Event Notification Report for September 27, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/26/2012 - 09/27/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
48358483554835048351483524835348374
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 48358
Rep Org: TRISTATE MATERIALS TESTING LAB, LLC
Licensee: TRISTATE MATERIALS TESTING LAB, LLC
Region: 1
City: WALLNGFORD State: CT
County:
License #: 06-31462-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HABIB CHAUDHARY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: TRISTATE MATERIALS TESTING LAB, LLC
Region: 1
City: WALLNGFORD State: CT
County:
License #: 06-31462-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HABIB CHAUDHARY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/28/2012
Notification Time: 19:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2012
Notification Time: 19:35 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
LOST MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
On 9/27/12, at about 1100 EDT, the Radiation Safety Officer of Tri-State Materials Testing was notified that an employee of Tri-State Materials Testing did not show at a jobsite as expected at 0900 EDT. The employee was carrying a Troxler Model 3411 moisture density gauge, S/N 4783. This gauge typically has a 9 milliCurie Cs-137 source and a 44 milliCurie Am:Be source. The RSO reported that the gauge was in the proper container and properly secured to the employee's vehicle when last seen.
The RSO searched for the employee and attempted to contact him numerous times with no result. The gauge is assumed lost and a report has been filed with the Wallingford Police Department.
* * * UPDATE AT 0002 ON 09/29/12 FROM HABIB CHAUDHARY TO PETE SNYDER * * *
The employee contacted the RSO and confirmed that he was in possession of the gauge and would return it on 09/29/12. The RSO notified the Wallington Police Department that the gauge was still in the possession of the Authorized User and secured.
Notified R1DO (Bellamy) and FSME Event Resource via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM HABIB CHAUDHARY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0143 EDT ON 9/29/2012 * * *
As of 0115 EDT, the gauge was in the possession of the RSO.
Notified R1DO (Bellamy) and FSME Event Resource via E-mail.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
On 9/27/12, at about 1100 EDT, the Radiation Safety Officer of Tri-State Materials Testing was notified that an employee of Tri-State Materials Testing did not show at a jobsite as expected at 0900 EDT. The employee was carrying a Troxler Model 3411 moisture density gauge, S/N 4783. This gauge typically has a 9 milliCurie Cs-137 source and a 44 milliCurie Am:Be source. The RSO reported that the gauge was in the proper container and properly secured to the employee's vehicle when last seen.
The RSO searched for the employee and attempted to contact him numerous times with no result. The gauge is assumed lost and a report has been filed with the Wallingford Police Department.
* * * UPDATE AT 0002 ON 09/29/12 FROM HABIB CHAUDHARY TO PETE SNYDER * * *
The employee contacted the RSO and confirmed that he was in possession of the gauge and would return it on 09/29/12. The RSO notified the Wallington Police Department that the gauge was still in the possession of the Authorized User and secured.
Notified R1DO (Bellamy) and FSME Event Resource via email.
* * * UPDATE FROM HABIB CHAUDHARY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0143 EDT ON 9/29/2012 * * *
As of 0115 EDT, the gauge was in the possession of the RSO.
Notified R1DO (Bellamy) and FSME Event Resource via E-mail.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Agreement State
Event Number: 48355
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: GUNDERSON CLINIC, LTD
Region: 3
City: LACROSSE State: WI
County:
License #: 063-1121-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EMILY EGGERS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: GUNDERSON CLINIC, LTD
Region: 3
City: LACROSSE State: WI
County:
License #: 063-1121-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EMILY EGGERS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/28/2012
Notification Time: 14:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2012
Notification Time: 14:21 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - THERASEED MODEL 200 SEED CARTRIDGES FAILED TO FUNCTION
The State of Wisconsin submitted the following information via email:
"On September 27, 2012 the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section received a notification that Pd-103 Theraseed model 200 seed cartridges from Theragenics failed to function as designed while preparing for a prostate seed implant procedure.
"The procedure was scheduled and pre-planned as a 'linked' procedure, with 145 Pd-103 seeds ordered from Theragenics. The order was received timely and the seed calibration was verified. Upon arriving in the Operating Room, the pre-implant testing routinely performed on the linker device worked appropriately, the procedure is performed with blank seed and spacer cartridges. The intraoperative pre-plan was performed from the ultrasound images as normal.
"While attempting to make the linked seeds + spacers the licensee ran into immediate jams. They initially thought it was the link making device, retrieved a spare and encountered the same issue. Shortly after they discovered the seed cartridges had a flaw, the hole on the entrance side of the cartridge was not completely open, thus the link wire could not enter the cartridge to push a seed through. A second cartridge was found with the same problem. On a third cartridge they were able to make a linked needle but the operation was not smooth.
