Event Notification Report for September 10, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/09/2012 - 09/10/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
482934829448295483084871048290
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48293
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/10/2012
Notification Time: 17:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2012
Event Time: 10:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2012
Notification Time: 17:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2012
Event Time: 10:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/08/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)
CHRISTOPHER NEWPORT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
BOTH UNITS ENTERED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 DUE TO INOPERABLE CONTROL STRUCTURE CHILLERS
"Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered LCO 3.0.3 due to both Control Structure (CS) chillers 'A & B' concurrently inoperable.
"At 1025 [EDT], the control room was notified that the 'B' CS Chiller was not running. There were no control room alarms due to this condition. Review of indications on control room panel 0C681 noted that the loop circ pump and all three CS fans remained in service. Indication of CS loop flow and loop temperature remained normal, approximately 600 gpm and 44 degrees.
"The 'B' CS Chiller restarted at 1027 [EDT] and normal system parameters were observed.
"Work on the 'A' CS Chiller was released at 0928 [EDT] on 9/10/2012 for scheduled maintenance, LCO's 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 were entered, however no work had actually commenced or was performed. The 'A' CS Chiller remained available and in standby during the entire evolution.
"Since the cause of the 'B' CS Chiller to shutdown has not been determined, the 'B' CS Chiller was declared inoperable. Inoperability of both CS chillers 'A & B' required immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3 per TS 3.7.4 Condition D. Both chillers were inoperable from 1025 [EDT] until 1042 [EDT] (17 minutes), when the 'A' CS Chiller was restored to operable status.
"This condition is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM LICHTNER TO CROUCH AT 2008 EDT ON 10/08/12 * * *
"This event was reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the 'A' Control Structure (CS) chiller was released for scheduled maintenance (LCO's 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 were entered), although no physical work had begun on the 'A' CS chiller. Concurrent with the 'A' chiller being in the aforementioned status, the 'B' CS chiller shutdown for approximately 2.5 minutes before automatically restarting.
"Following the ENS report, Susquehanna determined that although it had shutdown, the 'B' CS chiller remained operable and capable of fulfilling all its design functions. The chiller shutdown was not due to operation of a safety trip. Under safety trip conditions, automatic restart of the chiller would have been prevented and alarms would have been received in the control room. Rather, the event was due to chiller load recycle operation during which the chiller is designed to shutdown at approximately 5 degrees F below the normal operating chilled water temperature and automatically restart. Troubleshooting did not detect any faulty components and the chiller has remained in operation for greater than 48 hours since the shutdown, without a repeat event.
"Additionally, although the 'A' CS chiller was declared inoperable due to entry into LCO's 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 to perform routine maintenance, no physical action had been taken to disable the 'A' chiller. Therefore, the 'A' CS chiller was capable of auto-starting and performing its safety function for all design conditions while in the LCO's.
"Based on the above information, Susquehanna has determined that since both the 'A' and the 'B' CS chillers were available and capable of performing their design safety functions, there was no loss of safety function therefore this ENS report is retracted."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Trapp).
"Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered LCO 3.0.3 due to both Control Structure (CS) chillers 'A & B' concurrently inoperable.
"At 1025 [EDT], the control room was notified that the 'B' CS Chiller was not running. There were no control room alarms due to this condition. Review of indications on control room panel 0C681 noted that the loop circ pump and all three CS fans remained in service. Indication of CS loop flow and loop temperature remained normal, approximately 600 gpm and 44 degrees.
"The 'B' CS Chiller restarted at 1027 [EDT] and normal system parameters were observed.
"Work on the 'A' CS Chiller was released at 0928 [EDT] on 9/10/2012 for scheduled maintenance, LCO's 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 were entered, however no work had actually commenced or was performed. The 'A' CS Chiller remained available and in standby during the entire evolution.
"Since the cause of the 'B' CS Chiller to shutdown has not been determined, the 'B' CS Chiller was declared inoperable. Inoperability of both CS chillers 'A & B' required immediate entry into LCO 3.0.3 per TS 3.7.4 Condition D. Both chillers were inoperable from 1025 [EDT] until 1042 [EDT] (17 minutes), when the 'A' CS Chiller was restored to operable status.
"This condition is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM LICHTNER TO CROUCH AT 2008 EDT ON 10/08/12 * * *
"This event was reported as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the 'A' Control Structure (CS) chiller was released for scheduled maintenance (LCO's 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 were entered), although no physical work had begun on the 'A' CS chiller. Concurrent with the 'A' chiller being in the aforementioned status, the 'B' CS chiller shutdown for approximately 2.5 minutes before automatically restarting.
