Event Notification Report for June 27, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/26/2012 - 06/27/2012
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48051
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL BACKUS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DANIEL BACKUS
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 06/27/2012
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2012
Event Time: 14:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2012
Notification Time: 17:10 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2012
Event Time: 14:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SUCTION PIPE VOIDING
"On 06/27/2012, it was identified that a void existed in the common suction header for Safety Injection. The void was of the size such that operability was maintained. However, this was nonconforming to the Kewaunee Power Station licensing basis.
"At 1446 on 06/27/2012, the Kewaunee Power Station declared both Safety Injection Train A and Safety Injection Train B Inoperable due to venting of the common suction line to remove the void. LCO 3.0.3 was entered as directed by LCO 3.5.2. ECCS Operating. This loss of safety function is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The void in question has been reduced to an acceptable size with the common Safety Injection suction piping full. Both Safety Injection Train A and Safety Injection Train B have been restored to Operable status and LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 1500 on 06/27/2012."
The condition was detected by ultrasonic testing as part of a surveillance for RHR pump and valve testing.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"On 06/27/2012, it was identified that a void existed in the common suction header for Safety Injection. The void was of the size such that operability was maintained. However, this was nonconforming to the Kewaunee Power Station licensing basis.
"At 1446 on 06/27/2012, the Kewaunee Power Station declared both Safety Injection Train A and Safety Injection Train B Inoperable due to venting of the common suction line to remove the void. LCO 3.0.3 was entered as directed by LCO 3.5.2. ECCS Operating. This loss of safety function is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The void in question has been reduced to an acceptable size with the common Safety Injection suction piping full. Both Safety Injection Train A and Safety Injection Train B have been restored to Operable status and LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 1500 on 06/27/2012."
The condition was detected by ultrasonic testing as part of a surveillance for RHR pump and valve testing.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48052
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: ANDREW ZUCHOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: ANDREW ZUCHOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 06/27/2012
Notification Time: 20:16 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2012
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2012
Notification Time: 20:16 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2012
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
ANNE DeFRANCISCO (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF AN EMERGENCY SIREN
"At 1630 EST, Exelon was notified by the NJ State OEM (Office of Emergency Management) that Oyster Creek Emergency Preparedness Siren #25, located in Harvey Cedars, NJ, was inadvertently actuated at 0209 EST and sounded for a period of 2-3 minutes. The siren was inadvertently actuated by Atlantic City Electric when restoring power to the siren. No actual plant emergency existed. Siren #25 and all other of the 42 sirens remain functional. No other reportability thresholds have been met or exceeded. State and local authorities were also notified."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1630 EST, Exelon was notified by the NJ State OEM (Office of Emergency Management) that Oyster Creek Emergency Preparedness Siren #25, located in Harvey Cedars, NJ, was inadvertently actuated at 0209 EST and sounded for a period of 2-3 minutes. The siren was inadvertently actuated by Atlantic City Electric when restoring power to the siren. No actual plant emergency existed. Siren #25 and all other of the 42 sirens remain functional. No other reportability thresholds have been met or exceeded. State and local authorities were also notified."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48053
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSS PARKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSS PARKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 06/28/2012
Notification Time: 01:06 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2012
Event Time: 20:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2012
Notification Time: 01:06 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2012
Event Time: 20:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
NICK VALOS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO 100% LOAD REJECT
"Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip was actuated due to indications of a 100% Load Rejection. The cause of the Load Rejection is not known at this time. All Control Rods are fully inserted. The RCS is being cooled by forced flow (reactor coolant pumps). Secondary heat sink is being provided by the condenser steam dumps utilizing the main feedwater system. The auxiliary feedwater system actuated based on low steam generator level, but has since been secured. There were no unexpected (inconsistent with nature of trip) pressure or level transients. Off site power remains available. No release occurred nor is ongoing. Emergency Core Cooling Systems did not actuate. No unexpected isolations occurred. Emergency Plan entry was not required."
The plant is stable at normal temperature and pressure. The electrical system is in a normal offsite power alignment. The Unit 2 Reactor Trip had no effect on Unit 1 which continues to operate at 100% power.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ERIC SONNENBERG TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2337 EDT ON 7/6/12 * * *
"On June 27, 2012 at 2046 CDT, a Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip was initiated in anticipation of an automatic turbine trip due to operators noticing the turbine governor valves closing and turbine load reduction. It was originally reported that the cause was not known. This notification is updated to provide information to the cause of the load reduction.
"Troubleshooting has shown that the reduction of turbine load was due to a turbine speed channel card failing in the turbine control system. The card failure resulted in sending the auxiliary governor in the turbine control system an incorrect indicated overspeed condition and throttling the turbine governor valves to reduce the turbine speed. There was no actual turbine overspeed condition.
"The auxiliary governor is not part of the reactor protection system. No reactor protection setpoints were exceeded.
All other plant systems functioned as required, including the Reactor Protection System. All control rods fully inserted into the core due to the manual reactor trip. There was no Emergency Core Cooling System actuation. No Emergency Diesel Generators were started and power continued to be supplied from off site. The reactor coolant system had forced circulation and the condenser steam dumps were used for decay heat removal from the steam generators."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Daley).
"Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip was actuated due to indications of a 100% Load Rejection. The cause of the Load Rejection is not known at this time. All Control Rods are fully inserted. The RCS is being cooled by forced flow (reactor coolant pumps). Secondary heat sink is being provided by the condenser steam dumps utilizing the main feedwater system. The auxiliary feedwater system actuated based on low steam generator level, but has since been secured. There were no unexpected (inconsistent with nature of trip) pressure or level transients. Off site power remains available. No release occurred nor is ongoing. Emergency Core Cooling Systems did not actuate. No unexpected isolations occurred. Emergency Plan entry was not required."
The plant is stable at normal temperature and pressure. The electrical system is in a normal offsite power alignment. The Unit 2 Reactor Trip had no effect on Unit 1 which continues to operate at 100% power.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM ERIC SONNENBERG TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2337 EDT ON 7/6/12 * * *
"On June 27, 2012 at 2046 CDT, a Unit 2 Manual Reactor Trip was initiated in anticipation of an automatic turbine trip due to operators noticing the turbine governor valves closing and turbine load reduction. It was originally reported that the cause was not known. This notification is updated to provide information to the cause of the load reduction.
"Troubleshooting has shown that the reduction of turbine load was due to a turbine speed channel card failing in the turbine control system. The card failure resulted in sending the auxiliary governor in the turbine control system an incorrect indicated overspeed condition and throttling the turbine governor valves to reduce the turbine speed. There was no actual turbine overspeed condition.
"The auxiliary governor is not part of the reactor protection system. No reactor protection setpoints were exceeded.
All other plant systems functioned as required, including the Reactor Protection System. All control rods fully inserted into the core due to the manual reactor trip. There was no Emergency Core Cooling System actuation. No Emergency Diesel Generators were started and power continued to be supplied from off site. The reactor coolant system had forced circulation and the condenser steam dumps were used for decay heat removal from the steam generators."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Daley).