Event Notification Report for October 09, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/08/2012 - 10/09/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
48396485684839048391
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48396
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN CAVES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN CAVES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/10/2012
Notification Time: 07:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2012
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2012
Notification Time: 07:14 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2012
Event Time: 13:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL FITNESS FOR DUTY VIOLATION
A non-licensed employee supervisor was administered a for-cause chemical test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
A non-licensed employee supervisor was administered a for-cause chemical test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48568
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIM TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIM TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 12/07/2012
Notification Time: 10:31 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2012
Event Time: 10:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2012
Notification Time: 10:31 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2012
Event Time: 10:50 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60-DAY TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF AN INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"On October 9, 2012, at 1050 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), the 2A Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator (MG) Set Voltage Regulator failed causing the 2A1 Circuit Protector to trip on undervoltage, resulting in a half scram. In addition, the loss of 2A RPS caused the isolation of Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups 2, 3, 6, and 8, which resulted in the initiation of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) Trains 'A' and 'C' and the isolation of the 2-RM-90-256 Continuous Air Monitor (CAM), inboard valves, Drywell floor drain inboard isolation valve, and the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU).
"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level, High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Vessel High Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level, High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist, therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.
"The affected equipment responded as designed.
"This condition was the result of the failure of the 2A RPS MG Set voltage regulator. To address this condition, the failed voltage regulator was replaced.
"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
"This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Problem Evaluation Report 621027.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made in accordance with the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.
"On October 9, 2012, at 1050 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), the 2A Reactor Protection System (RPS) Motor Generator (MG) Set Voltage Regulator failed causing the 2A1 Circuit Protector to trip on undervoltage, resulting in a half scram. In addition, the loss of 2A RPS caused the isolation of Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups 2, 3, 6, and 8, which resulted in the initiation of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) Trains 'A' and 'C' and the isolation of the 2-RM-90-256 Continuous Air Monitor (CAM), inboard valves, Drywell floor drain inboard isolation valve, and the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU).
"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level, High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Vessel High Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level, High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist, therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.
"The affected equipment responded as designed.
"This condition was the result of the failure of the 2A RPS MG Set voltage regulator. To address this condition, the failed voltage regulator was replaced.
"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.
"This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Problem Evaluation Report 621027.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 48390
Rep Org: CONTINENTAL CEMENT
Licensee: CONTINENTAL CEMENT
Region: 3
City: HANNIBAL State: MO
County:
License #: 24-20263-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE HEIBEL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: CONTINENTAL CEMENT
Region: 3
City: HANNIBAL State: MO
County:
License #: 24-20263-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE HEIBEL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/09/2012
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2012
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2012
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2012
Event Time: 11:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
SHUTTER STUCK OPEN ON FIXED VEGA AMERICAS, INC. NUCLEAR GAUGE
The licensee hired VEGA Americas (formerly Ohmart/VEGA) to remove a fixed industrial gauge from their Green America Recycling facility. During removal, it was determined that the shutter was stuck in its normal operating open position. The vendor placed a temporary shutter over the source and will be shipping the gauge back to their facility for disposal. There were no personnel overexposures reported as a result of this incident.
The gauge was a VEGA Americas model SHF2-0, S/N M-6997, containing 120 mCi of Cs-137.
The licensee hired VEGA Americas (formerly Ohmart/VEGA) to remove a fixed industrial gauge from their Green America Recycling facility. During removal, it was determined that the shutter was stuck in its normal operating open position. The vendor placed a temporary shutter over the source and will be shipping the gauge back to their facility for disposal. There were no personnel overexposures reported as a result of this incident.
The gauge was a VEGA Americas model SHF2-0, S/N M-6997, containing 120 mCi of Cs-137.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48391
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM OAKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM OAKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 10/09/2012
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2012
Event Time: 10:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2012
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2012
Event Time: 10:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
DEBORAH SEYMOUR (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY AT THE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY
"At approximately 0100 hours EDT, on October 9, 2012, a low voltage circuit breaker in the Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) tripped due to an electrical fault. The associated loads were powered by backup batteries until they depleted at approximately 1057 EDT. This condition resulted in the loss of dose assessment (RASCAL) and facility cooling capability.
"Dose assessment capability at the EOF was restored by 1335 EDT. During this event, RASCAL could be run from any plant computer outside of the EOF and the results conveyed back to the EOF. EOF ambient temperature is being monitored. An estimated completion time for chiller restoration has not been established. A follow-up notification will be provided when the chiller operation has been restored. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"At no time was the public's or plant employees' health or safety at risk. Due to numerous backup systems, alternate methods were available to calculate dose projections, if required, and communicate the information to the EOF.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVE MCAGY TO CHARLES TEAL AT 2001 EDT ON 10/10/12 * * *
"At 1500 EDT on 10/10/12 Chiller Operations for the EOF has been restored. At 1700 EDT on 10/10/12 the EOF returned to normal office temperatures. At no time did temperatures affect the habitability or functionality of the EOF."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
Notified R2DO (Seymour).
"At approximately 0100 hours EDT, on October 9, 2012, a low voltage circuit breaker in the Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) tripped due to an electrical fault. The associated loads were powered by backup batteries until they depleted at approximately 1057 EDT. This condition resulted in the loss of dose assessment (RASCAL) and facility cooling capability.
"Dose assessment capability at the EOF was restored by 1335 EDT. During this event, RASCAL could be run from any plant computer outside of the EOF and the results conveyed back to the EOF. EOF ambient temperature is being monitored. An estimated completion time for chiller restoration has not been established. A follow-up notification will be provided when the chiller operation has been restored. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"At no time was the public's or plant employees' health or safety at risk. Due to numerous backup systems, alternate methods were available to calculate dose projections, if required, and communicate the information to the EOF.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * UPDATE FROM DAVE MCAGY TO CHARLES TEAL AT 2001 EDT ON 10/10/12 * * *
"At 1500 EDT on 10/10/12 Chiller Operations for the EOF has been restored. At 1700 EDT on 10/10/12 the EOF returned to normal office temperatures. At no time did temperatures affect the habitability or functionality of the EOF."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
Notified R2DO (Seymour).