"The Authorized User then decided to change the implant to a MICK applicator technique. All seeds were transferred to sterilized MICK cartridges. The implant proceeded with the MICK applicator. Upon completion of the implant it appears to be a satisfactory implant.
"DHS [Wisconsin Department of Health Services] plans to investigate on Wednesday, October 3, 2012 when a Theragenics representative is present."
Event Report ID No.: WI20014
The State of Wisconsin submitted the following information via email:
"On September 27, 2012 the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section received a notification that Pd-103 Theraseed model 200 seed cartridges from Theragenics failed to function as designed while preparing for a prostate seed implant procedure.
"The procedure was scheduled and pre-planned as a 'linked' procedure, with 145 Pd-103 seeds ordered from Theragenics. The order was received timely and the seed calibration was verified. Upon arriving in the Operating Room, the pre-implant testing routinely performed on the linker device worked appropriately, the procedure is performed with blank seed and spacer cartridges. The intraoperative pre-plan was performed from the ultrasound images as normal.
"While attempting to make the linked seeds + spacers the licensee ran into immediate jams. They initially thought it was the link making device, retrieved a spare and encountered the same issue. Shortly after they discovered the seed cartridges had a flaw, the hole on the entrance side of the cartridge was not completely open, thus the link wire could not enter the cartridge to push a seed through. A second cartridge was found with the same problem. On a third cartridge they were able to make a linked needle but the operation was not smooth.
"The Authorized User then decided to change the implant to a MICK applicator technique. All seeds were transferred to sterilized MICK cartridges. The implant proceeded with the MICK applicator. Upon completion of the implant it appears to be a satisfactory implant.
"DHS [Wisconsin Department of Health Services] plans to investigate on Wednesday, October 3, 2012 when a Theragenics representative is present."
Event Report ID No.: WI20014
Part 21
Event Number: 48350
Rep Org: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Licensee: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DALE PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Licensee: GE HITACHI NUCLEAR ENERGY
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DALE PORTER
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO
Notification Date: 09/27/2012
Notification Time: 11:01 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2012
Event Time: 11:01 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2012
Notification Time: 11:01 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2012
Event Time: 11:01 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
10 CFR Section:
21.21(a)(2) - INTERIM EVAL OF DEVIATION
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
ERROR IN MAIN STEAM LINE HIGH FLOW CALCULATIONAL METHODOLOGY
The following information was received by facsimile:
"GEH [General Electric Hitachi] has recently discovered that calculations of choked flow rate in the Main Steam Line (MSL) of GEH BWRs may not be conservative, with the potential impacts to be evaluated for existing MSL high-flow setpoints and Analytical Limits (ALs).
"GEH has not completed the evaluation of this condition to determine reportability under 10CFR Part 21 and is therefore issuing this 60-day Interim Notification. GEH will close or issue an update on this matter on or before December 12, 2012. Given the early status of the evaluation, GEH has no recommended actions at this time. This 60-day Interim Notification is issued in accordance with 10CFR Part 21.21(a)(2), and will be sent to all GE
BWR/2-6 plants and ABWR plants."
Affected plants include the following: Nine Mile 1-2, Fermi 2, Columbia, Grand Gulf, River Bend, FitzPatrick, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, Clinton, Dresden 2-3, LaSalle 1-2, Limerick 1-2, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom 2-3, Quad Cities 1-2, Perry 1, Duane Arnold, Cooper, Susquehanna 1-2, Brunswick 1-2, Hope Creek, Hatch 1-2, Browns Ferry 1-3, and Monticello.
The following information was received by facsimile:
"GEH [General Electric Hitachi] has recently discovered that calculations of choked flow rate in the Main Steam Line (MSL) of GEH BWRs may not be conservative, with the potential impacts to be evaluated for existing MSL high-flow setpoints and Analytical Limits (ALs).
"GEH has not completed the evaluation of this condition to determine reportability under 10CFR Part 21 and is therefore issuing this 60-day Interim Notification. GEH will close or issue an update on this matter on or before December 12, 2012. Given the early status of the evaluation, GEH has no recommended actions at this time. This 60-day Interim Notification is issued in accordance with 10CFR Part 21.21(a)(2), and will be sent to all GE
BWR/2-6 plants and ABWR plants."
