior to filling to detect the presence of hydrocarbons. The presence of moderator in the cylinders could lead to either an 'explosion' that ruptures the cylinder and releases UF6 or criticality from moderation of greater than a safe mass of uranium. The controls ensure that double contingency exits to prevent filling a cylinder containing enough moderator to support criticality.
"Cylinders affected are GE0195, GE0191, JM0226, and GE0407 and were filled on 9/16/12 and 9/22/12.
"Since one leg of double contingency was lost, this is being reported to the NRC as a 24-hour Event Report in accordance with NRC BL 91-01 Supplement 1.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-12-2554; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2012-06.
"Responsible Division: Production Support & Product Scheduling
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: A control relied upon for double contingency was violated. A cold pressure check and cylinder weight check performed prior to initial transfer of UF6 did not indicate the presence of moderator, and customer compliance with ANSI N14.1 also ensures that cylinders received at PGDP would not contain moderator. There was no indication of an adverse reaction noted during the filling of the cylinders. A cold pressure check performed after filling and cooldown did not indicate that an adverse reaction associated with UF6 and moderator had occurred. The introduction of UF6 eliminates the possibility of any residual moderator remaining in the cylinder; therefore, the cylinders are now in compliance with double contingency.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: In order for criticality to be possible, sufficient undetected moderator would have to be present in the cylinder prior to the initial transfer of UF6. Although a control was violated, the cold pressure check ensured the moderation parameter was not exceeded.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: Double contingency for this scenario is provided by two controls on moderation.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: 20,000 lbs. of UF6 at approximately 4.0% U235 enrichment. Plant limit is 5.5 wt.% U235 enrichment
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency is based on cylinder compliance with ANSI N14.1 and the performance of a cold pressure check prior to initial transfer of UF6. ANSI N14.1 compliance ensures that the cylinders are clean and free of moderator. The cold pressure check provides a positive indication that no moderator is present inside the cylinder. The cold pressure check was adequately performed prior to initial UF6; therefore, this control was not violated.
"The second leg of double contingency is based on performing a hydrocarbon test on the internal valve opening of the UF6 cylinder prior to initial transfer of UF6. The presence of hydrocarbon material in a UF6 cylinder could result in a cylinder rupture or criticality prior to initial transfer of UF6. The hydrocarbon test will give telltale signs that the inside of the cylinder may contain oil or other potential moderators. The hydrocarbon test was not performed; therefore, this control was violated. This leg of double contingency is considered to have been lost.
"Since double contingency for this scenario is based on two controls on one parameter and a control was violated, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: None are needed."