Event Notification Report for June 05, 2012

FLORIDA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE

The following information was obtained from the state of Florida via email:

"First quarter 2012 whole body dosimeter badge for a nuclear med tech indicated a 10.5 Rem dose. Badge was recounted and the dose remained the same. Dose is not confirmed by ancillary ring dosimeters. Ring dosimeters indicate a typical 100 mR/month. Because the ring dosimeters do not confirm the badge dose, the consulting health physicist does not think this is a valid dose and the med tech is still working. Florida is investigating."

The isotope used by the medical technician is Tc-99, 30 mCi.

Florida Incident Number: FL12-049

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER FILTER TRAIN INOPERABLE

"At approximately 5:02 a.m. CDT on June 5, 2012, during scheduled test of the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system, it was determined that the system would not function in the emergency mode. The plant is currently in cold shutdown for a maintenance outage.

"The activity was terminated and the TSC ventilation system was restored to its normal configuration. This failure caused the TSC to be potentially uninhabitable, and thus it could not have been relied upon for the purposes of the site Emergency Plan. Repairs and retest of the system were successfully completed at approximately 11:30 a.m. CDT.

"This condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The suction damper to the filter train failed to open which led the licensee to declare the filter train inoperable.

DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The gauge operator finished with a density reading and left the Troxler device at the measurement area when he was storing his tools in his truck. When he was returning to the measurement area, an end-loader drove over the Troxler, destroying the hand operating pad. At the time of the accident, the source was retracted into the shield. Immediately after the accident, the operator covered the gauge with shielding and established a boundary zone. No overexposures or contaminations are expected as the sources were retracted into the shielded position.

The Troxler is a model 3430 which contains 40 mCi of Am-241 and 8 mCi of Cs-137. The licensee is conferring with Troxler to determine whether the gauge will be repaired or returned for disposal.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

LOST SEALED SOURCES

The following was reported from the state via e-mail:

"During a routine six-month inventory, the licensee was unable to locate four (4) sealed sources, of which one has an activity that exceeds exempt quantities. The last known person using the sources was contacted on June 5, 2012 to determine if they were in his possession. He indicated that the previous x-ray RSO had found them and returned them to the source locker. However, the former x-ray RSO indicated that in-fact he did not locate the sources. Management and the materials RSO was notified and an investigation was initiated.

"All staff members were questioned and asked to check around their work areas. The assistant RSO checked all devices, pigs, the source cabinet and surveyed the entire facility, including shipping and receiving, with a micro-R survey meter. None of the sources were located on any disposal or transfer records.

"The sources were used in a prototype instrument called Plombix, designed to operate with an exempt source in the shape of a washer, and were used only for in house experiments. The missing sources were designed for this prototype instrument and do not fit all other instruments at this facility.

"Washington Department of Health corrective action is pending.

"The Assistant RSO indicated that sufficient controls are not in place to maintain control of sources stored outside the source locker, and that a single company source custodian will be assigned for all sources.

"Source Number: 1;
Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE M & D;
Radionuclide: CD-109, 0.000000194 Ci, 0.000007178 GBq;
Manufacturer: ISOTOPE PRODUCTS LAB;
Model Number: MISC-IND;
Serial Number: 1112-35.

"Source Number: 2;
Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE M & D;
Radionuclide: CD-109, 0.000064 Ci, 0.002368 GBq;
Manufacturer: ISOTOPE PRODUCTS LAB;
Model Number: MISC-IND;
Serial Number: D1-472.

"Source Number: 3;
Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE M & D ;
Radionuclide: CO-57, 0.000005 Ci, 0.000185 GBq;
Manufacturer: ISOTOPE PRODUCTS LAB;
Model Number: RFQ482-3;
Serial Number: C9-333.

"Source Number: 4;
Source/Radioactive Material: SEALED SOURCE M & D;
Radionuclide: CO-57, 0.000000122 Ci 0.000004514 GBq;
Manufacturer: ISOTOPE PRODUCTS LAB;
Model Number: MISC-IND;
Serial Number: 1096-28.

