Event Notification Report for September 18, 2012

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SURFACE CONTAMINATION IDENTIFIED ON A SHIPMENT

The following information was received from the State of Utah via email:

"During the normal receipt process of a shipment #0870-09-0101 of LLRW [low level radioactive waste] on September 18, 2012, Energy Solutions personnel found one barrel in a shipment of five barrels that had removable beta contamination (tritium) which exceeded U.S. DOT limits. There was no visible damage to the barrel and no indication that the barrel had leaked during transport. Licensee personnel surveyed the other barrels in the shipment and the vehicle. No removable beta contamination was found and the vehicle was released on September 18, 2012.

"[Utah Division of Radiation Control] staff are investigating this incident."

Utah Incident No.: UT120002

MALFUNCTION OF THE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DOOR INTERLOCK

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to Control the Release of Radioactive Material. An employee entered a secondary containment interlock and identified that both doors of the interlock opened simultaneously when the door on the reactor building side was opened. The employee immediately secured both doors in the interlock and notified the Main Control Room Supervisor. Both doors in the interlock were open for approximately 10 seconds. With both doors open, TS SR 3.6.4.1.2 was not met. This rendered secondary containment inoperable per TS 3.6.4.1. Reactor Building differential pressure, as observed in the Main Control Room, has remained less than -0.25" H20 at all times. Initial investigation determined that a mechanical interlock for the doors was malfunctioning. Administrative controls have been put in place to ensure the doors remain closed pending repairs to the mechanical interlock."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

OUTAGE OF PLANT RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM REMOTE READOUT DUE TO PLANNED MODIFICATION

"On September 18, 2012, power was removed from SCADA A of the Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) to perform a planned system modification. During this period, data for most Unit 1 radiation monitors will not be electronically available in the emergency response facilities and will not be supplied to the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), if activated. System alarms and data displays will still be available to the plant operators in the Control Room. The expected duration of RMS remote data partial inoperability is approximately 72 hours. The loss of Unit 1 remote readout capability requires compensatory measures to be used for the acquisition of radiological data in the emergency response facilities. These compensatory measures have been communicated to the emergency response organization, Therefore, it is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the portions of the RMS are inoperable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. An update message will be provided when the RMS is restored."

The NRC Resident has been notified.

* * * UPDATE FROM TONY SIROIS TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1749 EDT ON 09/20/12 * * *

"The Radiation Monitoring System alarms and data displays have been restored to the Comanche Peak Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) following completion of planned system modifications. The emergency assessment capability of the Comanche Peak ERF have been re-established.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Geoffrey Miller)

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER FAILURE

The following information was provided by the State of Pennsylvania via facsimile:

"On September 19, 2012, the licensee sent notification via email to the Department's Central Office regarding an event that took place on September 18, 2012. The event is reportable within 24 hours per 10CFR 30.50(b)(2).

"The licensee discovered during a routine maintenance inspection that the pin which allows the shutter handle to move was stuck in the closed position, rendering the shutter inoperable. No radiation exposure to personnel is believed to have occurred. The cause of the event was normal wear of gauge. The handle is in the closed position and the gauge has been taken out of service. A reactive inspection is planned by the Department's Western Regional Office.

"The device is identified as:
Manufacturer: Berthold Technologies USA, LLC
Model: LB8010
Serial #: 10055
Isotope: Cs-137
Activity: 20 mCi
Source Serial Number: 0800/08"

Event Report ID No: PA120031

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID ACTUATION OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNALS

"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

"On September 18, 2012, at 0045 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), during performance of surveillance procedure 1-SR-3.3.6.2.3(B), Reactor/Refueling Zone Ventilation Radiation Monitor 1-RM-90-141/143 Calibration and Functional Test, a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) partial Group 6 isolation occurred. The partial Group 6 isolation caused the initiation of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) subsystems 'A' and 'B' and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem 'A', and the isolation of the Unit 1 H2O2 analyzer and the 1-RM-90-256 Continuous Air Monitor (CAM). Due to the isolation of the 1-RM-90-256 CAM, Operations personnel declared the drywall CAM inoperable and entered Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.5 Condition B.

"Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 6 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywall Pressure, and Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist, therefore, the partial actuations were invalid.

"The affected equipment responded as designed. On September 18, 2012, at 0123 hours CDT, Operations personnel commenced restoring the affected systems to normal. At 0132 hours CDT, the 1-RM-90-256 CAM was returned to service, the SBGT subsystems 'A' and 'B' were secured, and TS LCO 3.4.5.B was exited. At 0133 hours CDT, the CREV subsystem 'A' was secured and at 0138 hours CDT, the Unit 1 hours analyzer was returned to service.

"This condition was the result of improper test setup during performance of 1-SR-3.3.6.2.3(B). It was determined that a jumper installed during the performance of 1-SR-3.3.6.2.3(B) to prevent an invalid actuation was not installed correctly. When the detector lead was lifted, an isolation signal was received. The surveillance procedure was stopped and the equipment was restored to pre-test condition.

"There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event.

"This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Problem Evaluation Report 611238.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."

PATIENT RECEIVED LESS THAN PRESCRIBED DOSE FOLLOWING BRACHYTHERAPY TREATMENT

On 9/18/12, a patient at the Oakwood Medical Center was administered a brachytherapy treatment of the prostate. 72 Iodine-125 seeds were implanted at the time. On a post-implant study on 11/18/12, it was determined that D90 dose for the treatment was 68.3%. The study indicated that the anterior prostate was somewhat "cold". There was some evidence of seed migration. The physician has been notified. The underdose is not expected to have any significant impact on the patient.

A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.