Event Notification Report for September 29, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/28/2012 - 09/29/2012
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48360
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: THOMAS AGSTER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: THOMAS AGSTER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/29/2012
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2012
Event Time: 08:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2012
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2012
Event Time: 08:09 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF POWER SUPPLY FOR NUCLEAR EMERGENCY TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM
"At 0809 [EDT] on 9/29/12 a loss of power to the Nuclear Emergency Telecommunication System (NETS) at the PSEG Nuclear Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) located in Salem, New Jersey resulted in a loss of dial tone to the NETS phones located at the Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations. This failure had no effect on the safety system or ability to safely control or monitor the Salem and Hope Creek generating stations: back-up emergency telecommunications (Direct-Inward-Dial, and Centrex) remained available. At 1038 [EDT] on 9/29/12, power was restored along with full NETS functionality. No injuries have occurred."
The NETS communicates between the site and the County and State. A card in the UPS power supply failed resulting in this loss of power. Power was restored by bypassing the UPS.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0809 [EDT] on 9/29/12 a loss of power to the Nuclear Emergency Telecommunication System (NETS) at the PSEG Nuclear Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) located in Salem, New Jersey resulted in a loss of dial tone to the NETS phones located at the Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations. This failure had no effect on the safety system or ability to safely control or monitor the Salem and Hope Creek generating stations: back-up emergency telecommunications (Direct-Inward-Dial, and Centrex) remained available. At 1038 [EDT] on 9/29/12, power was restored along with full NETS functionality. No injuries have occurred."
The NETS communicates between the site and the County and State. A card in the UPS power supply failed resulting in this loss of power. Power was restored by bypassing the UPS.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48443
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC G. BLOUGH
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIC G. BLOUGH
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 10/25/2012
Notification Time: 14:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2012
Event Time: 23:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2012
Notification Time: 14:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/29/2012
Event Time: 23:37 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/25/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
RANDY MUSSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INADVERTENT ALIGNMENT OF NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER TO STANDBY NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER POND
"On September 29, 2012, McGuire Nuclear Station experienced an inadvertent alignment of the Nuclear Service Water (RN) system suction and discharge to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP). This event occurred when a Unit 2 'B' Train blackout signal was inadvertently generated as a result of a tagging restoration/coordination error. This error resulted in the Unit 2 Train 'B' load sequencer sensing an under-voltage condition on 4160V Essential Switchgear 2ETB, which was de-energized at the time for maintenance activities. Further evaluation determined that the blackout signal which automatically aligned RN to the SNSWP was not in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of a blackout signal or the SNSWP safety function. Since alignment of RN to the SNSWP was not in response to a valid signal, this represented an invalid actuation reportable per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"As allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), McGuire is providing a telephone notification of this invalid actuation in lieu of submitting a written LER. The following additional information is being provided as part of the telephone notification of this event: 'B' Train of RN actuated to align Unit 1 and Unit 2 RN to the SNSWP. 'B' Train actuation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 RN to the SNSWP functioned successfully and was complete. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On September 29, 2012, McGuire Nuclear Station experienced an inadvertent alignment of the Nuclear Service Water (RN) system suction and discharge to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP). This event occurred when a Unit 2 'B' Train blackout signal was inadvertently generated as a result of a tagging restoration/coordination error. This error resulted in the Unit 2 Train 'B' load sequencer sensing an under-voltage condition on 4160V Essential Switchgear 2ETB, which was de-energized at the time for maintenance activities. Further evaluation determined that the blackout signal which automatically aligned RN to the SNSWP was not in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of a blackout signal or the SNSWP safety function. Since alignment of RN to the SNSWP was not in response to a valid signal, this represented an invalid actuation reportable per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"As allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), McGuire is providing a telephone notification of this invalid actuation in lieu of submitting a written LER. The following additional information is being provided as part of the telephone notification of this event: 'B' Train of RN actuated to align Unit 1 and Unit 2 RN to the SNSWP. 'B' Train actuation of Unit 1 and Unit 2 RN to the SNSWP functioned successfully and was complete. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."