Event Notification Report for May 22, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/21/2012 - 05/22/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
479474794847949479504795148025479414794247945
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47947
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BETH JENKINS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BETH JENKINS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 05/22/2012
Notification Time: 17:53 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 10:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2012
Notification Time: 17:53 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 10:55 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At 1055 hours [CDT] on 5/22/2012, a through-wall leak was discovered on the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) inlet drain pot piping. This is a safety-related, ASME Code Class 2 piping. Dresden Technical Requirements Manual 3.4.a, Condition B requires the leak to be isolated which renders the HPCI system inoperable. The Unit 2 HPCI system was isolated and declared inoperable at 1141 CDT and Technical Specification 3.5.1 condition G was entered.
"The event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1055 hours [CDT] on 5/22/2012, a through-wall leak was discovered on the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) inlet drain pot piping. This is a safety-related, ASME Code Class 2 piping. Dresden Technical Requirements Manual 3.4.a, Condition B requires the leak to be isolated which renders the HPCI system inoperable. The Unit 2 HPCI system was isolated and declared inoperable at 1141 CDT and Technical Specification 3.5.1 condition G was entered.
"The event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47948
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK IHLENFELDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK IHLENFELDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 05/22/2012
Notification Time: 19:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 17:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2012
Notification Time: 19:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 17:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO LOSS OF AMERTAP BALLS
"On May 22, 2012 it was determined that more than 20% (3 of 8 barrels) of the Amertap balls used for condenser cleaning on May 18, 2012 were not able to be recovered by normal means. Observers were stationed at the discharge structure during the process and it is not believed that balls were released to the river. The current agreement with the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency dated September 12, 2008, requires XCEL Energy to make a report to the MPCA whenever more than 20% (1.5 barrels or approximately 7,500 balls) of the Amertap balls are not recovered. The MPCA was notified May 22, 2012."
Approximately, 15,000 Amertap balls have not been recovered by the normal strainer system and may be in the discharge canal. The licensee is investigating the cause of the event.
The NRC Resident Inspector, Wright County Sheriffs Department, and Sherburne County Sheriffs Department have been notified.
"On May 22, 2012 it was determined that more than 20% (3 of 8 barrels) of the Amertap balls used for condenser cleaning on May 18, 2012 were not able to be recovered by normal means. Observers were stationed at the discharge structure during the process and it is not believed that balls were released to the river. The current agreement with the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency dated September 12, 2008, requires XCEL Energy to make a report to the MPCA whenever more than 20% (1.5 barrels or approximately 7,500 balls) of the Amertap balls are not recovered. The MPCA was notified May 22, 2012."
Approximately, 15,000 Amertap balls have not been recovered by the normal strainer system and may be in the discharge canal. The licensee is investigating the cause of the event.
The NRC Resident Inspector, Wright County Sheriffs Department, and Sherburne County Sheriffs Department have been notified.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47949
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN KEMPKES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN KEMPKES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 05/22/2012
Notification Time: 22:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 16:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2012
Notification Time: 22:29 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 16:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/19/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNANALYZED CONDITION IDENTIFIED DURING A FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW
"During a review of non-compliances with Appendix R that are being resolved as part of the NFPA 805, Risk Informed Fire Protection Transition, it was identified that a non-compliant operator manual action to manually backwash the cooling water strainers was identified in several fire areas, but the need to manually backwash the strainers may be required in other fire areas not previously identified. For Fire Areas 25, 30, 31, 38, 66, 109, and 117 power to the cooling water strainer central control panel could be affected which could require the need to perform a manual backwash of the strainers. Manual backwash of the cooling water strainers has not been established as an alternate compensatory measure for Fire Area 25, 30, 31, 38, 66, 109 and 117.
"Manual operator actions that are required to recover functionality of a system that is credited to achieve and maintain hot safe shutdown for a fire in a III.G.1 or III.G.2 fire area are indicative of a missing fire barrier.
"The lack of established alternate compensatory measures is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii).
"Compensatory measures have been established by verifying fire detection in the affected areas is functional with an hourly fire watch established in accordance with site procedures."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1708 EDT ON 7/19/12 FROM STEVE SCHMIDT TO HUFFMAN * * *
"An eight hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) was reported on May 22, 2012 for a non-Compliant manual operator action to backwash the cooling water strainers in several fire areas not previously identified.
"Subsequent analysis determined that the process of removing sufficient decay heat to achieve and maintain cold shutdown does allow the use of repair actions. Since Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) can be in the process of removing sufficient decay heat to reach cold shutdown conditions in much less than 15 hours there is significant margin to show this action is acceptable as a cold shutdown action and is in compliance with the requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G.
