Event Notification Report for October 05, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/04/2012 - 10/05/2012
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48385
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS BUSSIERE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS BUSSIERE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 10/05/2012
Notification Time: 12:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2012
Event Time: 05:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2012
Notification Time: 12:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2012
Event Time: 05:14 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNPLANNED AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION
"On October 5, 2012 at 05:14 EDT, restoration of steam generator narrow range level instrumentation from a bypassed condition was in progress when a valid Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation signal was received due to steam generator levels being below the Lo-Lo Level setpoint. As a result, both motor driven auxiliary feedpumps automatically started and two turbine driven auxiliary feedwater discharge valves automatically opened. The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump and the motor driven auxiliary feedwater discharge valves had been previously removed from service under administrative controls. The system was aligned per procedure so that water injection into the steam generators did not occur and the motor driven pumps were operated on mini-flow. Unit 1 is off line for a planned refueling and maintenance outage. There were no adverse impacts on the plant.
"At the time of the event, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 with RHR in service and preparations for Mode 4 entry in progress."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
"On October 5, 2012 at 05:14 EDT, restoration of steam generator narrow range level instrumentation from a bypassed condition was in progress when a valid Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation signal was received due to steam generator levels being below the Lo-Lo Level setpoint. As a result, both motor driven auxiliary feedpumps automatically started and two turbine driven auxiliary feedwater discharge valves automatically opened. The turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump and the motor driven auxiliary feedwater discharge valves had been previously removed from service under administrative controls. The system was aligned per procedure so that water injection into the steam generators did not occur and the motor driven pumps were operated on mini-flow. Unit 1 is off line for a planned refueling and maintenance outage. There were no adverse impacts on the plant.
"At the time of the event, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 with RHR in service and preparations for Mode 4 entry in progress."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48386
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTY NEWSHAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARTY NEWSHAN
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 10/05/2012
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2012
Event Time: 13:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2012
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2012
Event Time: 13:03 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
RPS AND PCIV ACTUATION DUE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER
"On October 5, 2012, at 1303 hrs. EDT James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) experienced a loss of offsite power during its planned refueling outage. This resulted in the Reactor Power System (RPS) receiving a valid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. All control rods were fully inserted when the full scram signal occurred. In addition, the four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) started in response loss of power but the EDG 'A' output breaker did not automatically close. Investigations are underway.
"The following systems were automatically isolated:
- Reaction Water Clean-up (RWCU)
- Drywell Floor Drain
- Drywell Equipment Drain
"The following systems were automatically actuated:
- 4 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG)
"All systems functioned as required except as noted above. JAF remains in Mode 5.
"In addition, a major loss of Emergency Response communication capability has occurred. Some of the systems not available include: Emergency Notification System (ENS), Health Physics Network (HPN), and commercial phone communication."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MARK HAWES TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1637 EDT ON 10/6/12 * * *
"On October 5, 2012, at 2011 hrs. EDT, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) restored 345 kv backfeed qualified offsite power line and restored non-vital power. One of the two newly installed 115 kv Reserve Station Transformers experienced a lockout signal for an unknown reason which caused an isolation signal disconnecting offsite power. The Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) started in order to provide vital power to plant systems. Both 115 kv Reserve Station Transformers have been removed from service and corrective actions are resolving this issue and the failure of the EDG 'A' output breaker to close. The EDGs are in standby. The current state of JAF is normal, Refueling Outage mode 5.
"In addition, Emergency Notification System (ENS), Health Physics Network (HPN), and commercial phone communication have been restored and verified functional. The Emergency Plan is functional."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R1DO (Trapp).
"On October 5, 2012, at 1303 hrs. EDT James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) experienced a loss of offsite power during its planned refueling outage. This resulted in the Reactor Power System (RPS) receiving a valid actuation of containment isolation valves in more than one system. All control rods were fully inserted when the full scram signal occurred. In addition, the four Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) started in response loss of power but the EDG 'A' output breaker did not automatically close. Investigations are underway.
"The following systems were automatically isolated:
- Reaction Water Clean-up (RWCU)
- Drywell Floor Drain
- Drywell Equipment Drain
"The following systems were automatically actuated:
- 4 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG)
"All systems functioned as required except as noted above. JAF remains in Mode 5.
"In addition, a major loss of Emergency Response communication capability has occurred. Some of the systems not available include: Emergency Notification System (ENS), Health Physics Network (HPN), and commercial phone communication."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MARK HAWES TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1637 EDT ON 10/6/12 * * *
"On October 5, 2012, at 2011 hrs. EDT, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) restored 345 kv backfeed qualified offsite power line and restored non-vital power. One of the two newly installed 115 kv Reserve Station Transformers experienced a lockout signal for an unknown reason which caused an isolation signal disconnecting offsite power. The Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) started in order to provide vital power to plant systems. Both 115 kv Reserve Station Transformers have been removed from service and corrective actions are resolving this issue and the failure of the EDG 'A' output breaker to close. The EDGs are in standby. The current state of JAF is normal, Refueling Outage mode 5.
"In addition, Emergency Notification System (ENS), Health Physics Network (HPN), and commercial phone communication have been restored and verified functional. The Emergency Plan is functional."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R1DO (Trapp).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48381
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN KELLY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: JUSTIN KELLY
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 10/05/2012
Notification Time: 07:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2012
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2012
Notification Time: 07:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2012
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY INFORMATION SYSTEM DUE TO PLANNED MODIFICATION
"At approximately 0800 EDT, on October 5, 2012, the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) will be removed from service to perform a planned modification for the improvement of site wide data communications between various plant process computing platforms. The expected duration of ERFIS non-functionality should not exceed 24 hours and during this time would not be able to be restored within one hour. The ERFIS computer system provides monitoring and communications capability for plant data systems including the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The loss of ERFIS requires alternate methods, as described in plant procedures, to be used for the above described functions. Therefore, assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the ERFIS computer system is non-functional. The on call Emergency Response Organization has been notified of the ERFIS outage.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At approximately 0800 EDT, on October 5, 2012, the Emergency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS) will be removed from service to perform a planned modification for the improvement of site wide data communications between various plant process computing platforms. The expected duration of ERFIS non-functionality should not exceed 24 hours and during this time would not be able to be restored within one hour. The ERFIS computer system provides monitoring and communications capability for plant data systems including the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). The loss of ERFIS requires alternate methods, as described in plant procedures, to be used for the above described functions. Therefore, assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the ERFIS computer system is non-functional. The on call Emergency Response Organization has been notified of the ERFIS outage.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."