Event Notification Report for July 20, 2012

UNIT 2 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE DUE TO MISSING FLOOD CONTROL BARRIER SEAL

"D5 and D6 Diesel Generators (DG) were declared inoperable at 1400 CDT due to a missing internal flood control barrier seal. The missing flood control barrier seal is required to be installed with Unit 2 in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 when the MSIV's are open.

"LCO 3.8.1 Condition B was entered for both DGs and LCO 3.8.1 Condition E was entered for two DGs inoperable on the same unit. The DGs could start and run if required at the time of entry.

"This condition is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"At 1505 CDT the missing internal flood barrier seal was verified in place restoring the safety function. LCO 3.8.1 Condition B and E were exited.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."

At this time, it is not known how long the seals had been missing. An investigation is on-going.

ANTICIPATORY LOSS OF SPDS AND ERDS DUE TO POSSIBLE LOSS OF INTEGRATED PLANT COMPUTER SYSTEM DURING TROUBLESHOOTING

"Beginning July 20, 2012, at approximately 2230, troubleshooting of MUX A components and fiber optic cables on the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) will be performed. A loss of IPCS during the troubleshooting is possible.

"The Safety Parameters Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) reside on the IPCS platform and will be out of service if IPCS is lost. These systems would be unavailable to the Control Room and all other Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs). During this time dose assessment capability would only be available in the manual data input mode. The majority of the Control Room indications will remain available to the plant staff, and would be used for emergency response, if needed. Information would be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems as needed. A follow-up notification will be submitted when the IPCS troubleshooting is complete.

"This notification is being made per the requirements of 8 Hour Non-Emergency Notification 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM BRETT JEBBIA TO VINCE KLCO ON 7/24/2012 AT 2243 EDT * * *

"Troubleshooting and repairs have been completed to the Fermi 2 Integrated Plant Computer System (IPCS) as of July 24, 2012 at 1855 [EDT]. No loss of communication ability occurred from initial notification while repairs and restoration were in progress. Event 48123 is retracted.

"[The initial anticipatory] notification was made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R3DO (Bloomer).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT- 12 MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGNS

The Iowa Department of Public Health provided a preliminary notification that 11 or 12 tritium exit signs are missing from a Bed Bath and Beyond store in Council Bluffs Iowa. The store has replaced all its tritium exit signs with LED exit signs. The tritium exit signs were removed by an electrical subcontractor specifically instructed to keep the removed signs segregated for special disposal by Shaw Industries. The removed tritium exit signs could not be located when Shaw arrived at the store to package and ship the signs. A representative for the store believes that either the signs were mixed with fluorescent lights that were being sent to a separate recycling facility or that the subcontractor may have inadvertently disposed of the tritium signs at an unknown location. The fluorescent light recycling facility has been contacted but was unable to find any evidence that the signs were sent to their location.

The tritium exit signs were generally licensed with a nominal activity of 11.5 curies each. The sign manufacturer was Shield Source.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source