Event Notification Report for October 08, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/07/2012 - 10/08/2012
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48565
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNY HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: KENNY HUNTER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 12/06/2012
Notification Time: 16:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2012
Event Time: 17:09 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2012
Notification Time: 16:34 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2012
Event Time: 17:09 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/06/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"On October 8, 2012, at 1709 EDT, Unit 2 received a Reactor Auto SCRAM System 'B' Trip signal in the main control room. The power monitoring breaker in RPS panel 2C71P003D tripped, causing a half-SCRAM in conjunction with the automatic actuation of the Unit 2 standby gas treatment system (SGT) and isolation of CIVs [Containment Isolation Valves] in multiple systems, both of which are normal responses to this loss of the 'B' RPS bus. The crew entered the appropriate abnormal operating procedures and confirmed the actuations automatically occurred as required given the loss of the RPS bus. They investigated the 'B' RPS Motor/Generator (M/G) set, placed the 'B' RPS bus on its alternate supply, reset the SGT and CIV actuation logic, and returned the CIVs to their normal position.
"Upon investigation, the 'B' RPS M/G set was found running with a steady output of 120 VAC. The breaker in RPS panel 2C71P003B stayed closed in. Further troubleshooting did not identify a cause for the failure of RPS breaker 2C71B003D. The breaker was replaced and the power monitoring relays were rebuilt. The 'B' MG Set was left running unloaded for 8 days with no trips observed.
"On October 26, 2012, approximately 20 seconds after returning the RPS 'B' M/G Set to service, RPS breaker 2C71B003D tripped again. At this time, investigators determined that 2C71B003B had no output voltage present when load was increased to 25 amps or greater. 2C71B003D tripped because 2C71B003B was not supplying load to it. A lug mounting screw was subsequently found to be loose on 2C71B003B. After tightening the screw, maintenance personnel determined that continuity existed and the 2C71B003B indicated closed with output voltage present as expected.
"Review of the six-month surveillances on 2C71B003B and the more-detailed 5-year surveillance that took place in August 2010 revealed no previous problems with the breaker. It is unknown when the lug mounting screw became loose or if repeated cycles of operation caused it to loosen. For broadness, thermography testing is being completed on 2C71P003 A, C, D, E, F and 1C71P003 A, B, C, D, E, F.
"When the second trip of 2C71B003D occurred on October 26, 2012, U1 SGT trains started and CIVs in multiple systems closed. This was an expected actuation with radiation monitor 2D11K634C already out of service and in the tripped condition at the time of the RPS 'B' trip. The RPS 'B' trip caused radiation monitor 2D11K634D to also trip thereby completing the logic to start U1 SGT trains and to close associated CIVs. The second event is included in this report since the failures are related as a result of having the same general cause and since they occurred over a reasonably short period of time.
"Because a malfunctioning subcomponent caused the loss of RPS 'B' rather than a valid CIV actuation signal, the resulting isolation of CIVs in multiple systems is considered an invalid actuation in both cases. Based on that information 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) allows these events to be reported via a telephone notification within 60 days instead of submitting a written LER."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On October 8, 2012, at 1709 EDT, Unit 2 received a Reactor Auto SCRAM System 'B' Trip signal in the main control room. The power monitoring breaker in RPS panel 2C71P003D tripped, causing a half-SCRAM in conjunction with the automatic actuation of the Unit 2 standby gas treatment system (SGT) and isolation of CIVs [Containment Isolation Valves] in multiple systems, both of which are normal responses to this loss of the 'B' RPS bus. The crew entered the appropriate abnormal operating procedures and confirmed the actuations automatically occurred as required given the loss of the RPS bus. They investigated the 'B' RPS Motor/Generator (M/G) set, placed the 'B' RPS bus on its alternate supply, reset the SGT and CIV actuation logic, and returned the CIVs to their normal position.
"Upon investigation, the 'B' RPS M/G set was found running with a steady output of 120 VAC. The breaker in RPS panel 2C71P003B stayed closed in. Further troubleshooting did not identify a cause for the failure of RPS breaker 2C71B003D. The breaker was replaced and the power monitoring relays were rebuilt. The 'B' MG Set was left running unloaded for 8 days with no trips observed.
"On October 26, 2012, approximately 20 seconds after returning the RPS 'B' M/G Set to service, RPS breaker 2C71B003D tripped again. At this time, investigators determined that 2C71B003B had no output voltage present when load was increased to 25 amps or greater. 2C71B003D tripped because 2C71B003B was not supplying load to it. A lug mounting screw was subsequently found to be loose on 2C71B003B. After tightening the screw, maintenance personnel determined that continuity existed and the 2C71B003B indicated closed with output voltage present as expected.
"Review of the six-month surveillances on 2C71B003B and the more-detailed 5-year surveillance that took place in August 2010 revealed no previous problems with the breaker. It is unknown when the lug mounting screw became loose or if repeated cycles of operation caused it to loosen. For broadness, thermography testing is being completed on 2C71P003 A, C, D, E, F and 1C71P003 A, B, C, D, E, F.
"When the second trip of 2C71B003D occurred on October 26, 2012, U1 SGT trains started and CIVs in multiple systems closed. This was an expected actuation with radiation monitor 2D11K634C already out of service and in the tripped condition at the time of the RPS 'B' trip. The RPS 'B' trip caused radiation monitor 2D11K634D to also trip thereby completing the logic to start U1 SGT trains and to close associated CIVs. The second event is included in this report since the failures are related as a result of having the same general cause and since they occurred over a reasonably short period of time.