"Therefore, the action is not a non-compliant operator manual action and EN 47949 is retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed." R3DO (Kozak) notified.
"During a review of non-compliances with Appendix R that are being resolved as part of the NFPA 805, Risk Informed Fire Protection Transition, it was identified that a non-compliant operator manual action to manually backwash the cooling water strainers was identified in several fire areas, but the need to manually backwash the strainers may be required in other fire areas not previously identified. For Fire Areas 25, 30, 31, 38, 66, 109, and 117 power to the cooling water strainer central control panel could be affected which could require the need to perform a manual backwash of the strainers. Manual backwash of the cooling water strainers has not been established as an alternate compensatory measure for Fire Area 25, 30, 31, 38, 66, 109 and 117.
"Manual operator actions that are required to recover functionality of a system that is credited to achieve and maintain hot safe shutdown for a fire in a III.G.1 or III.G.2 fire area are indicative of a missing fire barrier.
"The lack of established alternate compensatory measures is being reported as an unanalyzed condition as defined by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii).
"Compensatory measures have been established by verifying fire detection in the affected areas is functional with an hourly fire watch established in accordance with site procedures."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1708 EDT ON 7/19/12 FROM STEVE SCHMIDT TO HUFFMAN * * *
"An eight hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) was reported on May 22, 2012 for a non-Compliant manual operator action to backwash the cooling water strainers in several fire areas not previously identified.
"Subsequent analysis determined that the process of removing sufficient decay heat to achieve and maintain cold shutdown does allow the use of repair actions. Since Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) can be in the process of removing sufficient decay heat to reach cold shutdown conditions in much less than 15 hours there is significant margin to show this action is acceptable as a cold shutdown action and is in compliance with the requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G.
"Therefore, the action is not a non-compliant operator manual action and EN 47949 is retracted.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed." R3DO (Kozak) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47950
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK IHIENFELDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: MARK IHIENFELDT
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 05/22/2012
Notification Time: 22:31 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 17:32 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2012
Notification Time: 22:31 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 17:32 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FIFTY-EIGHT SIRENS WERE NOT FUNCTIONAL IN WRIGHT COUNTY MINNESOTA
"On May 22, 2012 at 1732 [CDT] Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant [MNGP] was notified by the Wright County siren vendor of an equipment malfunction with the siren activation system. Due to this issue, they are unable to activate any sirens in Wright County. The vendor discovered the issue during the completion of siren work in the county today. The vendor requested the dispatcher to issue a cancel test. The cancel test did not work. The issue is affecting both the primary and back up activation systems. The vendor will be following up until the issue is resolved. 58 sirens are impacted. The vendor anticipates investigation and repairs to be completed this evening. A compensatory measure, route alerting, is in place. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"MNGP was notified by the vendor at 2120 [CDT] on 5/22/2012 that the issue had been resolved and the sirens are now functional."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"On May 22, 2012 at 1732 [CDT] Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant [MNGP] was notified by the Wright County siren vendor of an equipment malfunction with the siren activation system. Due to this issue, they are unable to activate any sirens in Wright County. The vendor discovered the issue during the completion of siren work in the county today. The vendor requested the dispatcher to issue a cancel test. The cancel test did not work. The issue is affecting both the primary and back up activation systems. The vendor will be following up until the issue is resolved. 58 sirens are impacted. The vendor anticipates investigation and repairs to be completed this evening. A compensatory measure, route alerting, is in place. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"MNGP was notified by the vendor at 2120 [CDT] on 5/22/2012 that the issue had been resolved and the sirens are now functional."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47951
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PATRICK HAARHOFF
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PATRICK HAARHOFF
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 05/23/2012
Notification Time: 09:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 10:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2012
Notification Time: 09:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 10:13 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
DAVID HILLS (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FITNESS FOR DUTY - PERSONNEL ACCESS DENIED
"On May 22, 2012, at approximately 1013 hours CDT, access was denied to an individual who is licensed under Part 10 CFR Part 55 to operate a power reactor. The denial was due to the individual violating the company's Fitness for Duty policy.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On May 22, 2012, at approximately 1013 hours CDT, access was denied to an individual who is licensed under Part 10 CFR Part 55 to operate a power reactor. The denial was due to the individual violating the company's Fitness for Duty policy.
