Event Notification Report for August 20, 2012

FITNESS FOR DUTY POLICY VIOLATION

A non-licensed contract employee supervisor and a non-licensed contract employee committed a Fitness-For-Duty policy violation. Construction area access for both contract employees have been suspended, and the licensee has initiated an investigation. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TEN TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS DAMAGED

The following report was received from the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section via e-mail:

"On August 20, 2012, at 1:30 pm the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section, received a telephone notification from NRC Region III personnel that 10 tritium exit signs, that originally contained 7.5 Ci at the time of purchase 7-10 years ago, were placed in a compactor and damaged at a PSC Environmental Services, LLC facility in Detroit, Michigan (refer to NRC event notification #48205).

"The ten exit signs came from a Bed Bath & Beyond store in Wausau, WI. On August 20, 2012 at 2:00 pm, the Vice President of Loss Prevention and Safety was contacted and he informed the state that 14 tritium exit signs were being replaced with LED signs (this is being done nation-wide at all Bed Bath & Beyond stores) at the Wausau location and were intended to be returned to the manufacturer for disposal. The 4 remaining signs are in a secure location within the store.

"The Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section will be performing a site visit in Wausau to verify the four remaining signs are intact and will be performing an investigation into the root cause of this incident."

Wisconsin Report: WI120011

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

MINOR THRU-WALL LEAK AT WELD IN SAFETY INJECTION SUCTION PIPING

"While working In the vicinity of valve SI-3, the isolation valve between the Boric Acid Storage Tanks and the common Safety Injection (SI) pump suction piping header, plant staff discovered a thru-wall leak at the weld between the SI-3 valve body and the piping upstream of SI-3. Minor leakage (less than 1 drop per minute) was observed at the flaw location. Upon being informed of this condition, plant operators closed SI-3 at 1109 [CDT] to isolate the affected portion of the piping from the SI suction piping. The time period from when the leak was discovered until it was isolated from the SI piping was less than 10 minutes.

"As part of the immediate operability determination, plant staff attempted to characterize the flaw to determine the degradation mechanism. Because the flaw could not be readily characterized, the common SI suction piping exposed to the leakage was considered to have been inoperable from the time of discovery until valve SI-3 was closed.

"This condition resulted in both Safety Injection Train A and Safety Injection Train B being inoperable per LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, Condition A, due to an inoperable common suction line. Since the flaw could not be readily characterized, required ECCS flow was conservatively deemed to not be available and LCO 3.0.3 was conservatively entered per Condition C of LCO 3.5.2 during this brief period (less than 10 minutes) until valve SI-3 was closed. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.

"Closing SI-3 restored both Safety Injection Train A and Safety Injection Train B to Operable status and LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 1109 CDT on 8/20/2012.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO INADVERTENT SIREN ACTIVATION

"At 1432 EDT on 08-20-2012, the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Shift Manager was notified by the Beaver County 911 call center that some sirens in the Beaver County area were activated at 1417 EDT. Investigation revealed that approximately 94 of the 120 sirens in the Beaver County area had been inadvertently activated for approximately 20 seconds in a Fire Alert mode during siren maintenance activities. All States and Counties within the Beaver Valley Emergency Planning Zone have been notified.

"This event is reportable as a 4-hour Non-Emergency Notification 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'Any event resulting in notification to other government agencies that has been or will be made.'

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM

"At 1106 EDT, on August 20, 2012 Computer Engineering personnel discovered a computer component failure which would have prevented the transmission of Emergency Response Data (ERDS) to the NRC if the system were to be activated. The actual component failure was determined to have occurred at approximately 2000 EDT on 8/19/12. This resulted in an out of service duration of greater than 8 hours, which was not discovered until after the fact. The system was repaired and returned to service at 1720 EDT on 8/20/12.

"Since Unit 1 and Unit 2 ERDS was unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

RWCU SYSTEM ISOLATION DIFFERENTIAL FLOW - HIGH FUNCTION INOPERABLE

"On 8-20-2012 during scheduled surveillance testing, the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation Differential Flow - High function was discovered to be inoperable at 1520 CDT. The high differential flow signal is provided to detect a break in the RWCU system when area or differential temperature would not provide detection (i.e. cold leg break). This instrumentation provides isolation signals to both inboard and outboard isolation valves and its loss is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C).

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."

* * * RETRACTION AT 1513 EDT ON 9/27/2012 FROM BOB MURRELL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"Subsequent to the initial report, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold (NextEra) has determined that the RWCU Differential Flow High instrument loop was, at all times, capable of performing its TS function. Specifically an engineering analysis of the impact of the instrument as-found and as-left values on the overall instrument loop setting was performed. The analysis determined that the instrument in question was set at a value which would have isolated the RWCU Primary Containment Isolation Valves prior to reaching the Technical Specification (TS) allowable value and therefore the instrument loop remained capable at all times of performing its TS function.

"This event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure or a Condition Prohibited by TS and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER) per 10CFR50.73.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified the R3DO (Lipa).

OSHA NOTIFIED CONCERNING AN ONSITE NON-WORK RELATED FATALITY

"The control room received a 4911 notification [emergency on-site 911 call] regarding an employee illness where the employee was unresponsive. Site Medical Emergency Response Team responded, and requested offsite assistance via ambulance. The employee was transported to Piedmont Medical Center via ambulance where he was pronounced deceased. A notification to OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] was made at 1645 EDT on 8/20/12 due to the on-site fatality."

The employee had gone to a meeting and feeling ill went to the break room on-site. When the on-site medical team arrived at the break room they were unsuccessful in resuscitating the employee. The licensee will be notifying the state and local agencies.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.