"Because a malfunctioning subcomponent caused the loss of RPS 'B' rather than a valid CIV actuation signal, the resulting isolation of CIVs in multiple systems is considered an invalid actuation in both cases. Based on that information 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) allows these events to be reported via a telephone notification within 60 days instead of submitting a written LER."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Agreement State
Event Number: 48392
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: APPLIED INSPECTION SYSTEMS, INC.
Region: 4
City: FAYETTEVILLE State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0572-0332
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MACK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: APPLIED INSPECTION SYSTEMS, INC.
Region: 4
City: FAYETTEVILLE State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0572-0332
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE MACK
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/09/2012
Notification Time: 16:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2013
Notification Time: 16:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/08/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE DISCONNECTED
The following information was obtained from the State of Arkansas via email:
"The Arkansas Department of Health [the Department] was notified on October 8, 2012 at 1345 [hrs. CDT], by the licensee, of a source disconnect. The radiography crew had completed a radiograph of a pipe weld and was unable to retract the source into the shielded position. The licensee's RSO was notified, the boundaries were verified and the radiography crew made several attempts to retract the source. The crank-out device was disassembled and the crew manually pulled the cable and discovered that the drive cable had separated.
"The licensee contacted Source Production & Equipment Company (SPEC) for source retrieval. Licensee representatives remained on-site and maintained direct surveillance awaiting the arrival of the source retrieval team. SPEC personnel arrived on site on October 9, 2012 and were able to retrieve the source into the radiography camera.
"The Department sent two Health Physicists to observe the source retrieval.
"Equipment involved: Radiography Camera is a SPEC 150, SN # 1357, radiography source is a SPEC G-60, SN # TH0302 containing [redacted] Iridium-192.
"The camera was inspected by SPEC personnel and the source leak tested. After the associated equipment (crank-out and guide tube) were replaced, the camera was returned to service.
"The Department is awaiting a report from SPEC and from the licensee.
"The Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials Program, Event Number is AR-2012-012"
* * * UPDATE AT 1555 EDT ON 10/16/12 FROM KRIESEL TO HUFFMAN * * *
The Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials Program, reported that the SPEC source retrieval crew received exposures of 12 mR for individual #1 and 10 mR for individual #2 during retrieval of the source back into the radiography camera.
R4DO(Pick) notified and a copy of this update was e-mailed to FSME Events Resource.
* * * UPDATE AT 1314 EST ON 01/14/13 FROM PEMBERTON TO ALEXANDER * * *
The Arkansas Department of Health reported that it received the final reports from SPEC and Applied Inspections Systems (the licensee). SPEC has found that their investigation of the failure of the drive cable to be inconclusive. The Arkansas Department of Health has concluded that the root cause of this incident cannot be determined from the data available.
Since the exposure device and source involved in the incident were certified for use and returned to service by SPEC personnel, the Arkansas Department of Health considers this event closed.
R4DO (Vasquez) notified and a copy of this update was e-mailed to FSME Events Resource.
The following information was obtained from the State of Arkansas via email:
"The Arkansas Department of Health [the Department] was notified on October 8, 2012 at 1345 [hrs. CDT], by the licensee, of a source disconnect. The radiography crew had completed a radiograph of a pipe weld and was unable to retract the source into the shielded position. The licensee's RSO was notified, the boundaries were verified and the radiography crew made several attempts to retract the source. The crank-out device was disassembled and the crew manually pulled the cable and discovered that the drive cable had separated.
"The licensee contacted Source Production & Equipment Company (SPEC) for source retrieval. Licensee representatives remained on-site and maintained direct surveillance awaiting the arrival of the source retrieval team. SPEC personnel arrived on site on October 9, 2012 and were able to retrieve the source into the radiography camera.
"The Department sent two Health Physicists to observe the source retrieval.
"Equipment involved: Radiography Camera is a SPEC 150, SN # 1357, radiography source is a SPEC G-60, SN # TH0302 containing [redacted] Iridium-192.
"The camera was inspected by SPEC personnel and the source leak tested. After the associated equipment (crank-out and guide tube) were replaced, the camera was returned to service.
"The Department is awaiting a report from SPEC and from the licensee.
"The Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials Program, Event Number is AR-2012-012"
* * * UPDATE AT 1555 EDT ON 10/16/12 FROM KRIESEL TO HUFFMAN * * *
The Arkansas Department of Health, Radioactive Materials Program, reported that the SPEC source retrieval crew received exposures of 12 mR for individual #1 and 10 mR for individual #2 during retrieval of the source back into the radiography camera.
R4DO(Pick) notified and a copy of this update was e-mailed to FSME Events Resource.
* * * UPDATE AT 1314 EST ON 01/14/13 FROM PEMBERTON TO ALEXANDER * * *
The Arkansas Department of Health reported that it received the final reports from SPEC and Applied Inspections Systems (the licensee). SPEC has found that their investigation of the failure of the drive cable to be inconclusive. The Arkansas Department of Health has concluded that the root cause of this incident cannot be determined from the data available.
Since the exposure device and source involved in the incident were certified for use and returned to service by SPEC personnel, the Arkansas Department of Health considers this event closed.
R4DO (Vasquez) notified and a copy of this update was e-mailed to FSME Events Resource.