Event Notification Report for August 01, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/31/2012 - 08/01/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
48146481484814948150
Part 21
Event Number: 48146
Rep Org: QUALTECH NP CURTISS WRIGHT
Licensee: QUALTECH NP CURTISS WRIGHT
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM FRANCHUK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: QUALTECH NP CURTISS WRIGHT
Region: 3
City: CINCINNATI State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TIM FRANCHUK
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/01/2012
Notification Time: 10:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/2012
Notification Time: 10:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
TAMARA BLOOMER (R3DO)
PART 21 GROUP (EMAI)
POTENTIAL PART 21 ISSUE RELATED TO TYCO TIMING RELAY
The following information was provided via facsimile:
"QualTech NP is providing this notification as a potential 10 CFR Part 21 issue. We have discovered a manufacturing defect in a timing relay which prevents the relay from operating at a specific setting. This relay was purchased as a commercial grade item and dedicated through our dedication process for safety related applications at our Cincinnati facility.
"The subject equipment is TYCO Model CNT-35-96, a timing relay with adjustable trip ranges from seconds up to 9,990 hours. QualTech NP has recently identified a failure mode for this relay in that the device will not trip in the 10H setting. In communications with the manufacturer, they have confirmed that there is a flaw in the design that prevents this specific setting from tripping.
"QualTech NP has only sold this unit to two plants, both Exelon. We recognize, however that other utilities could have these installed. Based on the information in hand we are evaluating the need for a 10 CFR Part 21 notification. Since the item was qualified under the EPRI SQURTS [Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Standardization] Program, the recommended corrective action is to notify EPRI of the condition in order for SQURTS members to perform an impact evaluation.
"Additional details will be provided in the formal written report. Please contact Tim Franchuk at 513-528-7900, ext. 176 (office), [redacted] or via email tfranchuk@curtisswright.com for any additional information."
* * * UPDATE ON 8/2/12 AT 1659 EDT FROM MARGIE BREWER TO DONG PARK * * *
The licensee has revised the third paragraph to read as follows:
"QualTech NP has only sold this unit to two plants, Exelon LaSalle and Quad Cities. We recognize, however that other utilities could have these installed. Based on the information in hand we are evaluating the need for a 10 CFR Part 21 notification. Since the item was qualified under the EPRI SQURTS [Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Standardization] Program, QualTech NP recognizes that other SQURTS members may have used the qualification basis as part of licensee dedication activities, and therefore, will notify EPRI of the condition."
Notified R3DO (Kunowski) and Part 21 group via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 1803 EDT ON 09/10/12 FROM TIM FRANCHUK TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following update was received via fax:
"QualTech NP is issuing this letter to provide additional details from our initial notification dated July 31, 2012 with regard to a potential defect in a timing relay (Log No. 2012-31-00 and 2012-031-01). The affected equipment is TYCO Model CNT 35-96 and the defect is the failure of the component to trip in the 10H setting. The following actions have been taken since the time of the initial notification.
"QuaITech NP has notified EPRI, who in turn has notified SQURTS members of the defect in the 10H setting. In addition, supplemental testing has been performed to provide reasonable assurance that the defect is limited to the 10H setting.
"Please contact Tim Franchuk at 513-528-7900 ext. 176 (office) or via email tfranchuk@curtisswright.com for any additional information."
Notified R3DO Giessner) and Part 21 group via email.
The following information was provided via facsimile:
"QualTech NP is providing this notification as a potential 10 CFR Part 21 issue. We have discovered a manufacturing defect in a timing relay which prevents the relay from operating at a specific setting. This relay was purchased as a commercial grade item and dedicated through our dedication process for safety related applications at our Cincinnati facility.
"The subject equipment is TYCO Model CNT-35-96, a timing relay with adjustable trip ranges from seconds up to 9,990 hours. QualTech NP has recently identified a failure mode for this relay in that the device will not trip in the 10H setting. In communications with the manufacturer, they have confirmed that there is a flaw in the design that prevents this specific setting from tripping.
"QualTech NP has only sold this unit to two plants, both Exelon. We recognize, however that other utilities could have these installed. Based on the information in hand we are evaluating the need for a 10 CFR Part 21 notification. Since the item was qualified under the EPRI SQURTS [Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Standardization] Program, the recommended corrective action is to notify EPRI of the condition in order for SQURTS members to perform an impact evaluation.