"Reference Number: WA-12-047"

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

PREVIOUSLY STOLEN SOURCE HOLDER LOCATED IN A SCRAP YARD

The following information was received by facsimile:

"On June 5, 2012, US NRC Region I communicated with [Caribbean Marine Contractors, Corp] to notify that Ronan Measurement RLL-1 SN #206762A registered on behalf of Caribbean Marine Contractors had been found in a scrap yard in Taiwan. Immediately, we started doing our investigations to verify whether the RLL-1 found in Taiwan was ours. We proceeded to look in our storage container for the RLL-1. Noticing the absence of RLL-1, we talked to company personnel who regularly entered the storage container and everyone questioned arrived at this conclusion.

"Approximately two years ago, Caribbean Marine was doing work of dredging in the town of Guayama, PR. We stopped the work of dredging and we were doing preventive maintenance to the marine equipment (washing with fresh water, removing rust, paint, etc.). [A manager] who at that time was in charge of the project gave the order to take the RLL-1 that was not working out of the dredge and store it in the storage container of the project. Weeks later, thieves broke in the container and stole the metals that were inside. Usually metals lead them to recycling centers and sold by weight. These recycling centers in turn sold the material to Taiwan or India. That [is the] way we understand that you found the RLL-1 #206762A in Taiwan.

"The Ronan ultra-low level series of source holders (RLL) use very small quantities of radioactive materials. The RLL-1 is permitted to contain to a maximum of 900 microCuries of cesium-137 or 200 microCuries cobalt-60. The radioactive material is completely encapsulated in a stainless steel capsule, which is then heli-arc or laser welded closed. Due to high structural integrity, these source capsules qualify as special material form; virtually eliminating the possibility of the spread of radioactive contaminant. The sealed capsules are loaded into the RLL-1 device. This is a stainless steel tube that is welded shut at both ends and installed inside a shielded, steel housing. The general licensee is not permitted to repair, modify, or otherwise tamper with the device or its shielding. The combination of high structural integrity and low source quantity permits the general licensee to install and commission the device without special training or certification. The general licensee is required to install and operate the gage in accordance with the instructions provided by Ronan Engineering. The RLL-1 device is not required to be wipe tested and there is no shutter or moving parts that have to be periodically inspected or maintained. Important Exception The RLL-1 device is required to be tested every three years if it contains a single wipe capsule in excess of 100 microCuries. If a leak test is required, to stainless steel tag will be permanently affixed to the device stating. 'Leak Test Required'.

"Iso distance curves are provided in this manual for various applications as specified in the table below:
Application Drawing Number
Weight Gages C-16307-K and C-16310-K
Continuous Level Gages B-16306-K and C-16309-K
Density / Point Level Gages B-16305-K and B-16308-K

"These curves indicate that the maximum dose rate, at one foot, from any device is less than 0.5 mR/h. Most of these devices require (as a conservative estimate) less than 1 hour of handling to install. Based upon these low dose rates and the short period of time required for handling/installation it is unlikely that any personnel would receive a significant exposure. In fact, it can be safely assumed that working personnel will receive considerably less than 10 percent (10%) of the dose limits specified in column IV of 10 CFR 32.24, for the appropriate organs, and less than ten percent of the dose limits specified in 10 CFR 20.1201(a)."


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "NOT RECORDED" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LAB AREA CONTAMINATED

The following report was received via fax:

"On 06/06/12, the ARSO [Assistant Radiation Safety Officer] at UC Berkeley contacted the RHB [Radiological Health Branch] to report an event that occurred on 06/05/12. This event involved contamination caused by a Cs-137 source that is not a sealed source per manufacturer's statement. This source has a very thin window to permit transmission of betas. This source was used in a vacuum chamber and the contamination occurred and was detected when researchers were changing the flange. The licensee cordoned off a 6' x 10' area within a much larger lab. No floor contamination was detected, however, the bench and some equipment within the cordoned off area are still being cleaned. Access to this area was restricted for over 24 hours. The current activity of the source is 950 microCuries. Applying conservative assumptions to convert the detected contamination counts into activity, the licensee has come up with a total activity on the order of 10 microCuries (summed over the contaminated spots).

"The licensee notified the RHB within 24 hours, since the area was cordoned off for more than 24 hours, however, the activity detected is minimal per 30295(b)(1)(B) where the involved quantity is less than 5 times the lowest ALI specified in Appendix B 10 CFR 20 incorporated by reference in section 30253. Also, since this is not a sealed source, the reporting criteria for leakage of more than 0.005 microCuries does not apply. Based on these criteria, no reporting is required."

California incident: 060612

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source