Event Notification Report for August 14, 2012

CONFIRMED POSITIVE FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

A licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN BASED ON BOTH EMERGENCY DIESELS BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE

"Prairie Island Unit 1 is currently being shutdown per Tech Spec 3.8.1.F due to both Diesel Generators inoperable for Unit 1.

"On August 13th at 0939 CDT, a planned entry to Tech Spec 3.8.1.B was performed for one Diesel Generator inoperable, due to the scheduled monthly surveillance run of D1 Emergency Diesel Generator. At 1048 CDT, a small candle sized flame was identified at the exhaust manifold and D1 was subsequently shutdown. Subsequent investigation by maintenance determined that there appeared to be a gasket leak on the turbocharger. D1 was tagged out of service and repairs are currently in progress.

"Tech Spec 3.8.1 required action B.3.1 requires a determination be made to verify the operable Diesel Generator is not inoperable due to a common cause failure. On August 14th at 0230 CDT, Unit 1 entered the Limiting Condition for Operation to perform the monthly surveillance run to verify no common cause failure existed. At 0312 CDT, the Shift Manager reported a small candle sized fire on the exhaust manifold for D2. Unit 1 entered an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, a 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) report is required due to a loss of both D1 and D2. D2 was subsequently shutdown and declared inoperable.

"A Technical Specification shutdown was also required and a Unit 1 Shutdown was commenced at 0425 CDT and a 4 hour non-emergency notification is required per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).

"With both Diesels inoperable at 0230 CDT, Tech Spec 3 8.1.E requires one diesel to be returned to operable status within 2 hours. However, as neither diesel generator could be returned to service in this time period, Tech Spec 3.8.1.E requires the plant to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours and Mode 5 within 36 hours."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE ON 8/14/12 AT 1452 EDT FROM TERRY BACON TO DONG PARK * * *

"A Technical Specification shutdown has been completed at 1025 CDT as planned for Unit 1. It was a normal manual reactor trip with no unexpected equipment issues. As expected due to plant electrical conditions, the Auxiliary Feedwater System auto started. This is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a valid System Actuation, The Auxiliary Feedwater System operated as expected. Unit 1 is currently in Mode 3."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Giessner).

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES CONCERNING TRITIUM FOUND IN GROUNDWATER INLEAKAGE

"On Monday, August 13, 2012, analyses of samples taken from groundwater inleakage to the Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) Screenhouse building confirmed the presence of tritium at concentrations of approximately 32,000 to 44,000 picocuries per liter (pCi/l). This discovery was made during the conduct of the site's ongoing groundwater monitoring program. These concentrations are above the 30,000 pCi/l threshold for voluntary reporting for a non-drinking water pathway, as indicated in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 07-07, Industry Ground Water Initiative - Final Guidance Document.

"These test results do not indicate any threat to public health or safety, since the building inleakage is not a drinking water source, and there is no indication that tritium has migrated off the Nine Mile Point site in the groundwater. Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC, is continuing an investigation to identify the source of tritium and implement a corrective action plan.

"Voluntary notification of this discovery has been made to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation and the New York State Department of Health."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNPLANNED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF A CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL

"An employee was complaining of chest and jaw pain this morning at approximately 0745 CDT. The employee was admitted to the plant dispensary in his plant clothing. The employee's plant boots were contaminated, with a maximum activity of 17,552 dpm/100cm2. The plant nurse evaluated the employee and decided to transport the employee to a regional hospital. Before going into the ambulance the employee removed his plant clothing. A whole body survey was performed of the employee; no contamination was detected. Additionally, the gurney and ambulance personnel shoes were surveyed upon loading the ambulance; no contamination was detected. The ambulance tires were also surveyed prior to release from the Restricted Area; no contamination was detected."

R2(Gibson) was also notified by licensee.

Contamination was from Uranium Ore Concentrates

UNIT 1 MANUALLY TRIPPED IN ANTICIPATION OF AN AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP

"Unit 1 Manual Reactor Trip was initiated in anticipation of an auto turbine trip due to operators noticing the turbine governor valves closing in response to an Electro-Hydraulic Control System signal. All Control Rods are fully inserted. The RCS is being cooled by forced flow (reactor coolant pumps). Secondary heat sink is being provided by the condenser steam dumps utilizing the main feedwater system. The auxiliary feedwater system actuated based on low steam generator level, but has since been secured. There were no unexpected (inconsistent with nature of trip) pressure or level transients. Offsite power remains available. No release occurred nor is ongoing. Emergency Core Cooling did not actuate. No unexpected isolations occurred. Emergency Plan entry was not required."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

SAFETY SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION FAILURE DUE TO CLOSED VALVES

"At 2045 [CDT] on 8/14/12, MNGP [Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant] Operations determined that valves RHR-82 and RHR-84 had been inappropriately closed as part of an isolation clearance order for work on shutdown cooling suction piping. These valves are required to be open to provide overpressure protection for RHR piping passing through primary containment penetration X-12. Upon discovery of the condition, Primary Containment was declared Inoperable and the Required Actions of Tech Spec 3.6.1.1 were entered. Following discovery, the isolation was restored and the valves opened. At 0001 [CDT] on 8/15/12, Primary Containment was declared Operable.

"This issue is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety functions of a system needed to control the release of radioactive material or to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The MNGP Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this issue."

The licensee will contact the Minnesota State Duty Officer.

* * * RETRACTION FROM RANDY SAND TO CHARLES TEAL ON 08/23/12 AT 1545 EDT * * *

"This notification is a retraction of ENS 48190 based on further engineering evaluation. Monticello had previously evaluated penetration X-12 for thermally induced over pressurization. The evaluation qualified the piping components in the penetration for a maximum pressure of 3,306 psig using ASME Section III Appendix F operability criteria. The peak pressure calculated for the penetration was 2,743 psig based on Reactor pressure of 1000 psig with Reactor in Mode 1, and at worse case LOCA conditions for the Drywell. These assumptions and parameters envelop those that were present when valves RHR-82 and RHR-84 were closed on August 14, 2012. Therefore, this event would not have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function reported.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R3DO (Duncan).