"Additional details will be provided in the formal written report. Please contact Tim Franchuk at 513-528-7900, ext. 176 (office), [redacted] or via email tfranchuk@curtisswright.com for any additional information."
* * * UPDATE ON 8/2/12 AT 1659 EDT FROM MARGIE BREWER TO DONG PARK * * *
The licensee has revised the third paragraph to read as follows:
"QualTech NP has only sold this unit to two plants, Exelon LaSalle and Quad Cities. We recognize, however that other utilities could have these installed. Based on the information in hand we are evaluating the need for a 10 CFR Part 21 notification. Since the item was qualified under the EPRI SQURTS [Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Standardization] Program, QualTech NP recognizes that other SQURTS members may have used the qualification basis as part of licensee dedication activities, and therefore, will notify EPRI of the condition."
Notified R3DO (Kunowski) and Part 21 group via email.
* * * UPDATE AT 1803 EDT ON 09/10/12 FROM TIM FRANCHUK TO S. SANDIN * * *
The following update was received via fax:
"QualTech NP is issuing this letter to provide additional details from our initial notification dated July 31, 2012 with regard to a potential defect in a timing relay (Log No. 2012-31-00 and 2012-031-01). The affected equipment is TYCO Model CNT 35-96 and the defect is the failure of the component to trip in the 10H setting. The following actions have been taken since the time of the initial notification.
"QuaITech NP has notified EPRI, who in turn has notified SQURTS members of the defect in the 10H setting. In addition, supplemental testing has been performed to provide reasonable assurance that the defect is limited to the 10H setting.
"Please contact Tim Franchuk at 513-528-7900 ext. 176 (office) or via email tfranchuk@curtisswright.com for any additional information."
Notified R3DO Giessner) and Part 21 group via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48148
Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: JULIE BISSEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: JULIE BISSEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 08/01/2012
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2012
Event Time: 10:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2012
Notification Time: 13:24 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2012
Event Time: 10:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
LOSS OF ENS, HPN, PMC, AND RSC PHONE LINES
"At 0327 CDT, a call was received from the NRC Operations Center for Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone status check on the commercial phone line. The ENS phone system had no incoming rings, nor a dial-tone. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) was to submit a trouble ticket.
"At 0949 CDT, Emergency Planning personnel were working with Verizon Communications to determine the cause of the loss of the ENS phone. Verizon had isolated the problem to the American Broadband network and was working to resolve the problem.
"At 1010 CDT, Emergency Planning personnel identified that the Health Physics Network (HPN) line, the Protective Measures Counterpart [PMC] and Reactor Safety Counterpart [RSC] lines with the NRC had also been lost. The Conference Operations Network (COP) and all other commercial phone lines were functional and remained available. All areas were reachable by commercial phone lines.
"At 1022 CDT, the FCS Control Room was informed by Emergency Planning personnel of the communication means that were lost. The Emergency Plan per EPIP-OSC-1 was reviewed and verified no initiating conditions applied.
"At 1034 CDT, Emergency Planning personnel verified the communications problem with ENS, HPN, the Protective Measures Counterpart and Reactor Safety Counterpart lines was limited to the Fort Calhoun site. The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was not affected.
"At 1054 CDT, the ENS phone was restored to the FCS Control Room. This was verified by FCS placing a call to the NRC Operations Center. The NRC Operations Center then returned the call. All communications were satisfactorily restored.
"At 1132 CDT, the Protective Measures Counterpart line was restored.
"At 1142 CDT, the HPN and Reactor Safety Counterpart lines were restored.
"This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability.'"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0327 CDT, a call was received from the NRC Operations Center for Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone status check on the commercial phone line. The ENS phone system had no incoming rings, nor a dial-tone. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) was to submit a trouble ticket.
"At 0949 CDT, Emergency Planning personnel were working with Verizon Communications to determine the cause of the loss of the ENS phone. Verizon had isolated the problem to the American Broadband network and was working to resolve the problem.
"At 1010 CDT, Emergency Planning personnel identified that the Health Physics Network (HPN) line, the Protective Measures Counterpart [PMC] and Reactor Safety Counterpart [RSC] lines with the NRC had also been lost. The Conference Operations Network (COP) and all other commercial phone lines were functional and remained available. All areas were reachable by commercial phone lines.
"At 1022 CDT, the FCS Control Room was informed by Emergency Planning personnel of the communication means that were lost. The Emergency Plan per EPIP-OSC-1 was reviewed and verified no initiating conditions applied.