"This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Agreement State
Event Number: 48025
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 4
City: BENICIA State: CA
County:
License #: 6720-48
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: TEAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
Region: 4
City: BENICIA State: CA
County:
License #: 6720-48
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 06/14/2012
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2012
Notification Time: 13:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/14/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
RYAN LANTZ (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - CAMERA SOURCE FAILS TO RETRACT
The agreement State of California reported the following via email:
"On 06/13/12, the RSO at Team Industrial contacted RHB to report a radiography camera incident that occurred on 05/22/12 at the Evergreen refinery in Newalk, CA. The radiographers were using a QSA 880 camera on the second deck of the unit 1 at this refinery. The radiographer cranked the 59 Ci source out into the collimator and after the exposure, he couldn't retrieve the source back into the shielded position. He immediately contacted the RSO. Per RSO's instructions, the radiographer unscrewed the crank assembly and pulled the cable back to retrieve the source into shielded position. There were no exposures to the radiographers, two assistants, and any member of the public. The licensee's Instadose dosimetry indicated 8 mR for the radiographer for the period of 5/18 - 5/22 and 7 mR and 0 mR for the two assistants for the same period. Their pocket dosimeters indicated zero exposure for all three individuals.
"The crank assembly was sent to QSA and they have indicted that the worn out teeth and bearings of the crank assembly inhibited the normal retrieval of the source.
"RSO will be providing a detailed report to RHB ASAP."
CA 5010 Number: 061312
Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
The agreement State of California reported the following via email:
"On 06/13/12, the RSO at Team Industrial contacted RHB to report a radiography camera incident that occurred on 05/22/12 at the Evergreen refinery in Newalk, CA. The radiographers were using a QSA 880 camera on the second deck of the unit 1 at this refinery. The radiographer cranked the 59 Ci source out into the collimator and after the exposure, he couldn't retrieve the source back into the shielded position. He immediately contacted the RSO. Per RSO's instructions, the radiographer unscrewed the crank assembly and pulled the cable back to retrieve the source into shielded position. There were no exposures to the radiographers, two assistants, and any member of the public. The licensee's Instadose dosimetry indicated 8 mR for the radiographer for the period of 5/18 - 5/22 and 7 mR and 0 mR for the two assistants for the same period. Their pocket dosimeters indicated zero exposure for all three individuals.
"The crank assembly was sent to QSA and they have indicted that the worn out teeth and bearings of the crank assembly inhibited the normal retrieval of the source.
"RSO will be providing a detailed report to RHB ASAP."
CA 5010 Number: 061312
Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47941
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK ARNOSKY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MARK ARNOSKY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/22/2012
Notification Time: 07:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 06:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2012
Notification Time: 07:24 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 06:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE SIREN MALFUNCTION
"The MCR [Main Control Room] at Limerick Generating Station was informed by PEMA [Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency] that EPZ [Emergency Planning Zone] siren #129 located at Maryland and Western avenues in Chester County was sounding. The siren maintenance contractor was contacted to silence and repair the siren. No plant emergency exists. The siren activation was caused by an equipment malfunction. The remaining sirens in the EPZ remain functional. An 'Event of Potential Public Interest' will be issued for this problem."
The NRC Resident Inspector, the State, and local officials will be notified of the siren malfunction. The state is expected to issue a press release.
* * * RETRACTION AT 0758 ON 5/22/2012 FROM MARK ARNOSKY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The siren was not an EPZ siren but rather a local fire house siren. Therefore, the licensee is retracting this event.
Notified the R1DO (Trapp).
"The MCR [Main Control Room] at Limerick Generating Station was informed by PEMA [Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency] that EPZ [Emergency Planning Zone] siren #129 located at Maryland and Western avenues in Chester County was sounding. The siren maintenance contractor was contacted to silence and repair the siren. No plant emergency exists. The siren activation was caused by an equipment malfunction. The remaining sirens in the EPZ remain functional. An 'Event of Potential Public Interest' will be issued for this problem."
The NRC Resident Inspector, the State, and local officials will be notified of the siren malfunction. The state is expected to issue a press release.
* * * RETRACTION AT 0758 ON 5/22/2012 FROM MARK ARNOSKY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
The siren was not an EPZ siren but rather a local fire house siren. Therefore, the licensee is retracting this event.