Affected plants include the following: Nine Mile 1-2, Fermi 2, Columbia, Grand Gulf, River Bend, FitzPatrick, Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, Clinton, Dresden 2-3, LaSalle 1-2, Limerick 1-2, Oyster Creek, Peach Bottom 2-3, Quad Cities 1-2, Perry 1, Duane Arnold, Cooper, Susquehanna 1-2, Brunswick 1-2, Hope Creek, Hatch 1-2, Browns Ferry 1-3, and Monticello.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48351
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN FINLAY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN FINLAY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/27/2012
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2012
Event Time: 09:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2012
Notification Time: 13:55 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2012
Event Time: 09:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY - CONTRABAND MATERIAL IDENTIFIED IN THE PROTECTED AREA
A licensee contractor discovered contraband material concealed above ceiling tiles in a locker room during a renovation of the area. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for details.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
A licensee contractor discovered contraband material concealed above ceiling tiles in a locker room during a renovation of the area. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for details.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48352
Facility: COMANCHE PEAK
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RAUL MARTINEZ
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RAUL MARTINEZ
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/27/2012
Notification Time: 14:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2012
Event Time: 12:54 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2012
Notification Time: 14:08 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2012
Event Time: 12:54 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PARTIAL LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT DURING PLANNED MODIFICATIONS
"On September 27, 2012, Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant began a cyber security related modification to the Unit 1 and 2 Plant Computer Systems (PCS) and associated network infrastructure. The entire PCS for each unit will be out of service for approximately 6 hours. During that time, the PCS satellite display systems (SDSs) in the TSC and EOF will be inoperable. After approximately 8 hours, the PCS will be restored to service along with the SDSs in the TSC. The SDSs in the EOF will remain out of service until the modification and related site acceptance testing is complete, currently scheduled for October 5, 2012. During this period. the remote display of Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) information in the EOF and OSC will be unavailable.
"The loss of EOF SDS terminals will be compensated by use of an alternate plant parameter display system, and loss of EOF/OSC RMS remote display will be compensated by means of the status board recorder telephone loop. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions. notifications, dose projections, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the SDSs and RMS remote displays are inoperable.
"The extended loss of the EOF SDSs and EOF/OSC remote RMS data is being reported in accordance with 10.CFR.50.72(b)(3)(xiii). which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or off site communications capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A follow-up ENS communication will be made when the EOF SDSs and EOF/OSC remote RMS remote displays are fully restored to service."
* * * UPDATE FROM RAUL MARTINEZ TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0224 EDT ON 10/06/12 * * *
Maintenance has been completed on the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Plant Computer System. The system has been tested and returned to service.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Powers).
"On September 27, 2012, Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant began a cyber security related modification to the Unit 1 and 2 Plant Computer Systems (PCS) and associated network infrastructure. The entire PCS for each unit will be out of service for approximately 6 hours. During that time, the PCS satellite display systems (SDSs) in the TSC and EOF will be inoperable. After approximately 8 hours, the PCS will be restored to service along with the SDSs in the TSC. The SDSs in the EOF will remain out of service until the modification and related site acceptance testing is complete, currently scheduled for October 5, 2012. During this period. the remote display of Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) information in the EOF and OSC will be unavailable.
"The loss of EOF SDS terminals will be compensated by use of an alternate plant parameter display system, and loss of EOF/OSC RMS remote display will be compensated by means of the status board recorder telephone loop. Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions. notifications, dose projections, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the SDSs and RMS remote displays are inoperable.
"The extended loss of the EOF SDSs and EOF/OSC remote RMS data is being reported in accordance with 10.CFR.50.72(b)(3)(xiii). which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or off site communications capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A follow-up ENS communication will be made when the EOF SDSs and EOF/OSC remote RMS remote displays are fully restored to service."
* * * UPDATE FROM RAUL MARTINEZ TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0224 EDT ON 10/06/12 * * *
Maintenance has been completed on the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Plant Computer System. The system has been tested and returned to service.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Powers).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48353
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JORGE O'FARRILL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JORGE O'FARRILL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/27/2012
Notification Time: 22:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2012
Event Time: 12:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2012
Notification Time: 22:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2012
Event Time: 12:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/26/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
PART 21 GROUP
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
PART 21 GROUP
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 92 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PART-21 REPORT - FAULTY MASTER TRIP UNITS, SLAVE UNITS, AND RESISTANCE TEMPERATURE DETECTORS
"On September 27, 2012, the Site Vice President was notified that a 10CFR21 evaluation of thirteen (13) reworked Master Trip Units, Resistance Temperature Detector Units, and Slave Units supplied by Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (Rosemount) determined that a non-compliant condition involving a basic component existed.