"At 1034 CDT, Emergency Planning personnel verified the communications problem with ENS, HPN, the Protective Measures Counterpart and Reactor Safety Counterpart lines was limited to the Fort Calhoun site. The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was not affected.
"At 1054 CDT, the ENS phone was restored to the FCS Control Room. This was verified by FCS placing a call to the NRC Operations Center. The NRC Operations Center then returned the call. All communications were satisfactorily restored.
"At 1132 CDT, the Protective Measures Counterpart line was restored.
"At 1142 CDT, the HPN and Reactor Safety Counterpart lines were restored.
"This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability.'"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48149
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TYLER HALYE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: TYLER HALYE
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 08/01/2012
Notification Time: 16:08 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2012
Event Time: 12:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2012
Notification Time: 16:08 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2012
Event Time: 12:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/01/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TSC INOPERABLE DUE TO NON-FUNCTIONAL VENTILATION SUPPORT SYSTEM
"At 1212 EDT on August 1, 2012, Harris Operations discovered that cooling function was degraded on Technical Support Center (TSC) air handler 17. The TSC has three air handlers that provide the ventilation function, and the other two are operating with no known problems. Air Handler 17 has been removed from service and troubleshooting is in progress. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the Technical Support Center ventilation support system being potentially non-functional. The on-call Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been notified. The Alternate TSC is available per plant procedure if required.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
"At 1212 EDT on August 1, 2012, Harris Operations discovered that cooling function was degraded on Technical Support Center (TSC) air handler 17. The TSC has three air handlers that provide the ventilation function, and the other two are operating with no known problems. Air Handler 17 has been removed from service and troubleshooting is in progress. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the Technical Support Center ventilation support system being potentially non-functional. The on-call Site Emergency Coordinator and Emergency Response Manager have been notified. The Alternate TSC is available per plant procedure if required.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed."
General Information
Event Number: 48150
Rep Org: BETTER ROADS ASPHALT CORP
Licensee: BETTER ROADS ASPHALT CORP
Region: 1
City: SAJARDO State: PR
County:
License #: 52-19845-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID RHOE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Licensee: BETTER ROADS ASPHALT CORP
Region: 1
City: SAJARDO State: PR
County:
License #: 52-19845-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID RHOE
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL
Notification Date: 08/01/2012
Notification Time: 17:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2012
Event Time: 11:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2012
Notification Time: 17:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/01/2012
Event Time: 11:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
PAUL KROHN (R1DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
DAMAGED CPN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
A construction roller damaged the outer housing of a CPN moisture density gauge while it was sitting on the asphalt. The sources were fully contained. A portable radiac verified no abnormal radiation and swipe tests were performed to verify the sources were not leaking.
Gauge Model: MC-1 DRP CPN
Sources:
Cs-137 10 milliCuries
Am-241 50 milliCuries
* * * UPDATE ON 8/2/12 AT 1415 EDT FROM MARIA CORDERO TO DONG PARK * * *
At 1145 EDT on 8/1//12, a construction roller damaged the upper housing of the nuclear gauge. The RSO was notified at 1150 EDT. A Radiation Physicist Consultant from the Department of Health conducted a visual inspection and radiation surveys to verify shielding integrity. The leak tests of the two sources were negative. The authorized user placed the gauge in a shipping case for storage in the company area. The gauge will be returned to the manufacture for repairs.
Notified R1DO (Krohn) and FSME Events Resource via email.
A construction roller damaged the outer housing of a CPN moisture density gauge while it was sitting on the asphalt. The sources were fully contained. A portable radiac verified no abnormal radiation and swipe tests were performed to verify the sources were not leaking.
Gauge Model: MC-1 DRP CPN
Sources:
Cs-137 10 milliCuries
Am-241 50 milliCuries
* * * UPDATE ON 8/2/12 AT 1415 EDT FROM MARIA CORDERO TO DONG PARK * * *
At 1145 EDT on 8/1//12, a construction roller damaged the upper housing of the nuclear gauge. The RSO was notified at 1150 EDT. A Radiation Physicist Consultant from the Department of Health conducted a visual inspection and radiation surveys to verify shielding integrity. The leak tests of the two sources were negative. The authorized user placed the gauge in a shipping case for storage in the company area. The gauge will be returned to the manufacture for repairs.
Notified R1DO (Krohn) and FSME Events Resource via email.