Event Notification Report for May 21, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/20/2012 - 05/21/2012
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47939
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAVIER HERRERA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAVIER HERRERA
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 05/21/2012
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2012
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2012
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2012
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TSC TEMPORARILY OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"The Technical Support Center (TSC) fire protection sprinkler system was isolated and tagged out to perform planned maintenance. In conjunction with the sprinkler system being isolated, the charcoal filtered fan unit for the TSC ventilation was isolated. This prevents placing the TSC ventilation system in 'incident' mode; that is, the air cannot be re-directed through the charcoal filter in an event requiring the TSC atmosphere to be filtered due to an on-site release. The TSC ventilation system remains in service providing proper temperature control to maintain the facility habitable during normal operation; however with the 'incident' mode being unavailable, it may not remain habitable during all postulated scenarios and is, therefore, considered non-functional."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Public Service Commission.
"The Technical Support Center (TSC) fire protection sprinkler system was isolated and tagged out to perform planned maintenance. In conjunction with the sprinkler system being isolated, the charcoal filtered fan unit for the TSC ventilation was isolated. This prevents placing the TSC ventilation system in 'incident' mode; that is, the air cannot be re-directed through the charcoal filter in an event requiring the TSC atmosphere to be filtered due to an on-site release. The TSC ventilation system remains in service providing proper temperature control to maintain the facility habitable during normal operation; however with the 'incident' mode being unavailable, it may not remain habitable during all postulated scenarios and is, therefore, considered non-functional."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Public Service Commission.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47940
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GARY HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GARY HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 05/21/2012
Notification Time: 18:35 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2012
Event Time: 14:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2012
Notification Time: 18:35 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2012
Event Time: 14:52 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/21/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
PATRICK HILAND (NRR)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4DO)
PATRICK HILAND (NRR)
JEFFERY GRANT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM RESULTING FROM A LOW CONDENSER VACUUM-TURBINE TRIP
"At 1452 CDT on 5/21/2012 with the reactor at 100% power, River Bend Station experienced a reactor scram resulting from an RPS actuation. Following the scram, reactor water level briefly lowered below level 3. The reactor is stable with pressure and temperature being controlled by the feed water system and main steam bypass valves, respectfully. The cause of the scram was due to a turbine trip/low condenser vacuum. The low vacuum condition resulted from a loss of non-safety related 4160V switchgear that powers two of four circulating water pumps.
"A suspected spurious Division II isolation of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) was observed. Restoration of RCIC to standby is in progress.
"A report of a fire in a manhole was received shortly after the scram . Fire Brigade was dispatched and noted a small active fire in a cable tray. The fire was extinguished with fire extinguishers. Power cables are routed through this manhole.
"The plant is conducting causal investigations to fully understand the cause of the turbine trip. As information becomes available, River Bend Station will provide additional information."
All rods are inserted, and the plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup with the exception of NNS-Switchgear 2A being deenergized. Offsite assistance was not required to extinguish the fire.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1452 CDT on 5/21/2012 with the reactor at 100% power, River Bend Station experienced a reactor scram resulting from an RPS actuation. Following the scram, reactor water level briefly lowered below level 3. The reactor is stable with pressure and temperature being controlled by the feed water system and main steam bypass valves, respectfully. The cause of the scram was due to a turbine trip/low condenser vacuum. The low vacuum condition resulted from a loss of non-safety related 4160V switchgear that powers two of four circulating water pumps.
"A suspected spurious Division II isolation of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) was observed. Restoration of RCIC to standby is in progress.
"A report of a fire in a manhole was received shortly after the scram . Fire Brigade was dispatched and noted a small active fire in a cable tray. The fire was extinguished with fire extinguishers. Power cables are routed through this manhole.
"The plant is conducting causal investigations to fully understand the cause of the turbine trip. As information becomes available, River Bend Station will provide additional information."
All rods are inserted, and the plant is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup with the exception of NNS-Switchgear 2A being deenergized. Offsite assistance was not required to extinguish the fire.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 47974
Rep Org: 3M CORPORATION
Licensee: 3M CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: SPRINGFIELD State: MO
County:
License #: 22-00057-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE LEWANDOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: 3M CORPORATION
Region: 3
City: SPRINGFIELD State: MO
County:
License #: 22-00057-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE LEWANDOWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/29/2012
Notification Time: 16:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2012
Event Time: 13:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2012
Notification Time: 16:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/21/2012
Event Time: 13:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/29/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
FSME VIA EMAIL
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
FSME VIA EMAIL
INDUSTRIAL GAUGE INOPERABLE DUE TO BENT SHUTTER
"On May 21, 2012, the shutter on an industrial thickness gauging device (NDC Infrared Systems model 102) was discovered to be bent so that when closed, it did not adequately attenuate the radiation beam from the device. The facility Radiation Safety Officer removed the gauging device from the production line and secured plate steel over the radiation source to provide supplemental shielding to the same degree as the undamaged shutter. The device was placed in secure storage pending shipment for repair.
"The device was shipped to 3M Corporate Health Physics in St. Paul, MN, on May 25, 2012. On May 29, 2012, the device was received and the shutter assembly replaced with an undamaged, spare shutter assembly. The repair was performed by [corporate radiation safety staff] under US NRC Radioactive Materials license no. 22-00057-03. The device was then returned to 3M Springfield.
"Conversations between 3M Corporate Health Physics and US NRC Region III (Geoffrey Warren) on May 29, 2012, indicated that this event is reportable under 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2).
"Location of event: 3M Springfield, 3211 East Chestnut Expressway, Springfield, MO 65802
"Isotope, quantity, chemical and physical form: Am-241, 150 milliCuries on February, 7, 1997, double encapsulated solid source (special form).
"The event resulted in no additional exposure to any individual."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
"On May 21, 2012, the shutter on an industrial thickness gauging device (NDC Infrared Systems model 102) was discovered to be bent so that when closed, it did not adequately attenuate the radiation beam from the device. The facility Radiation Safety Officer removed the gauging device from the production line and secured plate steel over the radiation source to provide supplemental shielding to the same degree as the undamaged shutter. The device was placed in secure storage pending shipment for repair.
"The device was shipped to 3M Corporate Health Physics in St. Paul, MN, on May 25, 2012. On May 29, 2012, the device was received and the shutter assembly replaced with an undamaged, spare shutter assembly. The repair was performed by [corporate radiation safety staff] under US NRC Radioactive Materials license no. 22-00057-03. The device was then returned to 3M Springfield.
"Conversations between 3M Corporate Health Physics and US NRC Region III (Geoffrey Warren) on May 29, 2012, indicated that this event is reportable under 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2).
"Location of event: 3M Springfield, 3211 East Chestnut Expressway, Springfield, MO 65802
"Isotope, quantity, chemical and physical form: Am-241, 150 milliCuries on February, 7, 1997, double encapsulated solid source (special form).
"The event resulted in no additional exposure to any individual."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source