Notified the R1DO (Trapp).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47942
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CHRISTENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CHRISTENSEN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 05/22/2012
Notification Time: 07:38 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 02:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2012
Notification Time: 07:38 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 02:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
SCOTT SHAEFFER (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | A/R | Y | 19 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC SCRAM DUE TO REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM BEING DE-ENERGIZED
"At 0249 CDT on 5/22/2012, Unit 3 reactor automatically scrammed due to de-energization of Reactor Protection System (RPS) from actuation of 3A Unit Station Service Transformer (USST) differential relay 387SA, which resulted in a loss of 500KV power to Unit 3. This relay was picked up during a transfer of 4KV Unit Board 3C from alternate power (161KV) to normal power (3A USST). Investigation is in progress as to the cause of relay actuation. 500KV power was restored through the alternate feeder breakers from 161KV to all Unit 3 4KV Unit Boards successfully. 161KV remained available during the entire event. Loss of 500KV power lasted less than 30 seconds and power has been restored to all safety related boards. All Unit 3 diesel generators successfully started and tied to their respective 4KV Shutdown Boards.
"All safety systems responded as expected to the loss of 500KV power. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) reactor water level initiation set points were reached. RCIC was manually started to control reactor water level. Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) and PCIS initiation signals for groups 1, 2, 3, 6 & 8 were received as designed. At the time of the scram, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was tagged out for removal of temporary instrumentation following planned maintenance.
"This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation'. It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"At 0249 CDT on 5/22/2012, Unit 3 reactor automatically scrammed due to de-energization of Reactor Protection System (RPS) from actuation of 3A Unit Station Service Transformer (USST) differential relay 387SA, which resulted in a loss of 500KV power to Unit 3. This relay was picked up during a transfer of 4KV Unit Board 3C from alternate power (161KV) to normal power (3A USST). Investigation is in progress as to the cause of relay actuation. 500KV power was restored through the alternate feeder breakers from 161KV to all Unit 3 4KV Unit Boards successfully. 161KV remained available during the entire event. Loss of 500KV power lasted less than 30 seconds and power has been restored to all safety related boards. All Unit 3 diesel generators successfully started and tied to their respective 4KV Shutdown Boards.
"All safety systems responded as expected to the loss of 500KV power. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) reactor water level initiation set points were reached. RCIC was manually started to control reactor water level. Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) and PCIS initiation signals for groups 1, 2, 3, 6 & 8 were received as designed. At the time of the scram, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was tagged out for removal of temporary instrumentation following planned maintenance.
"This event is reportable within 4 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation'. It is also reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47945
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOE BRACKEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOE BRACKEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 05/22/2012
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 13:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2012
Notification Time: 16:33 [ET]
Event Date: 05/22/2012
Event Time: 13:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/22/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 35 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO DEGRADING CONDENSER VACUUM
"On Tuesday, May 22, 2012 at 1311 hours [EDT], with the reactor at approximately 35% core thermal power, during a planned power reduction to support thermal backwash of the main condenser, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to degrading main condenser vacuum. The cause of the degraded vacuum is currently under investigation.
"Following the reactor scram, all rods were verified to be fully inserted and the Primary Containment Isolation System Group II (Reactor Building) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup System) actuations occurred as designed due to the expected reactor water level shrink associated with the scram signal. Standby Gas Treatment System Train 'B,' which is designed to shutdown 65 seconds after the Group II signal is received if the Standby Gas Treatment Train 'A' is in service, continued to operate until manually secured. With this exception, all other plant systems responded as designed.
"Currently reactor pressure is being maintained at 920 psig with the Mechanical Hydraulic Control System (turbine by-pass valves). Reactor water level is being maintained in normal bands with the Condensate and Feedwater System. Off-Site power is being supplied to the station by the Start-up Transformer (normal power supply for shutdown operations).
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee has notified the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency.
"On Tuesday, May 22, 2012 at 1311 hours [EDT], with the reactor at approximately 35% core thermal power, during a planned power reduction to support thermal backwash of the main condenser, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to degrading main condenser vacuum. The cause of the degraded vacuum is currently under investigation.
"Following the reactor scram, all rods were verified to be fully inserted and the Primary Containment Isolation System Group II (Reactor Building) and Group VI (Reactor Water Cleanup System) actuations occurred as designed due to the expected reactor water level shrink associated with the scram signal. Standby Gas Treatment System Train 'B,' which is designed to shutdown 65 seconds after the Group II signal is received if the Standby Gas Treatment Train 'A' is in service, continued to operate until manually secured. With this exception, all other plant systems responded as designed.
"Currently reactor pressure is being maintained at 920 psig with the Mechanical Hydraulic Control System (turbine by-pass valves). Reactor water level is being maintained in normal bands with the Condensate and Feedwater System. Off-Site power is being supplied to the station by the Start-up Transformer (normal power supply for shutdown operations).
"This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."
The licensee has notified the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency.