Event Notification Report for October 03, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/02/2012 - 10/03/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
4839548372483674836848369
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48395
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN WHETSLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN WHETSLER
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/10/2012
Notification Time: 00:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2012
Event Time: 18:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2013
Notification Time: 00:32 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2012
Event Time: 18:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 01/30/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
DON ALLEN (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED FIRE PROTECTION DEFICIENCIES
"On 10/9/12, at 16:30 PDT control room operators were questioned whether recently identified fire protection program deficiencies should have been reported to the NRC.
"On October 3 and October 8, 2012, DCPP [Diablo Canyon Power Plant] staff reviewing NFPA 805 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment (NSCA) Variance From Deterministic Requirements (VFDRs) identified fire areas that neither conformed to Appendix R requirements nor had established, proceduralized and practiced compensatory measures in place. The issues were identified in the DCPP corrective action program and compensatory measures were established in accordance with the DCPP fire protection program requirements.
"Event: 10/3/12 Fire areas containing cables associated with startup transformers 1-2 and 2-2 could result in loss of startup power and also prevent the emergency diesels from performing their Appendix R safe shutdown function.
"Event: 10/8/12 Fire areas containing reactor coolant pump (RCP) breakers could result in loss of RCP seal cooling and prevent the credited local manual trip of the RCPs, contrary to the specified method of performing the Appendix R safe shutdown function.
"Event: 10/8/12 Fire areas containing cables for the ventilation systems of the 480V switchgear, DC panels, and battery chargers could require unproceduralized use of portable fans to maintain adequate cooling of the electrical equipment necessary to perform the Appendix R safe shutdown function.
"Operators established fire watches as compensatory measures as required by the DCPP fire protection program requirements.
"The above late notification of discovery of the unanalyzed conditions has been entered into the DCPP corrective action program.
"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
*****UPDATE AT 0028 EDT ON 11/01/12 FROM GLENN GOELZER TO S. SANDIN*****
"This is an update to EN #48395 reported on October 10, 2012, at 0032 EDT.
"During the NRC's Fire Protection Triennial Inspection the NRC identified that several Alternate Compensatory Measures (ACMs) were not in the current post-fire procedure CP M-10. The ACMs address potential Appendix R non-conformance issues identified via the initiative to convert the DCPP fire protection program to NFPA 805. PG&E has established compensatory measures for all the identified areas in accordance with the DCPP fire protection program requirements.
"[The] NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Deese).
* * * UPDATE FROM D. BAHNER TO V. KLCO ON 11/30/12 AT 1618 EST * * *
"This is an update to EN #48395 reported on October 9, 2012, at 2132 PST.
"During the ongoing evaluation of the issues previously identified in this event notification, PG&E [Pacific Gas & Electric] has concluded that a fire in the fire areas containing cables associated with startup transformers 1-2 and 2-2 would not result in loss of startup power or prevent the emergency diesels from performing their Appendix R safe shutdown function. This issue was reported as an unanalyzed condition. However, it is analyzed and controlled in plant procedure CP M-10, 'Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment.' PG&E retracts the initial event documented on October 3, 2012, thus making the date on which the first unanalyzed condition was discovered October 8, 2012. Therefore, PG&E will submit the 60-day Licensee Event Report by December 7, 2012.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R4DO(Whitten).
* * * UPDATE AT 1944 EST ON 1/30/13 FROM KLINE TO TEAL* * *
"This is an update to EN #48395 reported on October 9, 2012, at 2132 PDT.
"On October 31, 2012, at 2128 PDT, PG&E provided an update to this event notification identifying that several alternate compensatory measures (ACMs) were not in plant procedure, CP M-10, 'Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment.' PG&E has evaluated this further and concluded that ACMs had been adequately implemented in CP M-10, and therefore retracts the EN update of [November 1, 2012 at 0028 EDT].
"NRC resident inspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Walker).
"On 10/9/12, at 16:30 PDT control room operators were questioned whether recently identified fire protection program deficiencies should have been reported to the NRC.