"Following the ENS report, Susquehanna determined that although it had shutdown, the 'B' CS chiller remained operable and capable of fulfilling all its design functions. The chiller shutdown was not due to operation of a safety trip. Under safety trip conditions, automatic restart of the chiller would have been prevented and alarms would have been received in the control room. Rather, the event was due to chiller load recycle operation during which the chiller is designed to shutdown at approximately 5 degrees F below the normal operating chilled water temperature and automatically restart. Troubleshooting did not detect any faulty components and the chiller has remained in operation for greater than 48 hours since the shutdown, without a repeat event.
"Additionally, although the 'A' CS chiller was declared inoperable due to entry into LCO's 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 to perform routine maintenance, no physical action had been taken to disable the 'A' chiller. Therefore, the 'A' CS chiller was capable of auto-starting and performing its safety function for all design conditions while in the LCO's.
"Based on the above information, Susquehanna has determined that since both the 'A' and the 'B' CS chillers were available and capable of performing their design safety functions, there was no loss of safety function therefore this ENS report is retracted."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Trapp).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48294
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GARRISON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GARRISON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/10/2012
Notification Time: 21:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2012
Event Time: 21:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/2012
Notification Time: 21:30 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2012
Event Time: 21:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
MARK LESSER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER UNAVAILABLE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"On 9-11-12 the Technical Support System (TSC) ventilation will be removed from service for a planned maintenance activity. The ventilation system will be out of service for approximately 9 hours. During this time the TSC will be unavailable should an event involving a radiological release occur. The Catawba Emergency Plan has provisions to relocate TSC personnel if required to the alternate TSC location."
The licensee will inform State and local agencies as a courtesy and the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 9-11-12 the Technical Support System (TSC) ventilation will be removed from service for a planned maintenance activity. The ventilation system will be out of service for approximately 9 hours. During this time the TSC will be unavailable should an event involving a radiological release occur. The Catawba Emergency Plan has provisions to relocate TSC personnel if required to the alternate TSC location."
The licensee will inform State and local agencies as a courtesy and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48295
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE WHEELER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/10/2012
Notification Time: 22:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2012
Event Time: 14:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/2012
Notification Time: 22:07 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2012
Event Time: 14:43 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF SECONDARY CONTAINMENT
"At 1443 CDT, indication was received in the Control Room that both the inner and outer personnel access doors to the Reactor Building were open simultaneously. This caused entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 for Secondary Containment inoperable and is a loss of safety function per station procedure 2.0.11.1. An event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function requires an 8 hour report per 10CFR50.72.b.3.v.D for Accident Mitigation. The doors were open for several minutes until station personnel could reset the interlock to allow for door closure. The doors were reclosed and Secondary Containment was restored to operable at 1451 CDT.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition."
"At 1443 CDT, indication was received in the Control Room that both the inner and outer personnel access doors to the Reactor Building were open simultaneously. This caused entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 for Secondary Containment inoperable and is a loss of safety function per station procedure 2.0.11.1. An event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function requires an 8 hour report per 10CFR50.72.b.3.v.D for Accident Mitigation. The doors were open for several minutes until station personnel could reset the interlock to allow for door closure. The doors were reclosed and Secondary Containment was restored to operable at 1451 CDT.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this condition."
Agreement State
Event Number: 48308
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: ANDERSON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: MERIDIAN State: MS
County:
License #: MS-267-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAYSON MOAK
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Licensee: ANDERSON REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: MERIDIAN State: MS
County:
License #: MS-267-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAYSON MOAK
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 09/14/2012
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2012
Notification Time: 16:57 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - A PATIENT RECEIVING AN INCORRECT DOSAGE OF I-131
The following report was received from the State of Mississippi via email:
"On 9-10-2012, the licensee administered 163 mCi of I-131 from an admission order dated 9-6-2012, instead of the prescribed 100 mCi of I-131 from the written directive dated 9-5-2012. The licensee's investigation revealed a misinterpretation of an admission order as a written directive by the nuclear medicine technologist due to inclusion of the authorized user's name and 150 mCi of a radionuclide activity on the admission order. The written directive was never received by the Nuclear Medicine Department. The licensee determined the root cause of the error stemmed from a new communication process by which written directives are conveyed from the authorized user to Central Scheduling and then to the Nuclear Medicine Department.
"The administered dose is described as not out of line with doses typically prescribed for patients with similar disease and the authorized user indicates an expectation of no adverse effect for the patient. The referring physician and patient were both notified on 9-10-2012 by the authorized user.
"The licensee is correcting its procedure for written directives and how they are communicated to the Hospital's Nuclear Medicine Department and will submit them for review to DRH."
Mississippi Event Report No.: MS-267-01
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
* * * UPDATE FROM MOAK TO SNYDER ON 9/28/12 AT 1656 EDT * * *
"[The] licensee's inspection revealed the medical event was an isolated incident. The new procedures for communicating written directives were only in place for two (2) months with one (1) I-131 administration during this time. The licensee has since changed back to their old procedures where written directives are communicated directly from the authorized user to the nuclear medicine department."
Notified R4DO (O'Keefe) and FSME Event Resource (e-mail).
The following report was received from the State of Mississippi via email:
"On 9-10-2012, the licensee administered 163 mCi of I-131 from an admission order dated 9-6-2012, instead of the prescribed 100 mCi of I-131 from the written directive dated 9-5-2012. The licensee's investigation revealed a misinterpretation of an admission order as a written directive by the nuclear medicine technologist due to inclusion of the authorized user's name and 150 mCi of a radionuclide activity on the admission order. The written directive was never received by the Nuclear Medicine Department. The licensee determined the root cause of the error stemmed from a new communication process by which written directives are conveyed from the authorized user to Central Scheduling and then to the Nuclear Medicine Department.
"The administered dose is described as not out of line with doses typically prescribed for patients with similar disease and the authorized user indicates an expectation of no adverse effect for the patient. The referring physician and patient were both notified on 9-10-2012 by the authorized user.
"The licensee is correcting its procedure for written directives and how they are communicated to the Hospital's Nuclear Medicine Department and will submit them for review to DRH."
Mississippi Event Report No.: MS-267-01
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
* * * UPDATE FROM MOAK TO SNYDER ON 9/28/12 AT 1656 EDT * * *
"[The] licensee's inspection revealed the medical event was an isolated incident. The new procedures for communicating written directives were only in place for two (2) months with one (1) I-131 administration during this time. The licensee has since changed back to their old procedures where written directives are communicated directly from the authorized user to the nuclear medicine department."
Notified R4DO (O'Keefe) and FSME Event Resource (e-mail).
Agreement State
Event Number: 48710
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: GENERAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: FRAMINGHAM State: MA
County:
License #: G0038
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY CARPENITO
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: GENERAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: FRAMINGHAM State: MA
County:
License #: G0038
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY CARPENITO
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 01/31/2013
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2013
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/31/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
DARYL JOHNSON (ILTA)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
DARYL JOHNSON (ILTA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - GENERAL LICENSE DEVICE CONTAINING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL MISSING
The following information was received from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program via email:
"General licensee requested termination of GL registration G0038 on 9/13/12 noting that the registered material (two electron capture detectors [ECD]) had been shipped to another organization. Upon Agency [MA Radiation Control Program] inquiry, the receiving organization confirmed receiving only one ECD. The shipper stated the missing ECD had been physically removed from its original gas chromatograph several years earlier and was last known to be in a small cardboard box that was assumed to have been segregated during a lab cleanup and subsequently included in an overall lab equipment transfer to the receiving organization. Upon further investigation and review, the shipping organization stated on 12/20/12 that the ECD may have been inadvertently dispositioned during the lab cleanup. The ECD is a small metallic cylindrical object approximately less than one inch in diameter and four inches in length.
"The Agency considers this event to be closed."
The electron capture detector is a Hewlett Packard Model G1223A (Serial Number K0118). The source contained less than 15 mCi Ni-63.
MA Event #: 130131.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The following information was received from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program via email:
"General licensee requested termination of GL registration G0038 on 9/13/12 noting that the registered material (two electron capture detectors [ECD]) had been shipped to another organization. Upon Agency [MA Radiation Control Program] inquiry, the receiving organization confirmed receiving only one ECD. The shipper stated the missing ECD had been physically removed from its original gas chromatograph several years earlier and was last known to be in a small cardboard box that was assumed to have been segregated during a lab cleanup and subsequently included in an overall lab equipment transfer to the receiving organization. Upon further investigation and review, the shipping organization stated on 12/20/12 that the ECD may have been inadvertently dispositioned during the lab cleanup. The ECD is a small metallic cylindrical object approximately less than one inch in diameter and four inches in length.
"The Agency considers this event to be closed."