"Rosemount informed James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) that 13 reworked Master Trip Units, Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) Units and Slave Units were received at JAF which did not comply with their rebuild repair specification. Specifically, epoxy was not applied under certain resistors as required. In accordance with JA FitzPatrick plant procedures, this condition was determined as a 10CFRPart 21 condition involving a defect in a basic component.
"As noted by an engineering review, some of the applications for the trip units require them to energize to perform the associated safety functions. Therefore, a failure occurrence by an installed non-conforming unit could potentially have an adverse affect on the associated systems' safety/accident mitigation functions.
"JAF verified that none of the 13 deficient units were installed in any plant systems. Therefore, this condition had no actual safety consequences as the deficiency was identified by Rosemount prior to installation. The 13 units that were received at JAF without the epoxy have been returned to Rosemount for the addition of the epoxy and have subsequently been reworked and returned to JAF.
"This notification is made pursuant to 10CFR21.21(d)(3)(i)."
* * * RETRACTION ON 10/26/12 AT 1519 EDT FROM MARK HAWES TO DONG PARK * * *
"Subsequent to the original notification dated 9/27/2012, a study was performed by Rosemount (DS-RNII-2012-049). The study analyzed the reported condition of the Master Trip Units for a Static Coefficient Load Analysis and a calculation of the rigidity of the 2-Watt wire-wound resistor when installed without being secured by epoxy. The conclusion was that there is sufficient design margin to ensure that the resistor will remain rigid during qualified seismic conditions.
"Based on this assessment, there is not a significant safety concern related to the absence of epoxy and the previous 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) notification may be retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Caruso) and Part 21 group.
"On September 27, 2012, the Site Vice President was notified that a 10CFR21 evaluation of thirteen (13) reworked Master Trip Units, Resistance Temperature Detector Units, and Slave Units supplied by Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (Rosemount) determined that a non-compliant condition involving a basic component existed.
"Rosemount informed James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) that 13 reworked Master Trip Units, Resistance Temperature Detector (RTD) Units and Slave Units were received at JAF which did not comply with their rebuild repair specification. Specifically, epoxy was not applied under certain resistors as required. In accordance with JA FitzPatrick plant procedures, this condition was determined as a 10CFRPart 21 condition involving a defect in a basic component.
"As noted by an engineering review, some of the applications for the trip units require them to energize to perform the associated safety functions. Therefore, a failure occurrence by an installed non-conforming unit could potentially have an adverse affect on the associated systems' safety/accident mitigation functions.
"JAF verified that none of the 13 deficient units were installed in any plant systems. Therefore, this condition had no actual safety consequences as the deficiency was identified by Rosemount prior to installation. The 13 units that were received at JAF without the epoxy have been returned to Rosemount for the addition of the epoxy and have subsequently been reworked and returned to JAF.
"This notification is made pursuant to 10CFR21.21(d)(3)(i)."
* * * RETRACTION ON 10/26/12 AT 1519 EDT FROM MARK HAWES TO DONG PARK * * *
"Subsequent to the original notification dated 9/27/2012, a study was performed by Rosemount (DS-RNII-2012-049). The study analyzed the reported condition of the Master Trip Units for a Static Coefficient Load Analysis and a calculation of the rigidity of the 2-Watt wire-wound resistor when installed without being secured by epoxy. The conclusion was that there is sufficient design margin to ensure that the resistor will remain rigid during qualified seismic conditions.
"Based on this assessment, there is not a significant safety concern related to the absence of epoxy and the previous 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i) notification may be retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Caruso) and Part 21 group.
Agreement State
Event Number: 48374
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BAYER MATERIAL SCIENCE, LLC
Region: 4
City: BAYTOWN State: TX
County:
License #: 01577
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: BAYER MATERIAL SCIENCE, LLC
Region: 4
City: BAYTOWN State: TX
County:
License #: 01577
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/04/2012
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2012
Notification Time: 15:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/04/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK OPEN
"On September 27, 2012, the Agency was notified by the licensee that the shutter on a Berthold nuclear gauge model number LB300L was found in the stuck open position during a routine inspection. The activity was not provided. The gauge shutter is stuck in the open position, which is the normal operating position. The licensee stated that the gauge does not create an increased exposure risk to any personnel. The manufacturer has been contacted and is scheduled to repair the gauge the first week in October.
"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident # I-8992
"On September 27, 2012, the Agency was notified by the licensee that the shutter on a Berthold nuclear gauge model number LB300L was found in the stuck open position during a routine inspection. The activity was not provided. The gauge shutter is stuck in the open position, which is the normal operating position. The licensee stated that the gauge does not create an increased exposure risk to any personnel. The manufacturer has been contacted and is scheduled to repair the gauge the first week in October.
"Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident # I-8992