"On October 3 and October 8, 2012, DCPP [Diablo Canyon Power Plant] staff reviewing NFPA 805 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment (NSCA) Variance From Deterministic Requirements (VFDRs) identified fire areas that neither conformed to Appendix R requirements nor had established, proceduralized and practiced compensatory measures in place. The issues were identified in the DCPP corrective action program and compensatory measures were established in accordance with the DCPP fire protection program requirements.
"Event: 10/3/12 Fire areas containing cables associated with startup transformers 1-2 and 2-2 could result in loss of startup power and also prevent the emergency diesels from performing their Appendix R safe shutdown function.
"Event: 10/8/12 Fire areas containing reactor coolant pump (RCP) breakers could result in loss of RCP seal cooling and prevent the credited local manual trip of the RCPs, contrary to the specified method of performing the Appendix R safe shutdown function.
"Event: 10/8/12 Fire areas containing cables for the ventilation systems of the 480V switchgear, DC panels, and battery chargers could require unproceduralized use of portable fans to maintain adequate cooling of the electrical equipment necessary to perform the Appendix R safe shutdown function.
"Operators established fire watches as compensatory measures as required by the DCPP fire protection program requirements.
"The above late notification of discovery of the unanalyzed conditions has been entered into the DCPP corrective action program.
"NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
*****UPDATE AT 0028 EDT ON 11/01/12 FROM GLENN GOELZER TO S. SANDIN*****
"This is an update to EN #48395 reported on October 10, 2012, at 0032 EDT.
"During the NRC's Fire Protection Triennial Inspection the NRC identified that several Alternate Compensatory Measures (ACMs) were not in the current post-fire procedure CP M-10. The ACMs address potential Appendix R non-conformance issues identified via the initiative to convert the DCPP fire protection program to NFPA 805. PG&E has established compensatory measures for all the identified areas in accordance with the DCPP fire protection program requirements.
"[The] NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Deese).
* * * UPDATE FROM D. BAHNER TO V. KLCO ON 11/30/12 AT 1618 EST * * *
"This is an update to EN #48395 reported on October 9, 2012, at 2132 PST.
"During the ongoing evaluation of the issues previously identified in this event notification, PG&E [Pacific Gas & Electric] has concluded that a fire in the fire areas containing cables associated with startup transformers 1-2 and 2-2 would not result in loss of startup power or prevent the emergency diesels from performing their Appendix R safe shutdown function. This issue was reported as an unanalyzed condition. However, it is analyzed and controlled in plant procedure CP M-10, 'Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment.' PG&E retracts the initial event documented on October 3, 2012, thus making the date on which the first unanalyzed condition was discovered October 8, 2012. Therefore, PG&E will submit the 60-day Licensee Event Report by December 7, 2012.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R4DO(Whitten).
* * * UPDATE AT 1944 EST ON 1/30/13 FROM KLINE TO TEAL* * *
"This is an update to EN #48395 reported on October 9, 2012, at 2132 PDT.
"On October 31, 2012, at 2128 PDT, PG&E provided an update to this event notification identifying that several alternate compensatory measures (ACMs) were not in plant procedure, CP M-10, 'Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Equipment.' PG&E has evaluated this further and concluded that ACMs had been adequately implemented in CP M-10, and therefore retracts the EN update of [November 1, 2012 at 0028 EDT].
"NRC resident inspector has been notified."
Notified R4DO (Walker).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48372
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK ARNOSKY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK ARNOSKY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/03/2012
Notification Time: 20:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2012
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2012
Notification Time: 20:22 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2012
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS FAILED TO IDENTIFY UNPROTECTED CABLE
"During logic and cable routing reviews for Multiple Spurious Operations (MSO), an existing unprotected cable issue was identified that impacts the D22 emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) output breaker. This unprotected cable could fail due to fire damage in fire area 067W when the associated 4kV safeguard bus is credited for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown.
"The single spurious fire induced cable failure identified can cause the D22 EDG output breaker to spuriously close when the 4kV safeguard bus is credited using the offsite power source. The existing fire safe shutdown analysis failed to identify this cable required protection in order to credit the 4kV safeguard bus in area 067W postulated fire."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During logic and cable routing reviews for Multiple Spurious Operations (MSO), an existing unprotected cable issue was identified that impacts the D22 emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) output breaker. This unprotected cable could fail due to fire damage in fire area 067W when the associated 4kV safeguard bus is credited for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown.
"The single spurious fire induced cable failure identified can cause the D22 EDG output breaker to spuriously close when the 4kV safeguard bus is credited using the offsite power source. The existing fire safe shutdown analysis failed to identify this cable required protection in order to credit the 4kV safeguard bus in area 067W postulated fire."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48367
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH GIOFFRE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH GIOFFRE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/03/2012
Notification Time: 07:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2012
Event Time: 00:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2012
Notification Time: 07:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2012
Event Time: 00:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK BARRIER BEING PARTIALLY OPEN
"At 0010 [EDT] on 10/3/12, it was determined that an unanalyzed condition existed for the switchgear rooms on Unit 1. A degraded condition of a high energy line break (HELB) barrier was created during security surveillance. A HELB barrier door for the 27' elevation switchgear room was partially opened for a 14 minute period and could have allowed steam from a HELB on the 27' elevation of the Turbine Building to potentially impact equipment in both the 27' and 45' elevation switchgear rooms because these rooms are connected by a common ventilation system. The switchgear rooms are not analyzed for a steam environment. The degree of the impact could not be readily determined, but could likely affect the safety related equipment in the switchgear rooms. At 0024 [EDT] on 10/3/12, the HELB barrier door for the 27' elevation switchgear room was closed and the barrier restored which eliminated the potential unanalyzed condition. An 8 hour report to the NRC is required under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety' since there was not a reasonable expectation that the switchgear room environment could support operation of safety related equipment with the 27' elevation switchgear room door partially open. Further analysis is underway."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM CHARLES MORGAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1241 EST ON 11/19/12 * * *
"Subsequent engineering analysis conducted for this condition demonstrated that having the roll-up door stuck open six inches would not, should a HELB occur in the vicinity of the 27' switchgear room roll-up door, result in conditions within both switchgear rooms that would challenge the design limits and which would render the Class 1E electrical busses inoperable. Therefore the unit was not in a degraded or unanalyzed condition.
"As a result this condition is not reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Based on this information, Calvert Cliffs is retracting notification message EN #48367."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Dwyer).
"At 0010 [EDT] on 10/3/12, it was determined that an unanalyzed condition existed for the switchgear rooms on Unit 1. A degraded condition of a high energy line break (HELB) barrier was created during security surveillance. A HELB barrier door for the 27' elevation switchgear room was partially opened for a 14 minute period and could have allowed steam from a HELB on the 27' elevation of the Turbine Building to potentially impact equipment in both the 27' and 45' elevation switchgear rooms because these rooms are connected by a common ventilation system. The switchgear rooms are not analyzed for a steam environment. The degree of the impact could not be readily determined, but could likely affect the safety related equipment in the switchgear rooms. At 0024 [EDT] on 10/3/12, the HELB barrier door for the 27' elevation switchgear room was closed and the barrier restored which eliminated the potential unanalyzed condition. An 8 hour report to the NRC is required under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety' since there was not a reasonable expectation that the switchgear room environment could support operation of safety related equipment with the 27' elevation switchgear room door partially open. Further analysis is underway."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM CHARLES MORGAN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1241 EST ON 11/19/12 * * *
"Subsequent engineering analysis conducted for this condition demonstrated that having the roll-up door stuck open six inches would not, should a HELB occur in the vicinity of the 27' switchgear room roll-up door, result in conditions within both switchgear rooms that would challenge the design limits and which would render the Class 1E electrical busses inoperable. Therefore the unit was not in a degraded or unanalyzed condition.
