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Event Notification Report for April 29, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/28/2012 - 04/29/2012

EVENT NUMBERS
47872

Power Reactor
Event Number: 47872
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4     State: CA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DENNIS PETERSEN
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 04/29/2012
Notification Time: 17:35 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/29/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
PART 21 GRP BY EMAIL
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
PART 21 REPORT - CONTROLLERS DID NOT MEET EMI / RFI GUIDELINES

"This report constitutes a 10 CFR Part 21 notification. On March 23, 2012, Scientech (a business unit of Curtis Wright Flow Control), sent a 10 CFR Part 21 report (Letter Number 12-09-BB) to Pacific Gas & Electric Company. Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant (DCPP) entered this report into its corrective action program on April 23, 2012. This Part 21 report identified that eight AMS286 and AMS287 hand controllers supplied to DCPP had a deviation from the purchase specification. DCPP specified the controllers to be qualified to meet electromagnetic interference (EMI) / radio frequency interference (RFI) emissions and susceptibility in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.180, Rev. 1. Contrary to this requirement, Scientech did not perform the EMI / RFI testing on the AMS286 controllers shipped to DCPP with a Certificate of Conformance to DCPP's specification. Scientech tested the AMS287 controllers, which failed some of the required testing, but were shipped to DCPP with a Certificate of Conformance nonetheless. DCPP accepted the controllers based on the Certificates of Conformance, but did not install them. Following acceptance of the controllers, DCPP identified the nonconformance with its specification, and had another vendor modify the controllers to subsequently pass required testing.

"DCPP determined the deviation could have potentially created a substantial safety hazard if the controllers were installed at DCPP. The controllers were intended to control auxiliary feedwater from the Unit 1 control room and the hot shutdown panel as part of an upcoming process control system modification. Following a postulated fire in the control room, plant shutdown would be managed from the hot shutdown panel. In this instance, radios would be used to communicate with operators at the panel. The controllers would be susceptible to EMI/RFI interference and could potentially affect the operators' ability the safely shut down the plant and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. DCPP notified Scientech of this conclusion on 4/27/12."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.