The electron capture detector is a Hewlett Packard Model G1223A (Serial Number K0118). The source contained less than 15 mCi Ni-63.
MA Event #: 130131.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48290
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LAWLOR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT LAWLOR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 09/10/2012
Notification Time: 11:34 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2012
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2012
Notification Time: 11:34 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2012
Event Time: 09:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
JOHN GIESSNER (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
PLANT PROCESS COMPUTER REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE
"At 0900 CDT on September 10, 2012, the Unit 1 Plant Process Computer (PPC) was removed from service for a planned replacement in the current Unit 1 Refueling Outage. The Unit 1 PPC feeds the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) used in the Main Control Room (MCR) and the Technical Support Center (TSC). The Unit 1 PPC also feeds the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS).
"The Unit 1 and Unit 2 PPCs also feed the Plant Parameters Display System (PPDS) used in the MCR, TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Meteorological data will remain available. The dose assessment program will remain functional as the Unit 2 PPC will be capable of providing the necessary data through PPDS to run the program. The dose assessment program is not affected by the Unit 1 PPC being out of service. As compensatory measures, a proceduralized backup method to fax or communicate via a phone circuit applicable data to the NRC, TSC, and EOF exists. There is no impact on the Emergency Notification System (ENS) or Health Physics Network (HPN) communication systems.
"The new Unit 1 PPC is scheduled to be functional on September 17, 2012. However, based on the Mode Unit 1 will be in, this will limit the number of points that would provide usable data. The Unit 1 PPC will be tested as Mode changes occur. The Unit 1 PPC is planned to be declared functional by Mode 2. A follow-up ENS call will be made once the Unit 1 PPC is declared functional.
"The loss of SPDS and ERDS is a 'major loss of assessment capability' and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3) (xiii).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS call."
* * * UPDATE FROM BRYAN GAPINSKI TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1510 EDT ON 10/03/12 * * *
As of 1245 CDT on October 3,2012, the Unit 1 PPC is considered operational with respect to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Plant Parameter Display System (PPDS), and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Therefore, a major loss of assessment capability no longer exists on Unit 1. The Byron EP manager contacted the NRC ERDS Center on 10/02/2012 to conduct an ERDS test for Unit 1 to ensure the data was being satisfactorily sent to the NRC. Unit 1 and Unit 2 ERDS data to NRC was tested satisfactory lAW EP-AA-124-FÀ01.
"The NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS update. Notified the R3DO (Dave Passehl)
"At 0900 CDT on September 10, 2012, the Unit 1 Plant Process Computer (PPC) was removed from service for a planned replacement in the current Unit 1 Refueling Outage. The Unit 1 PPC feeds the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) used in the Main Control Room (MCR) and the Technical Support Center (TSC). The Unit 1 PPC also feeds the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS).
"The Unit 1 and Unit 2 PPCs also feed the Plant Parameters Display System (PPDS) used in the MCR, TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Meteorological data will remain available. The dose assessment program will remain functional as the Unit 2 PPC will be capable of providing the necessary data through PPDS to run the program. The dose assessment program is not affected by the Unit 1 PPC being out of service. As compensatory measures, a proceduralized backup method to fax or communicate via a phone circuit applicable data to the NRC, TSC, and EOF exists. There is no impact on the Emergency Notification System (ENS) or Health Physics Network (HPN) communication systems.
"The new Unit 1 PPC is scheduled to be functional on September 17, 2012. However, based on the Mode Unit 1 will be in, this will limit the number of points that would provide usable data. The Unit 1 PPC will be tested as Mode changes occur. The Unit 1 PPC is planned to be declared functional by Mode 2. A follow-up ENS call will be made once the Unit 1 PPC is declared functional.
"The loss of SPDS and ERDS is a 'major loss of assessment capability' and is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3) (xiii).
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS call."
* * * UPDATE FROM BRYAN GAPINSKI TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1510 EDT ON 10/03/12 * * *
As of 1245 CDT on October 3,2012, the Unit 1 PPC is considered operational with respect to the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Plant Parameter Display System (PPDS), and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Therefore, a major loss of assessment capability no longer exists on Unit 1. The Byron EP manager contacted the NRC ERDS Center on 10/02/2012 to conduct an ERDS test for Unit 1 to ensure the data was being satisfactorily sent to the NRC. Unit 1 and Unit 2 ERDS data to NRC was tested satisfactory lAW EP-AA-124-FÀ01.
"The NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois (through the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Resident Inspector) have been notified of this ENS update. Notified the R3DO (Dave Passehl)