"As a result this condition is not reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Based on this information, Calvert Cliffs is retracting notification message EN #48367."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Dwyer).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48368
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH GIOFFRE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH GIOFFRE
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/03/2012
Notification Time: 07:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2012
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2012
Notification Time: 07:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2012
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
WAYNE SCHMIDT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUTAGE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the planned loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF). Calvert Cliffs will be implementing a scheduled modification to renovate the site's common Technical Support Center (TSC) which will temporarily remove it from service. The planned maintenance window is expected to be three weeks beginning on 10/3/12 and concluding on 10/26/12. Should an emergency be declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the procedurally identified alternate TSC will be staffed and activated (CCNPP Simulator). All TSC responders and other key ERO personnel have been briefed on this activity and the applicable contingency actions that will be required to be taken in their specific emergency response procedures. This condition has no adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. An update will be provided once the TSC has been restored to normal operation."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM TOM JONES TO DONG PARK AT 1302 EDT ON 10/26/12 * * *
The TSC has been restored to normal operation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Caruso).
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the planned loss of an Emergency Response Facility (ERF). Calvert Cliffs will be implementing a scheduled modification to renovate the site's common Technical Support Center (TSC) which will temporarily remove it from service. The planned maintenance window is expected to be three weeks beginning on 10/3/12 and concluding on 10/26/12. Should an emergency be declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the procedurally identified alternate TSC will be staffed and activated (CCNPP Simulator). All TSC responders and other key ERO personnel have been briefed on this activity and the applicable contingency actions that will be required to be taken in their specific emergency response procedures. This condition has no adverse impact to the health and safety of the public. An update will be provided once the TSC has been restored to normal operation."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM TOM JONES TO DONG PARK AT 1302 EDT ON 10/26/12 * * *
The TSC has been restored to normal operation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Caruso).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48369
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ANDREW TEREZAKIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: ANDREW TEREZAKIS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/03/2012
Notification Time: 12:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2012
Event Time: 08:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2012
Notification Time: 12:15 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2012
Event Time: 08:43 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Defueled | 0 | Defueled |
FAILURE OF STARTUP TRANSFORMER CAUSED UNDERVOLTAGE CONDITION ON ESSENTIAL BUS
"On October 3, 2012, with Unit 2 in a defueled condition, a failure occurred on the 2B Startup Transformer, causing an undervoltage condition on an essential bus and resulted in the automatic start and loading of the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). Prior to the event, the 2B EDG was available and not required by Technical Specifications; however, the 2B EDG was inoperable. Additionally, the 2A EDG is available. All equipment responded as expected. Currently maintaining the plant in a defueled condition. Decay heat removal is being supplied by the 2A Fuel Pool Cooling train and was never interrupted. There was no impact on the Shutdown Safety Assessment.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Due to common high side feed, the loss of the 2B Startup Transformer resulted in the loss of the 1B Startup Transformer. Prior to the event, the 1A EDG was out of service for maintenance. As a result, Unit 1 entered Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 Action C. due to the loss of one offsite AC circuit and one diesel generator inoperable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On October 3, 2012, with Unit 2 in a defueled condition, a failure occurred on the 2B Startup Transformer, causing an undervoltage condition on an essential bus and resulted in the automatic start and loading of the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). Prior to the event, the 2B EDG was available and not required by Technical Specifications; however, the 2B EDG was inoperable. Additionally, the 2A EDG is available. All equipment responded as expected. Currently maintaining the plant in a defueled condition. Decay heat removal is being supplied by the 2A Fuel Pool Cooling train and was never interrupted. There was no impact on the Shutdown Safety Assessment.
"This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"Due to common high side feed, the loss of the 2B Startup Transformer resulted in the loss of the 1B Startup Transformer. Prior to the event, the 1A EDG was out of service for maintenance. As a result, Unit 1 entered Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 Action C. due to the loss of one offsite AC circuit and one diesel generator inoperable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.