Event Notification Report for June 01, 2012

UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO A BOMB THREAT

Two individuals (one male and one female) drove up to the site security gate and stated they had a bomb in the vehicle (Jeep Cherokee). LLEA was notified and responded to the site. The two individuals are in custody and the Raleigh Police bomb squad is enroute to the site. The site is in a heightened level of security.

Notified DHS, NICC, and FEMA.

* * * UPDATE AT 1544 EDT ON 6/1/2012 FROM ALLISON HARKEY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The Unusual Event was terminated at 1530 EDT on 6/1/2012. The vehicle search did not find a bomb and the two individuals are in custody.

Notified the R2DO (Vias), NRR EO (Chernoff), DHS, NICC, and FEMA.

CABLE ROUTING ERROR COULD FAIL DC CONTROL POWER TO SHUTDOWN BOARD IN A FIRE

"During NFPA 805 transition reviews, a cable routing error has been identified that would fail the DC control power to credited 4kV Shutdown Board 3EA for an Appendix R fire in Fire Area 23.

"Cable 3B181 provides alternate DC Control Power to 4kV Shutdown Board 3EA from Battery Board 2. Cable 3B181 is routed in Fire Area 23. However, cable 3B181 is not identified as being in Fire Area 23 in Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) calculation EDQ099920030037, Appendix R Computerized Separation Analysis. This error allowed the analysis to credit alternate DC Control Power to 4kV Shutdown Board 3EA. The normal DC Control Power to 4kV Shutdown Board 3EA is not available in the event of an Appendix R fire in Fire Area 23. The routing error results in the credited 4kV Shutdown Board 3EA being unable to perform its function for Fire Area 23 Appendix R fires due to both the associated normal and alternate DC Control Power cables being routed In Fire Area 23. The failure of 4kV Shutdown Board 3EA could result in a loss of power to credited safe shutdown equipment that would challenge the ability to provide adequate core cooling during performance of BFN Safe Shutdown Instructions.

"Compensatory actions in the form of fire watches to mitigate this condition are in place in accordance with the BFNP Fire Protection Report.

"This event is reportable as an 8 hour notification to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR 50,72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This is also reportable as a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST NI-63 ELECTRON CAPTURE DETECTOR

On June 1, 2012, the licensee reported a lost Ni-63 electron capture detector (ECD) to the state of Oregon. The source is an Agilent Technology model 19233, serial number L5286 and was used in a gas chromatograph (GC) device. The source was obtained in April of 2006. The last time the source was known to be in possession of the licensee was during a 6-month wipe test performed on November 1, 2011.

The gas chromatograph was sent to Far West Fiber Metal Recycling around the first of the year and it is possible the source was in the machine at the time of disposal. The licensee will continue to search for the source. The state of Oregon will follow-up with the licensee.

* * * UPDATE ON 1/9/13 AT 1218 EST FROM DARYL LEON TO HUFFMAN * * *

The following update was received from the State of Oregon Radiation Protection Services via facsimile:

"Inspection/investigation at TestAmerica Analytical Testing Corporation (TAATC) site performed on June 14, 2012. Missing ECD device not located, believe to have been housed inside a gas chromatograph (Hewlett-Packard model 5890, serial number 3033A30613) that was turned over to Far West Fiber Metal Recycling on December 5, 2011. All other ECD devices (25) were accounted for during the inspection.

"Discussion with Far West on June 4, 2012 indicates that metal items received are held for downstream customers for two weeks and then turned over to them for stripping/smelting. Far West had no record of receipt of the GC/ECD or which customer it may have gone to. Checks were made with local firms (Schnitzer Steel and Metro Metals) but no record of the GC/ECD unit receipt was located. TAATC continued to search for ECD unit for several months but it was not found. Believe ECD was smelted with GC at this time.

"Cause of this event due to management deficiency. RSO was moved to new position in November 2011 and out of room where ECD unit located and was training replacement person to perform some RSO duties (6-month leak testing/inventory) for ECD's. Missing ECD was housed in GC unit that was not used for 4 years and GC was used for spare parts. An employee of TAATC not listed on the materials license and unfamiliar with GC/ECD's removed 3 GC units from the room on December 5th and delivered to Far West Fiber for recycling, including the GC unit that normally housed the ECD in question. The other GC's did not house ECD's. The RSO and his trainee were unaware of the missing ECD until June 1, 2012 during routine 6-month leak testing nor was the RSO aware of the GC transfer since RSO works in a different area on site and do not routinely monitor ECD locations anymore.

"No other actions available at this time. The State of Oregon is closing this event."

Notified the R4DO (Gaddy) and e-mailed FSME Events Resource.

OREGON NMED REPORT NUMBER 120345


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING Sr-90 SOURCE IDENTIFIED DURING STATE INSPECTION

"The facility is a General License: 056-0600-0G that went out of business effective June 1, 2012. [North Carolina State] did an inspection on June 11, 2013 and [the licensee] had no records of inventory or sources or records of disposal. [The state] was able to determine from [state] records that [the licensee] had disposed of all sources except one on [the licensee's] inventory dated 6/13/1995. [The missing device contains] a Sr-90 [source] with a less than 25 micro Curie source, S/N 49874, that was purchased from CMI. [The state] called CMI and the RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] did not have any records of [the device] being disposed. The source is lost and missing so [the state] is filing this incident with the NRC today."

North Carolina Incident Report Number: 13-12. The state considers this incident to be closed.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf